Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
 E2:Dijn:214—On Man.     Bk.XIV:2:3—G-D and Man.
Circulated - 1673 
Posthumously Published - 1677

Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677

IntroductionPurpose  -  Spinozistic Ideas
 Mark Twain & Spinoza
The Ethics:   Part I  -  Part II  -  Part III  -  Part IV  -  Part V
Spinozistic Glossary and Index  

JBY Notes:

1.  The text is the 1883 translation of the  "The Ethics"  by R. H. M.
     Elwes, as printed
by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number.  

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }.    G-D   
   Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here. 

6.  Please e-mail errors, clarification requests, disagreement, or 
     suggestions to 

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read
on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively       Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its          EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze. 

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions,
or best, study the printed book
    book page numbers
are given for most scanned books. 
9.  From Elwes's IntroductionEL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 

10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for every-           E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for  teaching  the 
       "Organic  interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,   for  example  E2:XX:102,  become  more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.   Look  for  the 
       Cash Value.   

Bk.XIV:2:7, 8, 695.
11.  To  help  understand  many of the Propositions, use the analogy of           E2:Wolfson:2:8. 
       you  as  G-D  and all parts of you (past, present, and future) as the           Examples 
       modes  ( particular  things );  also  useful is the individual organism           Indivisible 
       to  the social organismthe State.      Apparent Contradiction                     2P20
         E2:III:84, E2:IV:84, E2:XLV:117, E5:XVIII:256, E5:XIX:256E5:XXXV:264,
 E5:Endnote 18:1.         Analogies 

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff. 
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xix. 
For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
For a "study of the plan of Ethics 2" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:338-9. 
For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.


TABLE OF CONTENTS: Bk.XII:x—Body and Mind. Bk.XII:193—Let us now ....
                                                                   Bk.XIV:xix—Chapter XIII,  Bk.XIV:2:3—Body and Mind.

Preface:82    Book I. Page Numbers.



Axioms, Definitions, and Lemmas within Proposition XIII:93
     Ethica II: The Lemmas on Bodies - Ron Bombardi


Part II Propositions: Book I:Pg. vii
          If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral.
          If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 


JBY Endnotes

Part II Proposition List: Book I:Pg. vii;  { Hypotheses }
          Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as you would a novel;
                               but select a Proposition, click its number to the left  
                               and  then  follow  all  its links in turn wherever they 
                               may  lead.  You will then be putting hypertexting to 
                               its  fullest and best advantage—a fuller discussion 
                               of  a  thread.  If  you do not stick to one thread at a 
                               time,  this Web Site will seem very convoluted and 
{Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                 so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.
             All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test        Hampshire:99-100
             them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea.

Prop. I.
   I - XV. 
Thought is an attribute of G-D, or G-D is a thinking
Prop. II. Extension  is  an  attribute  of  G-D,  or  G-D  is  an
extended  thing.
Prop. III. In G-D there is necessarily the idea not only of his                 Paraphrased
essence,  but also of all  things which necessarily 
follow  from his essence. 
Prop. IV
IV - VI 
The idea of G-D,  from which an infinite number of                Paraphrased
things follow in infinite ways, can only be one. 
Prop. V. The  actual being of ideas owns G-D as  its cause,
only  in  so  far  as  he  is considered as a thinking
thing,  not  in  so far as he is unfolded in any other 
attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of 
G-D and  of particular  things  do not own as their 
efficient  cause  their objects (ideata) or the things 
perceived,  but  G-D  himself  in  so  far  as he is a 
thinking thing. 
Prop. VI. The  modes  of  any given attribute are caused  by
G-D,  in  so  far   as he is considered  through  the
attribute  of  which  they  are modes, and not in so 
far as he is considered through any other attribute. 
Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things.
Prop. VIII. The  ideas  of particular things, or of modes, that do not
exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of G-D,
in  the  same  way  as the formal essences of particular 
things  or  modes are contained in the attributes of G-D.  
Prop. IX. The  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually  existing  is
caused by G-D not in so far as he is infinite, but in so
far  as  he  is  considered  as affected by another idea 
of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in 
so  far  as  he  is affected by a third idea, and so on to 
Prop. X.
  X - XIII.  
The  being  of  substance  does  not  appertain to the
essence of man—in other words, substance does not
constitute the actual being ("Forma") of man. 
Prop. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of
the  human  mind,  is  the  idea of some particular thing
actually existing. 
Prop. XII. Whatsoever  comes  to pass  in  the  object of the idea,
which  constitutes  the human mind, must be perceived
by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea 
in  the  human mind of the said occurrence.  That is,  if 
the  object  of the idea constituting the  human mind be 
a  body,  nothing  can  take  place  in that body without 
being perceived by the mind.  
Prop. XIII. The  object  of the idea constituting the human mind is
the  body,  in other words a  certain mode of extension
which actually exists, and nothing else. 
Prop. XIV.
The human mind is capable of perceiving a great num-
ber  of  things,  and  is  so   in proportion as its body is
capable of receiving  a great number of impressions. 
Prop. XV. The  idea,  which  constitutes  the  actual  being of the
human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great
number of ideas. 
Prop. XVI.
The  idea  of  every mode, in which the human body is
affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of
the human body,   and  also  the nature of the external  
Prop. XVII.
If   the  human  body  is  affected  in  a  manner which
involves  the  nature of 
any external body, the human 
mind  will  regard  the  said  external  body as actually 
existing,  or as present to itself,  until the human body 
be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence 
or the presence of the said external body. 
Prop. XVIII. If  the  human  body  has once been affected by two or
more  bodies  at  the  same  time, when the mind after-
wards  imagines any of them, it will straightway remem- 
ber the others also. 
Prop. XIX. The  human  mind  has  no knowledge of the body, and
does not know it to exist,  save through the ideas of the
modifications whereby the body is affected.                        ANS 
  ] affections
Prop. XX.
The  idea  or  knowledge  of the human mind is also in
G-D,  following in G-D in the same manner, and being
referred  to  G-D in  the  same manner, as the idea or 
knowledge of the human body.  Note 10 } 
Prop. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same
way as the mind is united to the body.
Prop. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the  modifications
of  the  body,  but also the ideas of such modifications.
Prop. XXIII. The  mind  does  not  know itself, except in so far as it
perceives  the  ideas  of  the
modifications of the body.
Prop. XXIV.
The  human mind does not involve an adequate know-
ledge of the parts composing the human body.
Prop. XXV. The idea of each modifications of the human body does
not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  external
Prop. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body
as  actually  existing,  except  through the ideas of the
modifications of its own body. 
Prop. XXVII. The  human mind does not perceive any external body
as  actually  existing,  except  through  the ideas of the
modifications of its own body. 
  ] affections
Prop. XXVIII. The  ideas  of the modifications of the human body, in
so far as they have reference only to the human mind,
are not clear and distinct, but confused. 
Prop. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modifications of the human
body  does  not  involve  an adequate knowledge of the
human mind. 
Prop. XXX We  can  only  have  a  very inadequate knowledge of
the duration of our body.
Prop. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of particular things external to ourselves.
Prop. XXXII.
All ideas,  in so far  as  they are referred to G-D,
are true.
There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
to be called false.
Prop. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or  adequate and
perfect,  is  true.
Prop. XXXV. Falsity  consists  in the privation of knowledge, which
inadequate, fragmentary,  or  confused ideas involve.
Prop. XXXVI. Inadequate  and  confused  ideas  follow  by the same
necessity,  as  adequate  or  clear  and  distinct ideas. 
Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma.II. below), 
and which is  equally  in a  part  and  in the whole, 
does not constitute the essence of any particular 
Prop. XXXVIII. Those  things,  which  are common to all,  and
which  are  equally  in  a part and in the whole,
cannot be conceived except adequately{G-D} 
Prop. XXXIX. That, which is  common  to and a property  of  the
human  body  and such  other bodies as are wont
to  affect  the  human body, and which is  present 
equally  in  each  part of either,  or  in  the  whole, 
will  be  represented  by  an adequate idea  in the 
mind.  G-D , Note 4 } 
Prop. XL.
Whatsoever  ideas  in  the mind follow from ideas
which are therein adequate,  are also themselves
Prop. XLI. Whatsoever  comes  to  pass  in the object of the
idea,  which  constitutes  the  human  mind, must
be  perceived  by  the  human  mind, or there will 
necessarily  be  an idea in the human mind of the 
said occurrence. That is, if  the object of the idea 
constituting  the  human mind be a body, nothing 
can  take  place  in  that  body  without being per- 
ceived by the mind.  
Prop. XLII. Knowledge  of  the  second and third kinds, not
knowledge of the first kind, teaches  us  to  dis-
tinguish the true from the false. 
Prop. XLIII. He,  who has a true idea, simultaneously  knows
that  he has  a true idea, and cannot doubt of the
truth of the thing perceived. 
Prop. XLIV.
It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as
contingent,  but as necessary.
Prop. XLV. Every  idea   of every body, or of every particular
thing  actually  existing,  necessarily 
 involves the
eternal and infinite essence of G-D. 
Prop. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
of G-D which every idea involves is adequate and
Prop. XLVII. The  human  mind has an adequate knowledge of
the eternal and infinite essence of G-D.
In  the  mind  there  is  no absolute or free will;  but
the  mind  is  determined  to wish  this  or that by a
cause, which has also been determined by another 
cause,  and  this  last by another cause, and so on 
to infinity. 
Prop. XLIX. There  is  in the mind no volition or affirmation and
negation, save that which an idea,  inasmuch as it
is an idea, involves. 



page 82

PREFACE:  Bk.XIV:2:51&2Bk.VIII:93[1]. 

I  now  pass  on  to  explaining the results,  which must necessarily

follow from the essence of G-D, or of the eternal and infinite being;             Scr:Note 4. 

not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in I:Prop.xvi.,  that an infinite
number  must  follow  in an infinite number of ways), but only those             

which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge
of the human mind and its highest blessedness.                                        E5:Wolfson:2:311
Bk.XIV:2:61&2Bk.VIII:93[1], Nicomachean Ethics. 

DEFINITIONS   G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis
. }

Bk.XV:26956E1:Parkinson:2601 >
Def. I.   By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain 
            determinate manner the essence of G-D, in so far as               
            as he is considered as an extended thing. 2P13L2, 13L3; 3P2. <------- small print, Logical Index. 


                   Bk.III:207; Bk.VIII:4471; Bk.XVIII:612d2642d21472d22332d2.
                                                   < Bk.XV:27170 on E2:X(15)N2:90 >
  < appertaining.  Bk.XV:26957E2:X(10)N2:89 > 
Def. II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, 
            which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, 
            and,  which  being  removed,  the thing is necessarily             
Wolf:P66, L1- 5
            removed also;  in other words,  that without which the 
            thing, can neither be nor be conceived.  
2P10, 37.                   <------- small print, Logical Index.

                     ] G:Shirley:2513ideateE2:XLVIII(9) & XLIX:120, E1:XXX:(1):69 [ 
Def. III.   By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed     E1:Parkinson:26311—True Idea
              by  the  mind  as  a  thinking  thing.   2P48S.
              Bk.XV:26958E2:XLIII(5)N:114,  E2:XLVIII(2)N:119, E2:XLIX(21)N:121,
                    E2:XLIX:120,  TEI:[110]:41. >


                ] G:Shirley:2513ideateE2:XLVIII(8) & XLIX:120, E1:XXX:(1):69 [ 
                    < Bk.XV:27059E1:Ax.VI:46, TEI:[29]:11, TEI:[35}:13, E2:XXIV:104. > 
Def. IV.    By an  adequate  idea, I mean  an  idea  which, in
               so far  as it is considered in itself, without relation
                 < denomination. TEI:[69]:26 >      { Bk.XIV:2:101—internal signs.}
               to  the  object,  has all  the  properties  or  intrinsic              
                ]characteristics[   Bk.XIV:2:98; Bk.XVIII:1762d4TEI:L64(60):395. 
               marks    of    a    true   idea.
{ Bk.XIV:2:101—TEI:L64(60):395.   Example: POSIT }   

                                                            { internal }
                  Explanation.—  I say  intrinsic,  in  order to exclude                  Hampshire32:102
{ sign }                 { external }
               that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement

               between  the idea and its object (ideatum).

                     Bk.XIV:1:xvii1&2, 331-369, 3571Bk.XIB:22786; 248144
              < E5:Parkinson:284170{ Neff-E5:L29[5](12):317, E5:Einstein Time } 
Def. V.   Duration  is  the  indefinite  continuance  of existing.   
                 Explanation.— I say indefinite, because it cannot be
              determined  page 83   through the existence itself of the 
              existing thing,  or by its efficient cause, which neces-                  E2:2P24-32. 
              sarily  gives  the existence of the thing,  but does not
              take it away.    { E5:Endnote 31:1, Neff-E5:L29[3](12):317 } 

                  Bk.XV:27060E1:IX:50, E1:XI(29)N:53, E4:Prf.(36):190; Bk.XVIII:2972d6.
Def. VI.   Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.              Reality Curve
                            ^ EL:Endnote Bk.III:211.         4PREF; 5P35, 40.         <------- small print, Logical Index.

                                    Bk.III:217,  Bk.XIV:2:192E3:V:136
{ PantheismBk.XVIII:368p36cs, 369p24. }
                           [ singular ]  < Bk.XV:27061E2:Def:95, E2:XIII(7)N1:92. >
Def. VII.  By   particular  ]individual[   things,  I  mean  things                Calculus:Fig. 3
              which are finite and have  a conditioned existence;                     Creation
              but if several individual things concur in one action,                Durant:638 - individual 
              so  as  to  be  all  simultaneously  the  effect of one 
              cause,  I consider them all, so far, as one particular 
              thing. { The ultimate thing is G-D, see 5P13} Bk.XVIII:2502d7



Ax. I.   The essence of man does not involve necessary
           existence,  that is,  it may, in the order of nature,
           come  to pass that this or that man does or does 
           not exist.                                      2P10, 30.                               <------- small print, Logical Index.

Ax. II.   Man thinks.       Bk.VIII:4483; Bk.III:209, 215, 218.       2P11.                              E1:Dijn:189

           Bk.III:187, 207, 243; Bk.XIV:1:4055, 2:1723; Bk.XVIII:1252axioms2699Bk.XIX:22010.  
Ax. III.  Modes  of  thinking, such as love, desire, or any other              Also understanding
           of the passions,  do not take place, unless there be in 
           the same individual an idea of the thing loveddesired, 
           &c.  But the idea can exist without the presence of any          { Why do you love it?;
           other mode of thinking.     2P11, 49.                                  do you think altruistically? }

Bk.III:209, 215, 218; Bk.XVIII:232a4. 
Ax. IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

                Bk.III:215.                                              { Note 4 }
Ax. V.  We  feel  and  perceive  no  particular  ] individual  things,
           save bodies and modes of thought.

N.B. The  postulates  are  given  after  the  conclusion  of Prop.xiii.

G:Shirley:2513 [

                          For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

Prop. IBk.XIV:2:8I - IX;
Bk.III:215; Bk.XIV:2:223; Bk.XVIII:492p1131p1; Bk.XIX:467. 

                      ] Individual, Note 4 [
Proof.— (1:1)  Particular thoughts,  or this or that thought,  are modes        Calculus:Fig.3
which,  in  a certain conditioned manner,  express the Nature of G-D

(I:Prop.xxv.Coroll.).  (2) G-D therefore possesses the attribute (I:Def.v.)

of  which  the  concept  is  involved  in all particular thoughts,  which

latter  are  conceived  thereby.  (1:3) Thought,  therefore, is one of the

infinite  attributes  of  G-D  which  express G-D's eternal and infinite

essence ( (4) In other words, G-D is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.

(1:5) This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are

able  to  conceive  an  infinite  thinking Being(1:6)  For, in  page 84  pro-

portion  as  a  thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts,

so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection.  (1:7) There-

fore  a  Being,  which  can  think  an  infinite  number  of things in an
infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite.

(1:8)  As,  therefore,  from  the  consideration  of thought alone we con-

ceive an infinite being,  thought is necessarily  (I.Deff.iv.and vi.) one

of  the  infinite  attributes  of  G-D,  as we were desirous of showing.

Prop. II.  E2;Wolfson:2:10Spinoza's Daring; Bk.XVIII:49131p2;

 Proof.— (2:1) The  proof  of  this  proposition  is  similar  to  that of the last.; Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer; Leda Cosmides & John ToobyMind / Body 

Prop. IIIBk.VII:474E1:Endnote 21:1; Bk.XII:165,187; Bk.XIV:1:238ff, 2:2961;
  Bk.XVIII:152p3,7762p3d1202p3d1302p3, 140p3d1502p3d,7d184p31872p3;

Proof.— (3:1) G-D  (by the first Prop. of this Part)  can think an infinite

number  of  things  in  infinite ways,  or  (what is the same thing,  by

I:Prop.xvi.) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which

necessarily follow therefrom.   (2) Now all that is in the power of G-D
E1:Endnote 21:1 [
necessarily is. (I:Prop.xxxv.)   (3:3) Therefore, such an idea as we are

considering  necessarily is, and in G-D alone.   Q.E.D.   ( I:Prop.xv.)

                                                                                            < E1:XXXIV:74 >
Note. (3:4) The  multitude  understand by the power of G-D the free               Metaphors. 

will  of  God,  and the right over all things that exist,  which latter are
accordingly  generally  considered  as  contingent.   (3:5) For it is said

that God has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to

nothing.   (3:6)  Further,  the power of G-D is very often likened to the

power of  kings.   (3:7)  But this doctrine we have refuted  (I:Prop.xxxii,

Corolls.i. and  ii.), and we have shown (I:Prop. xvi.) that G-D acts by
the  same  necessity,  as  that  by which he understands himself;  in

other  words,  as  it  follows  from  the necessity of the divine Nature
(as all admit),  that  G-D understands himself,  so also does it follow

by  the  same necessity,  that  G-D  performs  infinite  acts in infinite

(3:8)  We  further  showed  (I:Prop.xxxiv.),  that  G-D's  power is              Metaphors
        <         E1:XXXIV:74            >
identical  with G-D's essence in action;  therefore it is as impossible

for  us  to  conceive G-D  as not acting,  as to conceive him as non-
existent.  (3:9)  If  we  might  pursue the subject  page 85  further,  I could

point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to G-D is not

only human  (as showing that G-D is conceived by the multitude as
a man,  or  in  the  likeness of  a man),  but  involves  a  negation of

power.  (3:10)  However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so

often.  (3:11) I would only beg the reader again and again, to turn over

frequently in his mind what I have said in from I:Prop. xvi. to the end.

(3:12)  No  one will  be able to follow my meaning,  unless he is scrupu-

lously  careful  not  to  confound  the power  of  G-D with the human

power and right of kings.

Prop. IV.   Bk.III:203, 207, 2153 ; Bk.XIB:249147;  Bk.XVIII:104p2,4,5,6, 1984; Bk.XIX:12015. 

Proof.— (4:1)  Infinite  intellect  comprehends  nothing  save  the  attri-
affections [                                 { my capitals }
butes of G-D and his modifications (  (4:2) Now G-D is ONE 
E1:Endnote 21:1N [
(I:Prop.xiv.Coroll.).   (4:3)  Therefore  the  idea  of  G-D,  wherefrom an

infinite  number  of  things  follow  in  infinite  ways,  can only be one.


Prop. V.   Bk.III:216; Bk.XVIII:12811302p55p22, 35156p5,6,9; Bk.XIX:1156.

Proof.— (5:1)  This  proposition  is  evident  from  Prop. iii. of this Part.

(5:2) We there drew the conclusion,  that G-D can form the idea of his

essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely
Bk.XIX:9017; 12118; 12219.
because he is a thinking thing,  and not because he is the object of

his  own  idea.   (5:3) Wherefore  the  actual  being  of  ideas owns for

cause G-D, in so far as he is a thinking thing. (3a) It may be differently

proved  as  follows:   the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode

of thought,  that  is  (I:Prop.xxv.Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a

certain manner the nature of G-d,  in so far as he is a thinking thing,

and  therefore  (I:Prop.x.)  involves  the  conception of no other attri-

bute  of  G-D,  and consequently  (by I:Ax.iv.) is not the effect of any

attribute save thought.  (5:4) Therefore the actual being of ideas owns

G-D  as  its  cause,  in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing,

&c.  Q.E.D.

page 86

Prop. VI. Bk.III:200, 216; Bk.XVIII:141p10,2p6482p612811422p6d156p5,6,92862p6.  

                                        Bk.XIV:2:224; Bk.XIX:10614.  
Proof.— (6:1)   Each  attribute  is conceived through itself,  without any

other (I:Prop. x.);  wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the

conception  of  that attribute, but not of any other.   (6:2) Thus (I:Ax.iv.)

they  are caused by G-D,  only in so far as he is considered through

the  attribute  whose modes they are,  and not in so far as he is con-

sidered through any other.  Q.E.D.

 (6:3)  Hence  the  actual  being of  things,  which  are not

modes of  thought, does not follow from the Divine Nature, because
that  nature  has  prior  knowledge  of  the things.   (6:4)  Things repre-            Bk.XIV:2:231.
sented in ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute,
immanent }                              < Bk.XV:27063 >
in the same ^ manner,  and with the same necessity as ideas follow
(according  to  what  we have shown)    from the attribute of thought.
      2P36; 5P1.                                 ^ and are concluded—Bk.XIV:2:232.

Prop. VII.  Bk.XVIII:152p3,71272p7,d140p7d1502p3d,7d1682p7185p7.

Proof.— (7:1) This proposition is evident from I:Ax.iv.   (7:2)  For the idea

of  everything  that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause,

whereof it is an effect.

(7:3)  Hence  G-D's  power  of thinking is equal to his rea-               Metaphors 

lized  power  of action—that is,  whatsoever follows from  the infinite
< E1:XVII(21)N:61 > 
nature of G-D in the world of extension (formaliter),  follows without
 Bk.III:215.            ] E1:Endnote 21:1 [ 
exception  in  the same  order  and connection from the idea of G-D
TEI:Shirley:2617 [                                  Bk.III:207, 215.  
in the world of thought (objective).     
2P3238, 39; 3P28.


Neff TL:L66(64):399.
Note.  (7:4)  Before  going  any  further,  I wish to recall to mind what

has  been  pointed out above—namely, that whatsoever can be per-
 Bk.XIV:1:1532, 2153, 226, 2385. 
ceived  by  the  infinite  intellect  as constituting  the essence of sub-
 L65(63):396, Neff-TL:L66(64):399 } 
stance,  belongs  altogether  only  to  one  substance: consequently,
                       < Bk.XV:27064, E5:Prf(6):244. > 
substance  thinking and substance extended are one and the same
 Bk.XVIII:152p7s; Bk.XX:23475. 
substance, comprehended now through one attribute,  now through
2P812S, 21S; 3P2S.           Bk.XIV:1:2472. 
the other.   (7:5)  So,  also,  a  mode of extension  and  the idea of that
Bk.XVIII:142p7s.                 Bk.XIV:2:234415—different. 
mode  are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ^ ways.
                                                                                           Bk.XV:27065; Bk.XIX:10512. 
(7:6)  This  truth  seems  to have been dimly recognized by those Jews           Fifth Daring [2] 

who maintained that G-D, G-D's intellect, and the things understood               Metaphors 
                      Bk.XIX:1014.                                             Bk.XX:234.
by  G-D  are  identical  (7:7)   For instance,  a circle existing  page 87  in

nature,  and  the  idea  of  a  circle  existing,  which  is  also  in G-D,
<Bk.XV:27166Bk.XV:27379-E2:XVII(6)N:99, E2:XII:91, E2:XIII:92>, 
    <E5:Parkinson:283162Bk.XV:26316 on E1:X(2)N:51, E2:VII(4)N:86, E4:Ap.XXXII(1):242.>         
are one and the same thing  displayed  through  different  attributes.

(7:8) Thus,  whether  we  conceive Nature under the attribute of exten-           Hampshire32:64 
Bk.XV:27167E1:XI:51, E1:D.VI:45, 
>; Bk.XVIII:772p7s.
sion, or  under the attribute of thought,  or under any other attribute,
 Bk.XIV:1:2465&6—natural events. 
we shall find the same order,  or one and the same chain of causes

—that is, the same things following in either case.   Bk.III:216. 

(7:9) I said that G-D is the cause of an idea—for instance, of the idea

of a circle,—in so far as he is a thinking thing;  and of a circle, in so

far  as he is an extended thing,  simply because the actual being of

the  idea  of  a  circle  can only be perceived  as a proximate cause

through  another  mode of thinking,  and that again through another,
and  so  on  to  infinity;  so  that,  so  long  as we consider things as
modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature,

or  the whole chain of causes,  through the attribute of thought only.

(7:10) And,  in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we

must  explain  the  order of the whole of nature through the attribute
of  extension  only;    and  so  on,  in  the  case  of  other  attributes.

(7:11) Wherefore  of things as they are in themselves G-D is really the

cause,  inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes.   (7:12)  I cannot
for the present explain my meaning more clearly.     2P812S, 21S; 3P2S. 

 Bk.XVIII:262p7s, Bk.XVIII:2713Bk.XIV:1:57-59EL:L02(02):276;  Bk.XVIII:3582p7s. 

Prop. VIII.   Bk.III:215, 217;  Bk.XIV:2:312Bk.VIII:86[7],  Bk.XIV:2:2927&9; 
                          Bk.XVIII:3582p8, 366;
 Bk.XIX:1935E1:VIII(11)s2:48; Bk.XIX:19412.

Proof.— (8:1) This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood

more clearly from the preceding note.

(8:2)  Hence,  so  long  as particular things  do not exist,
Bk.III:217; conceived—Bk.XIV:2:2921. 
except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of G-D,
              < E1:XVII(21):61 >                                                    Bk.XVIII:3662p8c. 
their  representations  in thought or ideas do not exist,  except in so

far as the infinite idea of G-D exists; and when particular things are
Bk.III:203, 204, 215, 259; Bk.XIX:19613, 21422. 
said to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes

of G-D,  but  also in so far as they are said to continue,  their ideas
will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.

                                       2P9, 11, 15, 45; 3P11S; 5P21, 23.

Note. (8:3)  If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this

question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequate-

ly  explains the thing of which I here speak,  page 88   inasmuch as it is
has no parallel [
unique;  however,  I  will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible.
(8:4) The  nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines
See Sketch Bk.VII:68 [; Bk.XIX:19613; 2049. 
intersect  within  it,  the rectangles formed by their segments will be
equal   to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained
in area. Bk.VIII:45215This is  theorem 35,  Book III, of Euclid's Elements,
                  which is more easily stated if we add to Spinoza's diagram some letters
                  he  does  not  use.   If  AC  and  FG  are  any  two  lines intersecting at a
                  point B  in  a  circle,  then  the  rectangle with base AB and height BC is 
in area to that with base BG and height BF. ]       2P9; 3P11S.
in a circle.   (8:5)   Yet none of these rectangles  can  be  said to exist,  

except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
rectangles  be  said  to  exist,  except  in  so far as they are compre-

hended in the idea of the circle. (8:6) Let us grant that, from this infinite

number of rectangles, two only exist.  (8:7) The ideas of these two not

only  exist,  in so far as they are  contained  in the idea of the circle,

but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore

they  are  distinguished  from  the  remaining  ideas of the remaining


Prop. IX.  Bk.III:216, 218; Bk.XVIII:156p5,6,917014; Bk.XIX:1451.

Proof.— (9:1)  The  idea  of  an individual  thing actually existing is an

individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes (by the

Corollary and Note to Prop. viii.  of  this part);  thus  (by Prop. vi. of

this part) it is caused by G-D, in so far only as he is a thinking thing.

(9:2)  But not  (by I:Prop.xxviii.) in so far as he is a thing thinking abso-

lutely, only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode

of thinking; and he is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a

third,  and so on  to infinity.    (9:3)  Now,  the order and connection of

ideas  is  (by  Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and con-

nection of causes.  (9:4)  Therefore of a given individual idea another

individual idea, or G-d, in so far as he is considered as modified by

that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea G-d is the cause, in

so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.

(9:5)  Whatsoever  takes  place in the individual object of

any idea,  the  knowledge thereof is in G-d, in so far only as he has              Bk.XIV:2:516
the idea of the object.         2P12, 13, 30; 3P10. 

Bk.XVIII:1302p9c,20,241542p9cd; Bk.XIX:1653.

Proof. (9:6)  Whatsoever  takes  place  in the object of any idea,  its

idea  is in G-d (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far  page 89  as he is

infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea

of an individual  thing  (by the last Prop.);  but  (by Prop. vii.  of  this

part)   the  order  and connection of ideas  is the same  as the order

and connection of things. (9:7) The knowledge, therefore, of that which

takes  place  in any individual object will be in G-d, in so far only as

he has the idea of that object.  Q.E.D.

Prop. X.  Bk.XIV:2:8X - XIII.; Bk.XVIII:1262p10, 11, 13.

Proof.— (10:1)  The  being  of substance involves necessary existence

(I:Prop.vii.).  (2) If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the
posited }
essence of man,  substance being granted,  man would necessarily

be  granted also  (II:Def. ii.),  and,  consequently, man would neces-

sarily exist, which is absurd (II:Ax.i.). Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.

Note 1.
(10:3) This proposition may also be proved from I:v., in which

it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature;

for as there may  be  many men,  the being of substance is  not that

which constitutes the actual being of man.  (4)  Again, the proposition

is evident from the other properties of substance—namely, that sub-

stance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone

may see for himself.

< Bk.XV:27170 on E2:X(15)N2:90 > 
Corollary.  (10:5)  Hence  it  follows,  that  the  essence  of  man  is
determined }                   ] affections [           Bk.III:218; Bk.XIB:23294. 
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of G-D.  (6)  For
Bk.XIV:1:3844; Bk.XIV:2:411&2Bk.III:94[3]
(by the  last Prop.)  the  being of substance does not belong to the 
  Bk.XIV:2:371&2Bk.VIII:94[4]; Bk.XIX:479. 
essence of man.  (10:7)  That essence therefore (by I:xv) is something

which is in G-D,  and which without G-D can neither be nor be con-

ceived, whether it be a modification (I:xxv.Coroll.), or a mode which
expresses G-d's nature in a certain conditioned manner.    2P11; 4P29. 

Note 2. (10:8) Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without G-D
(10:9)  All men agree that G-D  is the one and
< Bk.XV:27170E2:De.II:82, E2:X:89, E2:XC:89 > 
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence;

that is,  G-D is not only the cause of things in respect to their being
< E2:Def.II:82. >
made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum

esse).   { Analogy }
(10:10)  At the same time many assert,  that that, without which a thing
> pertains—Bk.III:207.  < 
cannot  be  nor be conceived,  belongs to the essence of that thing;
wherefore they believe that either the Nature   
page 90   of G-D apper-
< Bk.XV:26957, E2:Def.II:82. > 
tains  to  the essence  of created things,  or else that created things

can  be or be conceived without G-D;  or else,  as is more probably
the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. (10:11) I think the cause for

such confusion is mainly,  that they do not keep to the proper order
< argument.  Bk.XV:27169. >
of philosophic thinking.  (10:12) The Nature of G-D,  which should be re-

flected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge

and  the  order of Nature,  they have taken to be  last in the order of

knowledge,  and  have  put into the first place what they call the ob-

jects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural pheno-

mena, they  give no attention at all to the Divine Nature,  and, when

afterwards they apply their mind  to the study  of  the Divine Nature,

they are quite  unable  to  bear  in  mind  the  first hypotheses,  with

which  they  have  overlaid  the  knowledge  of  natural phenomena,

inasmuch  as  such hypotheses are no help towards understanding

the Divine Nature  (10:13)  So that it is hardly to be wondered at,  that
these persons contradict themselves freely.

(10:14) However, I pass over this point.  (15)  My intention here was only

to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing can-
                                                < Bk.XV:27170E2:Def.II:82, E2:X:89, E2:X(5)C:89. > 
not be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individ-

ual things  cannot  be  or be conceived without G-D,  yet G-D does

not appertain to their essence.   (10:16)  I said that "I considered as be-

longing to the essence of a thing that,  which being given, the thing

is  necessarily  given  also,  and which being removed,  the thing is

necessarily  removed  also;  or  that  without  which  the thing,  and

which  itself  without  the  thing  can  neither  be  nor be conceived."


Prop. XI. Bk.III:205, 218; Bk.XIV:2:442; Bk.XVIII:142p11,12; 1262p10,11,13; 1552p11,13; 2052p11d; Bk.XIX:1923.

Proof.— (11:1) The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is

constituted  by  certain  modes  of the attributes of G-D, namely  (by

II:Ax.ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.Ax.iii.) the idea is

prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely,

those of which the idea is prior in nature)  must  be  in the same indi-

vidual (by the same Axiom). (11:2) Therefore an idea is the first element

constituting  the human mind.  (11:3)  But not the idea of a non-existent

thing,  for  then II:viii.Coroll.)  the   page 91  idea itself cannot be said to

exist;  it  must  therefore  be  the  idea of something actually existing.

(11:4)  But not of an infinite thing.    (11:5) For an infinite thing (I:xxi., xxii.),

must always necessarily exist;  this would  (by II:Ax.i.) involve an ab-

surdity.  (11:6) Therefore the first element, which constitutes the actual

being  of the human mind,  is the idea of something actually existing.


(11:7) Hence it follows,  that the human mind is part of the
Bk.XIV:2:413, 2:494, 2:564, 2:155, 2:3245; Bk.III:140, 218, 222.                                Hampshire32:83
infinite intellect of G-D; thus when we say, that the human mind per-              Durant:63981 

ceives this or that, we make the assertion, that G-d has this or that

idea,  not  in so  far as he is infinite,  but in so far as he is displayed

through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes            Spinoza's Religion
         Bk.III:219, 225; Bk.XVIII:125p11c.
the essence of the human mind; and when we say that G-d has this

or that idea,  not only in so far as  he constitutes the essence of the

human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human

mind, has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human
                                     < Bk.XV:27272E2:XXIV-XXIX:104, E1:XVII(18)N:61. > 
mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.  Bk.III:223; Bk.XVIII:177p11c. 
                               2P12, 13, 19, 22, 23, 30, 34, 38, 43, 43S; 3P28; 5P36.                        <------- small print, Logical Index. 

Note.  (11:8)  Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will

call  to  mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;  I there-
fore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pro-

nounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.

Prop. XII.  Bk.III:219, 221, 223; Bk.XVIII:142p11,12, 174p12.

Proof.—  (12:1)  Whatsoever  comes  to pass in the object of any idea,

the  knowledge  thereof is necessarily in G-D (II:ix.Coroll.), in so far

as he is considered  as affected by the idea of the said object,  that

is (II:xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything.  (12:2) There-

fore,  whatsoever  takes  place in the object constituting the idea of

the  human  mind,  the  knowledge  thereof is necessarily in G-d, in

so  far  as  he  constitutes the nature of the human mind;  that is (by

II:xi.Coroll.)  the  knowledge  of  the  said  thing  will  necessarily  be                                 Bk.XVIII:1542p12d; Bk.XIX:1464.
the mind, in other words the mind perceives it.

page 92

Note.  (12:3) This proposition is also evident,  and is more clearly to
Note ]
be understood from II:vii., which see.

Prop. XIII.  Bk.XIB:236106, 107; Bk.XIV:2:2931; Bk.XVIII:362p13; 1262p13; 1552p11,13; Bk.XIX:1142.

Proof.— (13:1)   If  indeed  the  body  were  not the object of the human

mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in G-D              Added by JBY  

(II:ix.Coroll.)  in  virtue of his constituting our mind, but in virtue of his

constituting the mind of something else; that is (Il:xi.Coroll.) the ideas

of the modifications  of  the body would not be in our mind:  now (by

II.Ax.iv.)  we  do  possess  the ideas of the modifications of the body.

(13:2) Therefore  the  object of the idea constituting the human mind is

the body, and the body as it actually exists (Il:xi.).  (3) Further, if there

were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body,

then,  as  nothing  can  exist from which some effect does not follow
by 2P12 ]
(I:xxxvi.)  there  would  necessarily  have  to  be  in our mind an idea,

which  would  be the effect of that  other object  (II:xi.);  but  (II:Ax.v.)

there  is no such idea.  
 (13:4)  Wherefore  the object of our mind is the
2P17S ]             
body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D. {
 L65(63):396, Neff TL:L66(64):398 }

Note 1. (13:5)  We  thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
Bk.XIV:2:3242.                                           Bk.III:127, 219. 
united  to  the  body,  but  also the nature of the union between mind        E2:Wolfson:2:5352:552.

and body.  (6)  However,  no one will be able to grasp this adequately
Bk.XIX:2564.             { the Worm, EL:L15(32):290 } 
or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of

our body.  (7) The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been
                                                                                                                < Bk.XV:27275   
entirely  general,  applying  not  more to men than to other individual
      E2:XIII:92, E2:D.VII:83, E3:LVII(7)N:170. >    
things,   all  of  which,  though  in  different  degrees,  are  animated               Durant:63773
 < Bk.VIII:45831Bk.XIV::2:58, E2:XIII(Ax.2):95 >                       3P51S
("Animata"). (13:8) For of everything there is necessarily an idea in G-D,           Hampshire32:65 

of  which  G-D  is the cause,  in the same way as there is an idea of

the human body; thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the

human  body  must  necessarily  also  be  asserted  of  the  idea  of

everything  else.  (13:9)  Still,  on  the other hand,  we cannot deny that

ideas,   like  objects,   differ  one  from  the  other,  one  being  more               
excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object

of  one  idea  is  more  excellent than the object of another idea, and

contains more reality.

(13:10) Wherefore,  in  order  to  determine,  wherein the human  page 93 

mind differs from other things,  and wherein it surpasses them,  it is

necessary  for  us  to  know  the nature of its object,  that is,  of  the
Bk.XIX:2551E3:II(11):132, E5:Prf.(5):244.              Bk.III:37.
human body.  (13:11) What this nature is, I am not able here to explain,
nor  is  it  necessary  for  the  proof of what I advance,  that I should

do so.   (13:12) I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given

body  is  more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving
Bk.XVIII:139p13; Bk.XIX:22214.
many  impressions at once,  so  also  is  the mind,  of which it is the

object,  more  fitted  than others for forming many simultaneous per-

ceptions;  and  the  more  the  actions of one body depend on itself
Bk.III:225; Bk.XVIII:1262p13; Bk.XIX:2576. 
alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more
fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension.

(13:13) We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others,

and may further see the cause,  why we have only a very confused

knowledge of our body,  and also many kindred questions,  which I

will,  in the following propositions,  deduce  from what has been ad-

vanced.  (13:14) Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and

prove  more  strictly  my present statements.   (13:15)  In order to do so,
                                                                                                  { Bk.XIV:2:65 }
I must  premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies.

Ethica II: The Lemmas on Bodies - Ron Bombardi
Bk.III:220; Bk.XIV:2:63; Bk.XIX:20612. 

                                                          < Bk.XV:266
33E1:XXI:63 >
Axiom I.    All bodies are either in motion or at rest.    2P13L3. 

Axiom II.   Every body is moved sometimes more slowly, sometimes
                more quickly.

                            { a little worm } ,  ] Bk.XIII:193165 [
Lemma I.  Bodies  are  distinguished from one another in respect of
                motion  and  rest,  quickness  and  slowness,  and  not  in
                respect of substance  < Bk.XV:26315E1:VIII:48 >  

                    Proof.— The first part of this proposition is,  I take it,  self-
                evident.  That  bodies  are not distinguished in respect of
                substance,  is plain both from  I:v.  and  I:viii.  It is brought 
                out still more clearly from I: xv.,note.         2P13L3, 13L4.  
Lemma II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.       2P37, 38C; 5P4.                         Bk.XIV:2:672.
 Bk.III:203Neff L66(64):399. 

                     Proof.—   All  bodies  agree  in the fact,  that they involve 
                 the  conception  of  one  and the same attribute (II:Def.i.).            Bk.XIV:2:673, 4.
                 Further,  in  the fact that they may be moved less or more 
                quickly,   and   may  be  absolutely  in  motion  or  at  rest.  

Lemma III.   A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion
                   or rest by another body,  which other body has been de-
                   termined to motion or rest by a third body,  and that third 
                   again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.                                          Bk.XIV:2:681.  

                   Proof.—   Bodies  are  individual things (II:Def.i.), which
                       page 94  (Lemma I.)  are  distinguished  one from the other 
                   in respect to motion and rest;  thus  (I:xxviii.) each must 
                   necessarily  be determined to motion or rest by another 
                   individual  thing,  namely (II:vi.), by another body, which 
                   other  body  is  also (Ax.i.) in motion or at rest.   And this 
                   body again can only have been set in motion or caused 
                   to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or 
                   rest.  This  third  body  again  by  a  fourth, and so on to 
                   infinity.  Q.E.D.  { the Worm, EL:L15(32):290 } Bk.XVIII:33102/11. 

Corollary. (13:16)  Hence  it  follows,  that  a body in motion keeps in

motion,  until  it  is determined to a state of rest by some other body;

and  a  body  at  rest  remains so,  until it is determined to a state of
motion   by   some  other  body.    (13:17)   This  is  indeed  self-evident.

(13:18)  For  when  I  suppose,  for  instance, that a given body, A, is at

rest,  and  do  not  take  into  consideration  other  bodies in motion,

I  cannot  affirm  anything  concerning  the  body  A, except that it is

at rest.   (13:19)  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,  this

cannot  have  resulted  from  its  having  been  at  rest,  for no other

consequence  could  have  been involved than its remaining at rest.

(13:20) If,  on the other hand,  A  be  given in motion, we shall,  so long

as  we  only  consider A,  be unable to affirm anything concerning it,

except  that  it is in motion.   (13:21)  If A is subsequently found to be at

rest,  this  rest  cannot be the result of A's previous motion, for such

motion  can  only  have  led  to  continued  motion;  the state of rest

therefore  must  have  resulted  from something,  which was not in A,

namely,  from  an  external  cause  determining  A  to  a state of rest.

Axiom I.—  All  modes, wherein one body is affected by another body,
                  follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
                  and  the  body  affecting;  so  that  one and the same body 
                  may  be  moved  in  different  modes,  according  to the dif- 
                  ference  in the nature of the bodies moving it;  on the other 
                  hand,  different  bodies  may  be  moved in different modes 
                  by one and the same body.           2P16, 24; 3P17S, 51, 57. 

Axiom II.— When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest,
                  which it is unable to move,  it recoils,  in order to continue
                  its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in the 
                  recoil  and  the  plane  of  the  body  at rest,  whereon the 
                  moving  body  has impinged,  will  be  equal  to  the angle 
                  formed  by  the  line  of motion of incidence and the same 
                  plane.   < See Sketch Bk.XV:51. >               2P17C.

page 95
 (13:22)  So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,               Bk.XIV:2:654.

which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest,
                                                                                               < composite >
quickness and slowness.  (23) We now pass on to compound bodies.

 (13:24)   When any given bodies of the same or different

magnitude are  compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if

they be moved at the same or different rates of speed,  so that their

mutual  movements  should  preserve  among  themselves a certain

fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that togeth-
 < E2:D.VII:83 >
er they compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from              Bk.XIV:2:686. 

other bodies by this fact of union.  { E2:XXIV(1):104 }      2P13L7, 24; 4P39.

Axiom III.—  In  proportion  as  the  parts  of an individual, or a com-

pound  body,  are in contact over a greater or less superficies,  they

will  with  greater  or  less  difficulty  admit of being moved from their

position;  consequently  the  individual will,  with greater or less diffi-
culty,  be  brought  to assume another form.   Those bodies,  whose
] areas of their surfaces [ 
parts  are  in  contact over large superficies,  are called hard;  those,
whose  parts  are  in  contact over small superficies,  are called soft;

those,  whose  parts  are  in  motion among one another,  are called              Bk.XIV:2:687. 


Lemma IV. 
 If  from  a  body or individual,  compounded of several

bodies,  certain  bodies  be  separated,  and if, at the same time, an

equal  number  of  other  bodies of the same nature take their place,

the individual will preserve its nature as before, without any change

in its actuality (forma).           2P13L5, 24.  

Proof.—  Bodies (Lemma I.)  are not distinguished in respect of sub-

stance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an individual

consists  (by  the  last  Def.)  in  a  union  of  bodies;  but  this union,

although  there  is  a  continual  change of bodies,  will (by our hypo-

thesis) be maintained;  the individual,  therefore, will retain its nature

as  before,  both  in  respect  of  substance  and  in respect of mode.


Lemma V.   If the parts composing an individual become greater or

less,  but in such proportion,  that they all preserve the same mutual

relations of motion and rest, the individual will still preserve its origin-

al nature, and its actuality will not be changed.      3Post1.

 { the Parts , EL:L15(32):290 }

Proof.—  The same as for the last Lemma.

page 96

Lemma VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled

to  change the motion,  which they have in one direction,  for motion

in another direction,  but in such a manner,  that they be able to con-

tinue  their  motions  and their mutual communication in the same re-

lations as before, the individual will retain its own nature without any

change of its actuality.               2P13L7S.

Proof.—  This  proposition  is self-evident,  for  the individual is sup-

posed  to retain all  that,  which,  in its definition,  we spoke of as its

actual being.

retains—                     Bk.XIV:2:692
Lemma VII
.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves
Bk.XIB:22480Bk.XIV:1:2451, 2464 
its nature,  whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest, whether it               Bk.XIV:2:693. 

be  moved  in  this  or that direction;  so long as each part retains its
 L65(63):396, Neff TL:L66(64):398 } 
motion, and preserves its communication with other parts as before.
3Post1                        ^ proportion of motion and rest—Bk.XIV:1:2461. 

Proof.—  This proposition is evident from the definition of an individ-

ual prefixed to Lemma III.

Note 2.— 
(13:25) We thus see, how a composite individual may be affect-
                                                            < Bk.XV:26634E1:XXII:65. >
ed  in  many different ways,  and preserve its nature notwithstanding.

(13:26)  Thus  far  we  have  conceived  an  individual  as composed of

bodies  only  distinguished  one  from  the other in respect of motion

and  rest,  speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple

character.  (27)  If, however, we now conceive another individual com-

posed  of  several  individuals  of diverse natures, we shall find that             
Bk.XIV:2:656, 691.

the  number  of  ways  in which it can be affected,  without losing its
the Parts , EL:L15(32):290 }
nature,  will  be  greatly multiplied. 
(13:28)  Each of its parts would con-

sist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would

admit, without change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and

would  consequently  be able to transmit its motions more quickly or

more slowly to the remaining parts.   (29) If we further conceive a third

kind  of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind,  we

shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways

without changing their actuality.
(13:30) We may easily proceed thus to
Bk.VIII:46238Bk.XIV:2:7, 69. ]; Bk.XVIII:33102/11. 
                                      < Bk.XV:27276—Bk.XV:26634-E1:XXII:65, EL:L15(32):290. >
infinity,  and conceive the whole of Nature as one individual,  whose
parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in
Conservation of energy - if not subscribed Britannica Online. } 
the  individual  as  a  whole(13:31) I should feel bound to explain and
demonstrate  this  point  at  more  length,  if  I were writing a special  

treatise on body.   (32)  But I have already said  page 97  that such is not

my object,  I have only touched on the question,  because it enables

me to prove easily that which I have in view.

POSTULATES.   { Bk.XIV:2:7, 69. }                                                        Damasio:210, 211
Bk.XV:27277E2:XVII(6)N:99, Bk.XV:2629 on E1:Axiom:46. >  

I.    The human body is composed of a number of individual parts,
      of  diverse  nature,  each  one  of  which  is  in itself extremely
      complex.                                        2P15, 24; 3Post1, 17S 

II.   Of the individual parts composing the human body some are                Bk.XIV:2:696. 
      fluid, some soft, some hard. 

III.  The  individual  parts  composing the human body, and conse-
     quently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of ways             
     by external bodies.  Bk.XIX:2171.            2P14, 28; 3P51; 4P39. 

IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a num-
      ber  of  other  bodies,  by  which  it is continually, so to speak,
      regenerated. Bk.XIV:2:2423.              2P19; 4P18S, 39. 

V.   When  the  fluid part of the human body is determined by an ex-
      ternal body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes the
      surface  of  the  latter,  and,  as  it  were,  leaves the impression        Bk.XIV:2:703. 
      thereupon of the external body which impels it.  2P17C; 3Post2 

VI.  The  human  body can move external bodies, and arrange them           Bk.XIV:2:704.
      in a variety of ways.                  2P14; 4P39. 

Prop. XIV.  Bk.XIV:2:72XIV - XLIX; Bk.III:220. 

Proof.— (14:1) The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in very
many ways by external bodies,  and is capable in very many ways of             

affecting external bodies. (2) But (II.xii.) the human mind must perceive
all that takes place in the human body;  the human mind is, therefore,

capable  of  perceiving  a great number of things,  and is so in propor-

tion, &c.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XV.  Bk.III:220; Bk.XVIII:1962p15; Bk.XIX:201a, 2023.

Proof.— (15:1) The  idea  constituting  the  actual being of the human

mind is the idea of the body  (II.xiii.),  which (Post.i.) is composed of

a great number of complex individual parts.  (15:2)  But there is neces-

sarily  in  G-d  the  idea  of each individual part whereof the body is

composed  (II.viii.Coroll.);  page 98   therefore (II.vii.),  the  idea  of  the

human  body  is  composed  of  these  numerous ideas of its compo-

nent parts.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XVI.  Bk.III:214, 222; Bk.XVIII:1281.

(16:1)  All  the  modes,  in  which  any  given body is affected,

follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the nature
of  the affecting body (by Ax.i. after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.), where-

fore  their  idea also necessarily  (by I.Ax.iv.)  involves  the nature of

both bodies;  therefore, the idea of every mode, in which the human

body  is  affected  by  external  bodies,  involves  the  nature  of the

human body and of the external body.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.
 (16:2)   Hence  it  follows,  first,  that  the  human mind

perceives  the  nature  of  a  variety  of  bodies,  together with the
nature of  its  own.                             2P17, 26, 47.

Corollary II.  (16:3)  It  follows,  secondly,  that  the ideas,  which we
have  of external bodies,  indicate rather the constitution of our own        Hampshire:135affectus
body  than the nature of external bodies.   (16:4)    I have amply illustra-

ted this in the Appendix to Part I.       2P17S; 3P14, 18, GDE; 4P1S, 9; 5P34

Prop. XVII.  Bk.III:221; Bk.XVIII:158p17; 163p17.

Proof.—  (17:1)  This  proposition  is  self-evident,  for  so  long  as the

human  body  continues to be thus affected,  so long will the human
 affections }
mind  (II.xii.)  regard  this  modification of  the  body—that is  (by the

last Prop.),  it  will  have  the  idea  of  the mode as actually existing,

and this idea involves the nature of the external body.   (17:2)  In other

words,  it will have the idea which does not exclude,  but postulates

the existence or presence of the nature of the external body;  there-

fore  the  mind  (by II:xvi., Coroll. i.)  will regard the external body as

actually existing, until it is affected, &c.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.  (17:3)  The  mind  is  able  to  regard as present external

bodies,  by  which  the  human body has once been affected,  even

though they be no longer in existence or present.

                                     2P17S, 18, 40S1, 44S, 49S; 3P18, 25, 47S; 4P13.

page 99
Proof. (17:4) When  external  bodies  determine the fluid parts of the

human  body,  so  that  they often impinge on the softer parts,  they

change  the surface of the last named (Post.V.);  hence (Ax.ii.,  after
reflected [
Coroll. of Lemma iii.)  they  are  refracted   therefrom   in  a different

manner   from  that  which  they followed  before such change;  and,

further,  when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their

own  spontaneous  movement,  they  will   be refracted  in the same

manner,  as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces

by external bodies;  consequently,  they will,  while they continue to

be  thus  refracted,  affect  the  human  body  in  the  same manner,

whereof the mind (II:xii.) will again take cognizance—that is (II:xvii.),

the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do

so,  as  often  as  the  fluid parts of the human body impinge on the

aforesaid  surfaces by their own spontaneous motion.   (17:5)  Where-

fore,  although  the external bodies,  by which the human body has

once been affected,  be no longer in existence, the mind will never-

theless regard them as present,  as often as this action of the body

is repeated.  Q.E.D.

(17:6)   We thus see how it comes about,  as is often the case,

that  we regard as present things which are not.   (17:6a)   It is possible

that  the  same result may be brought about by other causes;  but  I

think  it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explana-

tion,  just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause  (17:7)  Indeed,

I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are

based  on  postulates,  which rest, almost without exception,  on ex-
        < Bk.XV:27278E2:XL(19)N2:113.  doubted. >  
perience,  that  cannot  be  controverted by those who have shown,
3Post2                              3P11S; 5P21
as we have,  that the human body, as we feel it,  exists (Coroll. after
2P17C ]
II:xiii.). (17:8) Furthermore (II:vii.Coroll., II:xvi.Coroll.ii.), we clearly under-

stand what is the difference between the idea,  say, of Peter, which
                                                                < Bk.XV:27379—Bk.XV:27166 on E2:VII(7)N:87. >  
constitutes  the  essence  of  Peter's mind,  and the idea of the said
Peter,  which is in another man,  say, Paul.   (17:9) The former directly

answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies exist-
ence so long as Peter exists;  the latter indicates rather the disposi-

tion  of Paul's body than the nature of Peter,  and,  therefore,  while

this  disposition  of  Paul's body lasts,  Paul's mind will regard Peter
2P26S; 3P12  
as  present  to itself,  even though he no longer exists.  
                               < Bk.XV:27380—Bk.XV:283165 on E5:I:247. >  
to  retain  the   page 100  usual  phraseology,  the  modifications  of the

human body,  of which the ideas represent external bodies as pres-
                                           < Bk.XV:283165 on E5:I:247. >  
ent to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall             Bk.XIV:2:854. 
                                          ^ 2P40S1; 3P12, 27, 56; 4P9; 5P34
the figure of things.  (17:11) When the mind regards bodies in this fash-
                           ] E2:Wolfson:2720 [   2P35S, 49S.
ion,  we  say  that it imagines.   (17:12)  I will here draw attention to the
fact,  in  order  to indicate where error lies,  that the imaginations of
the  mind,  looked at in themselves,  do not contain error.   (17:13)  The

mind does not err in the mere act of imagining,  but only in so far as
it  is  regarded  as being without the idea,  which excludes the exist-

ence  of  such  things  as  it imagines to be present to it.   (17:14)  If the

mind,  while  imagining non-existent things as present to it,  is at the

same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of ima-
gination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature,  and not to a

fault,  especially  if  this  faculty  of imagination depend solely on its

own  nature—that is (I:Def.vii.),  if this faculty of imagination be free.

                                    2P26S, 35S, 40S1, 49S; 3Post2, 11S, 12, 27, 56; 4P9; 5P21, 34. 

Prop. XVIII.  Bk.III:222; Bk.XIV:2:2141; Bk.XVIII:2102p18,s. 

Proof.— (18:1) The  mind  (II:xvii.Coroll.imagines any given body, be-
   { EMOTION }                  { to LOVE or HATE - need }
cause the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions
from  an  external  body,  in  the same manner as it is affected when

certain  of  its  parts are acted on by the said external body;  but (by

our hypothesis)  the body was then so disposed,  that the mind ima-

gined two bodies at once;  therefore,  it  will also in the second case

imagine  two  bodies  at once,  and the mind,  when it imagines one,

will straightway remember the other.  Q.E.D.

                                                         Bk.XV:27381; Bk.XIX:14913. 2P40S23P52; 4P135P21
Note. (18:2)  We now clearly see what Memory is.  (18:2a)  It is simply a
linking [                                       ^ Bk.XIV:1:xxi.
certain  association  of  ideas  involving the nature of things outside
 Bk.III:222, 228.               ^ Bk.XIX:1477.
the  human body,  which association arises in the mind according to
linkage                ] affections [
the  order  and association of the modifications  (affectiones)  of the            Hampshire32:91

human body.  (18:3)  I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only,
which  involve  the  nature of things outside the human body:  not of

ideas  which  answer  to  the  nature of the said things:  ideas of the

modifications of the human body are, strictly speaking (II:xvi.), those

which  involve  the  nature  both  of the human body and of external

bodies.  (18:4)   I  say secondly,  that this association  page 101  arises ac-

cording  to  the  order  and  association  of  the  modifications of the            Hampshire32:91  

human body,  in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas,

which  arises  from  the order of the intellect,  whereby the mind per-

ceives  things through their primary causes,  and which is in all men
the same.   (18:5)  And  hence  we can further clearly understand,  why
the  mind  from  the  thought of one thing,  should straightway arrive

at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;

for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple),  a Ro-

man would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which

has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything

in  common  with it,  except that the body of the man has often been

affected  by these two things;  that is,  that the man has often heard

the  word  pomum,  while he was looking at the fruit;  similarly every

man  will go on from one thought to another,  according as his habit

has ordered the images of things in his body.   (18:6)  For a soldier, for

instance,  when  he  sees the tracks of a horse in sand,  will at once

pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and

thence  to the thought of war, &c.;  while a countryman will proceed

from  the  thought  of a horse to the thought of a plough,  a field, &c.

(18:7)  Thus  every man will follow this or that train of thought,  accord-
ing  as  he  has  been  in the habit of conjoining and associating the
analyze, instead }
mental images of things in this or that manner.
2P40S2; 3P11S, 52, De4; 4P13; 5P21.

Prop. XIX.   Bk.III:219, 222;

Proof.— (19:1)  The  human  mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
human body (II:xiii.), which (II.ix.) is in G-d, in so far as he is regard-

ed as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing:

or,  inasmuch  as (Post.iv.)  the human body stands in need of very

many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and

the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and con-

nection of causes (II:vii.); this idea will therefore be in G-d, in so far

as  he  is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular

(19:2)Thus G-d has the idea of the human body, or knows the

human  body,  in  so far as he is affected by very many other ideas,

and not in   page 102  so far as he constitutes the nature of the human

mind;  that is  (by II.xi.Coroll.),  the  human  mind does not know the

human  body.   
(19:3)  But the ideas of the modifications of body are in

G-d,  in so far  as  he constitutes the nature of the human mind,  or
affection [
the  human  mind  perceives those modifications (II:xii.),  and conse-

quently (II:xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing; there-

fore the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Q.E.D.

Prop. XX.  Bk.III:223; Bk.XII:1791; Bk.XVIII:1302p9c,20,24.

Proof. (20:1) Thought  is  an  attribute  of G-D (II.i.);  therefore (II.iii.)

there must necessarily be in G-D the idea both of thought itself and
affections [
of all its modifications,  consequently also of the human mind  (II.xi.).

(20:2) Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from

G-d,  in so far as he is infinite,  but in so far as he is affected by an-
particular [
other idea of an individual thing (II.ix.).  (20:3) But (II.vii.) the order and

connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as the order and connection of

causes;  therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in G-d and
related [
is referred to G-D, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of

the body.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXI.  Bk.III:223.

Proof.—  (21:1)  That  the  mind  is united to the body we have shown

from the fact,  that the body is the object of the mind (II:xii. and xiii.);

and  so  for  the  same  reason  the idea of the mind must be united

with  its  object,  that  is,  with  the  mind in the same manner as the

mind is united to the body.  Q.E.D.

(21:2) This  proposition  is  comprehended much more clearly

from what we said in the note to II:vii(21:3) We there showed that the
idea of body and body,  that is,  mind and body (II.xiii.), are one and
 E5:Endnote 20:20 }; Bk.XIX:1143.
the  same  individual  conceived now under the attribute of thought,

now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the idea of the mind

and the mind itself are one and the same thing,  which is conceived

under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. (21:4) The idea of

the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in G-D by the same neces-

and follow from him from the same power of thinking.  
(5)  Strictly

speaking,  the  idea of the mind,   page 103   that is, the idea of an idea,
        form           [
is nothing but the distinctive quality  (forma)  of the idea in so far as
 Bk.III:223.                 Bk.III:83—relation to its; Bk.XIX:13110. 
it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object;

if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows

it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it,  and

so on to infinity.  (21:6) But I will treat of this hereafter.     2P43S; 4P8; 5P3. 

Prop. XXII.  Bk.XVIII:3542p22; Bk.XIX:15016.

                                                               ] affections [
Proof. (22:1)The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in G-d in
] related [                                            
the same manner, and are referred to G-d in the same manner, as

the ideas of the said modifications.   (22:2) This is proved in the same

way as II:xx.   (22:3) But the ideas of the modifications of the body are
] E2:XI(7)c [
in the human mind (II:xii.), that is, in G-d, in so far as he constitutes
^ [
2P11C ]
the essence of the human mind;  therefore the ideas of these ideas

will be in G-d,  in  so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the hu-

man mind, that is (II:xxi.), they will be in the human mind itself, which
affections [
therefore perceives not only the modifications of the body,  but also

the ideas of such modifications.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXIII.  
 Bk.III:223; Bk.XVIII:1902p23; Bk.XIX:1465; 15016.


Proof.  (23:1) The  idea  or knowledge of the mind  (II:xx.)  follows in
] related [
G-d  in  the same manner,  and is referred to G-d in the same man-

ner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.  (23:2) But since (II:xix.) the

human  mind  does  not  know  the human body itself,  that is  (II:xi.

Coroll.),  since  the  knowledge of the human body is not referred to

G-d,  in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the  nature  of the human mind;

therefore,  neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to G-d,  in

so  far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind;  therefore

(by the same Coroll.II:xi.),  the  human  mind  thus  far has no know-

ledge of itself.
Further the ideas of the modifications,  whereby

the  body  is  affected,  involve  the  nature of the human body itself

(II:xvi.), that is (II:xiii.), they agree with the nature of the mind; where-

fore  the  knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge

of the mind; but (by the last Prop.)  the knowledge of these ideas is
to this extent [
in  the  human  mind itself;  wherefore the human mind thus far only

has knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.

page 104
Prop. XXIV.   Bk.III:223; Bk.XVIII:1302p9c,20,24Bk.XIX:14811.

Proof.—  (24:1)  The  parts composing the human body do not belong

to  the essence of that body,  except in so far as they communicate

their  motions  to  one  another in a certain fixed relation  (Def. after

Lemma.iii), not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals with-

out  relation  to  the  human body.  
(24:2)The parts of the human body

are  highly  complex individuals  (Post.i.),  whose parts  (Lemma.iv.)
impairing [
can  be separated from the human body without in anyway destroy-
form         [
ing the nature and distinctive quality of the latter, and they can com-

municate their motions (Ax.i., after Lemma iii.) to other bodies in an-

other relation;  therefore  (II:iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part

will be in G-d, inasmuch (II:ix.) as He is regarded as affected by an-

other idea of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the

order  of Nature to the aforesaid part (II.vii.).  
(24:3) We may affirm the

same  thing  of  each  part of each individual composing the human

body;  therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the human

body  is  in  G-d,  in  so far as he is affected by very many ideas of

things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only,

in other  words,  the idea which constitutes the nature of the human

mind  (II:xiii.);   therefore  (II:xi.Coroll.),  the  human  mind  does  not

involve an adequate knowledge ]
of the component parts [ of the human

body.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXV.  Bk.III:222, 223.

                                      [ 2P16 ]                               ] affection [
Proof.— (25:1)  We  have  shown that the idea of a modification of the

human  body  involves  the nature of an external body,  in so far as
E2:XVI:98 [
that  external  body  conditions  the human body in a given manner.

(25:2) But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has no
related [
reference  to  the  human body,  the knowledge or idea thereof is in
G-d (II:ix.),  in so far as G-d is regarded as affected by the idea of a

further thing, which (II:vii.) is naturally prior to the said external body.
 as it affects man, }
(25:3) Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body ^ is not

in G-d, in so far as He has the idea of the modification of the human
because G-D has no emotions , C:4.4 }                                                                  G-D at 100% °P
body ^ ;  in  other  words,  the idea of the modification of the human
 necessarily, }
body  does  not  page 105  involve ^ a  { human's }  adequate  knowledge

of the external body.  Q.E.D. 

Prop. XXVI. 
Bk.III:222; Bk.XVIII:157p26Bk.XIX:1465.

(26:1)  If the human body is in no way affected by a given ex-

ternal body,  then  (II:vii.)  neither  is the idea of the human body,  in
E2:XIII:92 [         [ by 2P13 ]
other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the

existence of the said external body, nor does it any manner perceive

its  existence.  (26:2)  But,  in  so  far  as  the human body is affected in

any  way  by  a  given  external  body,  thus  far  (II:xvi. and Coroll.) it

perceives  that  external  body.  Q.E.D.

 E2:Shirley:2720 [
 (26:3) In  so  far as the human mind imagines an external              E2:2P24-32. 
body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.    2P43S.

Proof. (26:4) When the human mind regards external bodies through
                                ] affections [
the  ideas  of  the  modifications of its own body,  we say that it ima-
                                                                 [ cannot in any other way (by 2P26) ]
gines  (see II:xvii.note);  now  the  mind ^ can only imagine external

bodies as actually existing.  (26:5) Therefore (by II:xxv.), in so far as the

mind imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of

them.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVII. Bk.XIX:14811.

                                              ] affectiones [
Proof. (27:1) Every idea of a modifications of the human body involves

the nature of the human body, in so far as the human body is regard-

ed  as  affected in a given manner  (II:xvi.).   (27:2) But, inasmuch as the

human  body  is  an  individual  which may  be affected in many other

ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.  [ See 2P25D ]  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVIII. Bk.XVIII:189p28.

Proof. (28:1) The  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  human body, 

involve  the  nature  both of the human body and of external bodies

(II:xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human body but
also of its parts; for the modifications are modes (Post.iii.), whereby

the parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as

a whole are affected.
 (28:2) But (by II:xxiv, xxv) the adequate knowledge

of  external  bodies,   as  also  of  the  parts  composing   page 106   the

human body,
 is not in G-D, in so far as He is regarded as affected by
the human mind, but in so far as He is regarded as affected by other

(28:3)  These  ideas  of  modifications,  in  so  far  as  they  are

referred  to  the  human  mind  alone,  are as consequences without       
Real and Unreal Waves
{ support }
; Bk.XIX:14810. <Parkinson:27484E2:XXVIII:105, E2:XXXVIII:109, TEI:[73]:27.>  
premisses, in other words, confused ideas.   Q.E.D.

 (28:4)  The  idea  which  constitutes  the nature of the human

mind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in             E2:2P24-32. 

itself  alone,  clear and distinct;  as also is the case with the idea of
affection [ 
the human mind,  and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of
related [
the human body,  in so far as they are referred to the mind only, as

everyone may easily see. {
sic - Somewhat clearer in Bk.VII:84 }     2P29C, 43S.

Prop. XXIX.  Bk.XVIII:189p29.

                                            ] affection [
Proof.— (29:1) The idea of a modification of the human body  (II.xxvii.)
               < Bk.XV:27382E2:XXIV:104 >
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,  in other

words, does not adequately express its nature; that is (II:xiii.) it does
not agree with the nature of the mind adequately; therefore (

the  idea  of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the

human  mind,  or  does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof.

(29:2) Hence it follows that the human mind, when it per-               E2:2P24-32. 

ceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate
Bk.III:224, 228—mutilated; Bk.XVIII:119p29c; Bk.XX:23576. 
but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,  of its own

body,  and  of external bodies.  
(3) For the mind does not know itself,

except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body

(II. xxiii.).
  (29:4) It only perceives its own body (II:xix.) through the ideas
Bk.III:225. { things } [ by 2P26 ]
of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the

same means;  thus,  in so far  as it has such ideas of modification, it

has not an adequate knowledge of itself (II:xxix.), nor of its own body
(II:xxvii.),  nor of external bodies (II:xxv.),  but only a fragmentary and
Bk.XII:2522judgment              { and thus prone to error, alcohol abuse. }
confused knowledge thereof ^ (II:xxviii. and note.)  Q.E.D. 
    { ^ 
E3:GN(2):185 }                                                 2P40S2, 43S; 3P3.

Note.  (29:5)  I say expressly,  that the mind has not an adequate but                 E2:2P24-32. 

only  a  confused knowledge of itself,  its own body,  and of external

bodies,  whenever  it perceives things after the common order of na-
                                  < Bk.XV:27485E2:XXIV:104, E2:XXXVII -XL:109, E4:IV(9)C:194. >  
ture; that is, whenever it is determined  page 107  from without, namely,
passive emotion }
by  the fortuitous play of circumstance,  to regard this or that;  not at
Bk.III:224, 225; Bk.XIX:2387.
such times as it is determined from within,  that is,  by  the fact of re-
garding  several things at once,  to understand their points of agree-

ment,  difference,  and  contrast.   (29:6) Whenever  it  is determined in
{ active emotion }
anywise from within,  it regards things clearly and distinctly,  as I will
Bk.III:225; Bk.XIX:27610. 
show below.   { E3:GN2 }           2P43S.

Prop. XXX. 

Proof.  (30:1) The  duration  of  our  body  does  not  depend  on its
essence (II:Ax.i.), nor on the absolute nature of G-D (I:xxi).   (30:2)  But
determined [
(I:xxviii.) is conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in turn
are  conditioned  to  exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation

by other causes, these last again being conditioned by others,  and
so on to infinity.  (30:3) The duration of our body therefore depends on
] structure of the universe [
the common order of nature, or the constitution of things.  (30:4)  Now,

however  a  thing  may  be  constituted,  the adequate knowledge of

that  thing  is in God, in so far as He has the ideas of all things,  and

not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only. (II:ix.Coroll.).

(30:5)  Wherefore  the  knowledge of the duration of our body is in G-d

very inadequate,  in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the

nature  of  the  human  mind; that is  (II:xi.Coroll.),  this knowledge is

very inadequate in our mind.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXXI. 

                                 [ singular ]
Proof.—  (31:1) Every  particular  thing,  like the human body,  must be
] determined [
conditioned  by  another  particular  thing  to  exist  and operate in a

fixed  and  definite  relation;  this other particular thing must likewise

be  conditioned by a third,  and so on to infinity. (I:xxviii.)   (31:2) As we

have shown in the foregoing proposition,  from this common proper-

ty  of  particular things,  we have only a very inadequate knowledge

of the duration of our body;  we must draw a similar conclusion with

regard to the duration of particular things, namely, that we can only

have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof.   Q.E.D.

 (31:3) Hence it follows that all particular things are contin-
Bk.XIV:2:1091.     ] knowledge [   
gent and perishable. 
(4)  For we can have no ade
quate  page 108  idea               E2:2P24-32. 

of their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must under-
stand  by  the  contingency  and  perishableness  of things. (I:xxxiii.,
Note i.)  (31:5) For (I:xxix.), except in this sense,  nothing is contingent. 

                                                  2P43S; 3De15.

Prop. XXXII.  Bk.III:224, 225; Bk.XVIII:1682p32.

Proof.— (32:1)  All ideas which are in G-D agree in every respect with              G-D at 100% °P

their  objects  (II:vii.Coroll.),  therefore  (  they  are  all  true.                       ^

Q.E.D.   { Only objective ideas are in G-D when G-D is at 100% °P.   E3:GN(2)n }      <          Added by JBY

Prop. XXXIII. Bk.XVIII:168p33; Bk.XIX:14914

Proof.— (33:1) If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode
Bk.XVIII:172p33d.                                            ]    form of error or      [
of  thinking,  which  should  constitute the distinctive quality of false-
Bk.XIX:1317. ^
hood.  (33:2) Such a mode of thinking cannot be in G-D (II:xxxii.); exter-

nal to G-D it cannot be or be conceived (I:xv.).  (3) Therefore there is              Calculus:ALL
             { adequate }               ]       whereby  they  can  be  called  false.         [
nothing  positive  in  ideas  which  causes  them  to  be  called false.


Prop. XXXIV.  Bk.III:225; Bk.XVIII:125p34,36,38,40,43. 

Proof.—  (34:1)  When  we  say that an idea in us is adequate and per-

fect,  we say,  in other words (II:xi.Coroll.),  that the idea is adequate

and  perfect  in  G-D,  in so far as he constitutes the essence of our

mind;  consequently  (II:xxxii.),  we  say  that  such  an  idea  is  true.


Prop. XXXV.  Bk.III:187, 224; Bk.XIB:241125; Bk.XVIII:142p35, 168p35; Bk.XIX:1489.


                                                           { adequate }
Proof.—  (35:1) There is nothing positive in ideas,  which causes them
E2:Wolfson:2:110        Bk.XIV:2:1144.                     ] absolute [
to be called false (II:xxxiii);  but falsity cannot consist in simple priva-

tion  (for  minds,  not  bodies,  are  said  to  err  and to be mistaken),
neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error
lacking }
are not identical; wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge,

which inadequate,  fragmentary,  or confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.

                                                                                       > falsity—Bk.III:187  <
Note. (35:2) In the note to II:xvii. I explained how error consists in the
lacking }; Bk.XIX:14614.    Bk.XIV:1:4397Bk.VIII:87[8] or sin. ^
privation  of  knowledge,  but in order to throw more light on the sub-
defect  <                                                                     ] deceived [
ject  I  will  give an example.  (35:3) For instance,  men are mistaken in              Wegner:28  
      Bk.XIV:2:1165.       Bk.III:224.
thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness               Mark Twain  

of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are
determined [
conditioned.  (35:4) Their  idea  of freedom, therefore, is simply  page 109

their ignorance of any cause for their actions.   (5)  As for their saying

that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without

any idea to correspond thereto. (6) What the will is, and how it moves
the body,  they none of them know;  those who boast of such know-
 make up stories of [              Bk.XIV:2:1165.  
ledge,  and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to              Pineal Gland

provoke either laughter or disgust.   (35:7)  So, again, when we look at
the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
 seeing [           
this  error does not lie solely in this fancy,  but in the fact that,  while

we  thus  imagine,  we  do  not  know  the  sun's true distance or the
cause of the fancy.   (35:8)  For although we afterwards learn,  that the

sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters,

we none the less shall fancy it to be near;  for we do not imagine the

sun  as  near  us,  because we are ignorant of its true distance,  but

because  the  modification  of  our  body involves the essence of the

sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby.

                             2P43S, 49S; 3De27; 4P1S; 5P5.

Prop. XXXVI.  Bk.III:225; Bk.XIV:2:117; Bk.XVIII:12534, 36, 38, 40, 43. 

 Proof.—  (36:1)  All  ideas  are in G-D (I:xv.),  and in so far as they are
related [                                                                    Bk.XIX:1452.
referred to G-D are true (II:xxxii.) and (II:vii.Coroll.) adequate;  there-

fore  there  are no ideas confused or inadequate,  except in respect
finite, a modeBk.III:225.
to a particular mind (cf. II:xxiv. and xxviii.); therefore all ideas, wheth- 
Cor. ]
er  adequate  or  inadequate,  follow  by  the  same  necessity (II:vi.).



Prop. XXXVII.  Bk.III:225, 226; Bk.XVIII:3672p37; Bk.XIX:2769, 30610. 

Proof.— (37:1)  If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if possible, that it consti-

tutes  the  essence  of  some  particular  thing;  for instance,  the es-

sence of B.  (37:2) Then (II:Def.ii.) it cannot without B either exist or be

conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.  (37:3) Therefore it does

not  appertain to B's essence,  nor does it constitute the essence of

any particular thing.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXXVllI.  Bk.III:226; Bk.XVIII:183fp38; Bk.XIX:29517, 30713. 

Proof.—  (38:1)  Let  A  be  something,  which  is common to all bodies,

and  which  is  equally  present  in the part of any given body and in

the whole.  (1a)  I say A cannot be conceived page 110 except adequate-

(38:2) For the idea thereof in G-D will necessarily be adequate (II:vii.           G-D at 100% °P

Coroll.), both in so far as G-D has the idea of the human body, and

also  in  so  far as he has the idea of the modifications of the human

body,  which  (II:xvi., xxv., xxvii.)  involve in part the nature of the hu-

man  body and the nature of external bodies;  that is (II:xii., xiii.), the

idea  in  G-D will necessarily be adequate,  both in so far as he con-               Idea of G-D

stitutes  the  human mind,  and in so far as he has the ideas,  which
are  in the human mind.   (38:3) Therefore the mind (II:xi.Coroll.) neces-

sarily  perceives  A  adequately,  and has this adequate perception,

both  in  so far as it perceives itself,  and in so far as it perceives its

own or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other man-

ner.  Q.E.D.

(38:4)   Hence  it  follows  that  there  are  certain  ideas or 
Bk.XV:27488E2:XL(3)N1:111, E2:XXXVII:109, :46. > 
notions  common  to  all  men;  for (by Lemma.ii.)  all bodies agree in            Bk.XIV:2:1247.
      Bk.III:56,127, 228.              ^ E2:Wolfson:2:1623. 
certain  respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be adequately  
or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.  Bk.XIX:28121.      2P40S2; 3P3.

Prop XXXIX.  Bk.III:227, 228; Bk.XVIII:183fp38; Bk.XIV:2:1624. 


Proof.— (39:1)  If A  be that,  which is common to and a property of the

human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
Bk.XIX:2768, 27916.
body  and in the said external bodies,  in each part of each external

body  and  in the whole,  there will be an adequate idea of A in G-D

(II:vii.Coroll.),  both  in  so far as he has the idea of the human body,

and  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  ideas  of  the given external bodies.
(39:2)  Let  it  now  be  granted,  that  the human body is affected by an

external body through that, which it has in common therewith, name-

ly,  A;  the idea of this modification will involve the property A (II:xvi.),

and therefore (II:vii.Coroll.) the idea of this modification,  in so far as

it involves the property A,  will be adequate in G-D, in so far as G-D

is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (II:xiii.), in so far as

he constitutes the nature of the human mind;  therefore (II:xi.Coroll.)

this idea is also adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.

page 111

Corollary.—  (39:3)  Hence  it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive
Bk.III:227, 228.
adequately  more things,  in proportion as its body has more in com-          Hampshire32:95 

mon with other bodies.        2P40S2.

Prop. XL. Bk.XIX:15118EL:L42(37):360—E5:IV(4)n:249.

Proof.— (40:1) This proposition  is self-evident.   (2)  For  when  we say

that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein

adequate, we say, in other words (II:xi.Coroll.), that an idea is in the

divine intellect,  whereof G-D is the cause,  not in so far as he is in-

finite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many parti-

cular  things,  but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the

human mind.

Note I.
(40:3) I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which            Weinphal:104
are  common  to  all men,  and which form the basis of our ratiocina-
tion.  (40:4)  But  there  are  other  causes of certain axioms or notions,              Bk.XIV:2:1191. 

which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours;
for  it  would  thus appear what notions are more useful than others,
and  what  notions  have  scarcely any use at all.  
(40:5)  Furthermore,

we  should  see  what notions are common to all men,  and what no-

tions  are  only  clear  and  distinct  to those who are unshackled by
prejudice,   and   we   should   detect  those  which  are  ill-founded.
                                                                                               < Bk.XV:27491 >  
(40:6)  Again  we  should discern whence the notions called secondary
   Bk.XIV:2:123; Bk.III:226 ^ 
derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are 
founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions.           Bk.XIV:2:1231. 

(40:7) But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because
                                          < Bk.XV:27592TEI > 
I have set it aside for another treatise,  partly because I am afraid of

wearying the reader by too great prolixity. 
(40:8) Nevertheless, in order

not  to  omit anything necessary to be known,  I will briefly set down
                                                                                                     < E2:Parkinson:27593 > 
the causes,  whence  are  derived  the  terms styled transcendental,           Hampshire32:117 
             ] Entity [       Bk.XIX:27711.                                                       
such as Being, Thing, Something.   (40:9) These terms arose from the

fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly

forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in

II:xvii.note) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded,
the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, which

the  body  is capable of forming distinctly within itself,  be largely ex-

ceeded,  all will  page 112  become entirely confused one with another.

(40:10) This being so,  it is evident  (from II:Prop.xvii.Coroll.  and  xviii.)
that  the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simulta-

neously, as its body can form images simultaneously.  (11)  When the

images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines

all  bodies confusedly without any distinction,  and will comprehend
them,  as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of

Being, Thing, &c.  (40:12) The same conclusion can be drawn from the

fact  that images are not always equally vivid,  and from other analo-

gous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose

which  we  have  in  view  it  is  sufficient for us to consider one only.

(40:13)  All may be reduced to this,  that these terms represent ideas in

the  highest degree confused. 
(40:14)  From similar causes arise those
                  Bk.III:53, 226—species.                        Bk.XIV:2:1242. 
notions,   which  we  call  generaI,  such  as  man,  horse,  dog,  &c.

(40:15) They  arise,  to  wit,  from  the fact that so many images,  for in-

stance,  of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind,  that
Bk.XIV:2:883. 3P56.
the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the

extent  of the mind losing count of small differences between individ-

uals  (e.g. colour, size, &c.)  and their definite number,  and only dis-

tinctly  imagining  that,  in  which  all the individuals,  in so far as the
body is affected by them,  agree;  for that is the point, in which each

of  the  said  individuals  chiefiy affected the body;  this the mind ex-
affirms }
presses  by the name man,  and this it predicates of an infinite num-
ber of particular individuals.   (40:16)  For,  as we have said, it is unable

to imagine the definite number of individuals.  (16a) We must, however,

bear  in  mind,  that these general notions are not formed by all men

in the same way,  but vary in each individual according as the point

varies,  whereby  the  body has been most often affected and which
the  mind  most  easily  imagines or remembers.   (40:17)  For instance,

those  who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of

man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature;

those  who  have  been  accustomed to regard some other attribute,

will  form a different general image of man,  for instance, that man is

a  laughing  animal,  a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational
animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images

of things according to the habit of his body.

page 113

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who

seek  to  explain  things  in  nature  merely by the images formed of
them, so many controversies should have arisen.      4P27.


[ Bk. VIII:55916 ]
Bk.XV:27594TEI:[19-24]:8, E4:LXII(5)N:230. >  
Note II.
(40:19) From all that has been said above it is clear, that we,
                                                  < universal >  Bk.III:228.
in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:—                              E1:Shirley:609.

    EL:Shirley:212201; Bk.XIV:2:1454,7, 10; Bk.XVIII:232p40s2; Bk.XIX:2891. 
   { imagination, reason, intuition  -  I:2.1 }
Bk.XIB:22377; Bk.XVIII:364. 

(1.)  (40:20) From particular things represented to our intellect fragment-
raw, unverified }                   Bk.XIV:2:1341. 
arilyconfusedly,  and  without  order  through  our  senses  (II: xxix.

Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of know-
   < uncertain.  Bk.XV:27595TEI:[20]:8. >
ledge from the mere suggestions of experience.   

names }
(2.)  (40:21)  From symbols,  e.g., from the fact of having read or heard

certain  words  we  remember  things  and  form  certain  ideas  con-
 E2:XVII(12):100 }
cerning  them,  similar  to  those  through  which  we  imagine  things

(II:xviii. note).  
 (40:22)   I  shall  call  both these ways of regarding things
I:2.1 }           { raw, unverified data
knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
                                                                           "Imagination is opposed to intellect,
                                                                            just as image is opposed to idea." 

Bk.III:56, 226; Bk.XIB:22377. 
(3.) (40:23) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and
a posteriori }
adequate ideas of the properties of things (II:xxxviii.Coroll., xxxix and             
                                      { Verified data, but still subject to error }    { I:2.1 } 
Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind.
Bk.XIA:5817; Bk.XIV:2:1662 ^  

] E1:Shirley:609 [ 
(40:24)  Besides  these two kinds of knowledge,  there is,  as I will here-
I:2.1}; Bk.III:230; Bk.XIA:142116; Bk.XVIII:364; Bk.XIX:29930, 30034.         Robinson3:170
after show,  a  third kind  of knowledge,  which we  will  call  intuition.           Parkinson:285177 
{the knowledge that comes from a mystical experience.}
a priori } Bk.III:230; Bk.XX:24189.               { true idea } 
(40:25) This kind of ^ knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the  
Bk.XIA:142117, 118.  
absolute essence of certain attributes of G-D to the adequate know-
Bk.XIB:222; Bk.XIX:30033. 
ledge of the essence of things.  (40:26) I will illustrate all three kinds of
Bk.XIB:22684.                Bk.XIB:244133; Bk.XVIII:364. 
knowledge  by  a  single  example.  (27)  Three numbers are given for                Bk.XIV:2:1594. 

finding  a  fourth,  which  shall be to the third as the second is to the

first.   (40:28)  Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the

third,  and  divide  the product by the first;  either because they have

not  forgotten  the  rule  which  they  received  from a master without

any  proof,  or  because  they  have often made trial of it with simple

numbers,  or  by  virtue  of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of

the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property

of proportionals.

(40:29) But  with  very  simple numbers there is no need of this.  (30) For

instance,  one,  two,  three,  being given, everyone can see that the

fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer
< E2:Parkinson:27596TEI:[24]:10. >
the  fourth  number  from  an  intuitive  PAGE 114  grasping of the ratio,

which the first bears to the second. 2P42, 47S; 3P1, 56, 58; 4P26, 27; 5P7, 10, 12, 25, 28, 31.

Prop. XLI.   Bk.III:228.

(41:1) To  knowledge  of  the first kind we have (in the forego-
Bk.XVIII:1832p41d; Bk.XIX:2891.
ing  note)  assigned all those ideas,  which are inadequate and con-

fused;  therefore  this  kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity

(II:xxxv.).  (2) Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds    
                                                            < E5:Parkinson:285177E5:XXXVI(7)N:265. >  
of  knowledge  those  ideas  which  are  adequate;  therefore  these

kinds are necessarily true (II:xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.

Bk.III:228; Bk.XIX:2905.

Proof. (42:1) This proposition is self-evident. (2)  He, who knows how

to distinguish between true and false,  must have an adequate idea

of true and false.   (42:3)  That is  (II:xl.note.ii.), he must know the true

and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

Prop. XLIII.  
Bk.III:228; Bk.XVIII:176f2p43; Bk.XIX:1318

Proof. (43:1)  A true  idea in us is an idea which is adequate in G-D,
                              [ explained ]
in  so  far  as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
posit ]
(II:xi.Coroll.).  (2)  Let us suppose that there is in G-D,  in so far as he

is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, A. 
(43:3) The
                                                                                              ] related [
idea  of  this idea must also necessarily be in G-D,  and be referred

to  him in the same way as the idea A (by II:xx.,  whereof the proof is

of universal application).   
But  the  idea A is supposed to be re-

ferred to G-D, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind;

therefore, the idea of the idea A must be referred to G-D in the same

manner;  that is (by II:xi.Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will

be  in the mind,  which has the adequate idea A;  therefore he,  who

has  an  adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II:xxxiv.),  must at the

same  time  have  an  adequate idea or true knowledge of his know-

ledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.

(43:5)  I explained in the note to II:xxi. what is meant  page 115  by
         < TEI:[34], [35}:13 >
the  idea  of an idea;  but we may remark that the foregoing proposi-
self-evident. ]                             { Pollock:129 bottom }
tion is in itself sufficiently plain. 
(43:5a) No one, who has a true idea, is
                                                                                               E1:Shirley:609 ^
ignorant  that  a true idea involves the highest certainty.   (43:6)  For to          Hampshire:99-100

have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing per-           clear and distinct 
     { knowing its cause }                                                  Bk.III:228.
fectly, or as well as possible.  (43:7)  No one, indeed, can doubt of this,          E2:Parkinson:27597
                     ^ E1:Parkinson:2601                                                                         Bk.XVIII:164p43s.
unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless,  like a picture on
tablet [
a panel,  and not a mode of thinkingnamely, the very act of under-

standing.  (8) And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything,

unless he do first understand it? (43:9)  In other words,  who can know

that  he  is  sure  of  a  thing,  unless  he  be  first sure of that thing?

Further,  what can there be more clear,  and more certain, than
Bk.XIV:2:1003.                                 ] makes manifest [
a true idea as a standard of truth?   (43:11)  Even as light displays both        Hampshire32:100 & 105  
 ^ posit: ONE1D6}
itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

(43:12) I think I have thus sufficiently answered these questions—name-
2P35 ]                                 [ only as being to nonbeing ]
ly, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it

is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or per-

fection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by an
characteristic [
extrinsic mark); consequently, neither will a man who has true ideas

have any advantage over him who has only false ideas.   (13) Further,
2P19 to 2P35s ]
how comes it that men have false ideas?  (43:14)  Lastly, how can any-

one be sure,  that  he  has  ideas  which  agree  with  their objects?

These  questions,  I  repeat,  I have,  in my opinion,  sufficiently

(43:16) The difference between a true idea and a false idea

is  plain:  from  what was said in II:xxxv.,  the former is related to the

latter  as  being is to not-being.  (43:17) The causes of falsity I have set

forth very clearly in  II:xix. and II:xxxv. with the note.   (43:18) From what

is  there  stated,  the difference between a man who has true ideas,
obvious. [
and a man who has only false ideas, is made apparent.  (43:19)  As for

the  last  question—as  to how a man can be sure that he has ideas

that  agree with their objects,  I have just pointed out, with abundant

clearness,  that  his  knowledge arises from the simple fact,  that he

has an idea which corresponds with its objectin other words,  that 

truth  is its own standard.
  (43:20)  We may add that our mind,  in so far
< E1:XVII(18)N:61 >
as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of G-D (II:xi.
Coroll.);  therefore,  the  clear and distinct  ideas  of the mind are as
inevitably [                           Bk.XIV:1:2402.   
necessarily  true  as  the  ideas of G-D.             2P49S; 4P27, 62                                Bk.XIV:2:1553,1581. 

page 116

Prop. XLIV.  Bk.III:229; Bk.XII:2021—the theory of determinism; Bk.XVIII:3202p44; Bk.XX:23677. 

Proof. (44:1)  It  is  in  the nature of  reason  to  perceive things truly

(II:xli.),  namely (,  as they are in themselvesthat is  (I:xxix.),

not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.
Corollary I.
(44:2) Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagin-

ation that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the
Bk.III:229; Bk.XVIII:1212p44c1.
past, as contingent.

(44:3) How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly ex-
(3a)  We have shown above  (II:xvii. and Coroll.)  that the mind
always regards things as present to itself,  even though they be not

in existence,  until some causes arise which exclude their existence
and presence.  (44:4)  Further (II:xviii.),  we showed that,  if the human

body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously,

the  mind,  when  it  afterwards  imagines  one  of  the  said external

bodies,  will  straightway  remember the otherthat is,  it will regard

both  as  present  to itself,  unless there arise causes which exclude

their existence and presence.   
(44:5)   Further,  no one doubts that we          
imagine  time,  from   the  fact  that  we imagine bodies to be moved

some  more  slowly than others,  some more quickly,  some at equal                Bk.XIV:1:3532.

speed.  (6) Thus,  let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for         Bk.XII:202-3Determinism

the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening;

then,  that  to-day he again sees Peter in the morning.   (44:7)  It is evi-

dent, from II:xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will

imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did

when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine

a   complete day,  and,  together with his imagination of the morning,

he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with even-

ing,  he will imagine Simon—that is, he will imagine the existence of

Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand,  if he

sees  Simon  in  the  evening,  he will refer Peter and Paul to a past

time,  by  imagining  them  simultaneously  with the imagination of a

past  time.   (44:8)  If  it should at any time happen,  that on some other

evening  the  child  should see James instead of Simon,  he will,  on

the  following  morning,  associate  with  his  imagination  of evening

sometimes  Simon,  sometimes   PAGE 117   James,  not  both  together:

for  the child is supposed to have seen,  at evening,  one or other of
2P49S; 3P18, 18S1.
them,  not  both  together.  (44:9)  His imagination will therefore waver;

and,  with  the imagination of future evenings,  he will associate first

one, then the otherthat is, he will imagine them in the future, neith-

er of them as certain, but both as contingent.  (44:10) This wavering of

the  imagination  will  be  the same,  if the imagination be concerned

with  things which we thus contemplate,  standing in relation to time

past or time present:  consequently,  we may imagine things as con-

tingent,  whether  they  be  referred to time present,  past,  or future.            

Corollary II. (44:11)  It  is  in  the  nature  of reason to perceive things 
Bk.XV:27698Bk.XV:26425 on E1:XVI(3)C1:59, 
                   Bk.XV:26736, TEI:[108:10]:40. >
under  a  certain  form of eternity  (sub quâdam œternitatis specie).               Bk.XIV:2:161. 
                              aspect—Bk.III:229.                  4P62; 5P29

Proof.  (44:12)  It  is  in  the nature of reason to regard things,  not as 
contingent,  but  as  necessary (II:xliv.).   (44:13)  Reason perceives this

necessity  of things  (II:xli.)  trulythat is  (,  as  it  is  in itself.

(44:14)  But  (I:xvi.)  this  necessity  of things is the very necessity of the

eternal  Nature  of  G-D;  therefore,  it  is  in  the  nature of reason to
                                   < a certain species of >
regard things under this form of eternity  (44:15)  We may add that the
[ foundations ]                        Bk.III:56                             [ explain ]
bases  of  reason are the notions (II:xxxviii.),  which answer to things

common  to  all,  and  which (II:xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence
of  any  particular thingwhich must therefore be conceived without

any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity. 

Prop. XLV.  Bk.III:230; Bk.XVIII:3682p45-47Bk.XIX:1613,13830; 27918; 29724. 

Proof.  (45:1) The  idea  of  a particular thing actually existing neces-

sarily  involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing
Cor. ]
(II:viii.).  (45:2) Now particular things cannot be conceived without G-D

(I:xv.); but,  inasmuch  as (II:vi.) they have G-D for their cause, in so
considered [
far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in ques-

tion  are  modestheir  ideas must necessarily involve  (I:Ax.iv.)  the
by 1D6, ]
conception of the attribute of those ideasthat is (I:vi.),  the eternal
and infinite essence of G-D.  Q.E.D.

< Bk.XV:282160 on E4:LXXII(3)N:235,
5P29S                     E2:Parkinson:278112 >
Note. (45:3) By existence I do not here mean duration—that is, exist-
ence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly,  and as a certain form

of  quantity.   (45:4)  I  am  speaking  of the very  page 118  nature of exist-

ence,  which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in

infinite  numbers  and  in  infinite  ways from the eternal necessity of

G-D's Nature (I:xvi.).   (45:5)  I am speaking,  I repeat,  of the very exist-

ence  of  particular  things,  in so far as they are in G-D.  
(45:6)  For al-
determined [ 
though  each  particular thing  be  conditioned  by another particular
Bk.III:153.                               Bk.III:231; Bk.XIV:2:1973. 
thing  to  exist in a given way,  yet the force whereby each particular
< Bk.XV:27699E1:XXVIII:67, 
E2:Parkinson:278111 & 112
160 on E4:LXXII(3)N:235. >
thing   perseveres   in  existing  follows from the eternal necessity of              Bk.XIV:2:1984.
                               1P23 > 
G-D's Nature  (cf. I:xxiv.Coroll.).

Prop.  XLVI.
 Bk.III:230; Bk.XX:23779.


Proof. (46:1)The proof of the last proposition is universal; and wheth-

er a thing be  considered  as  a part  or  a  whole,  the  idea thereof,

whether  of  the  whole  or  of  a part (by the last Prop.),  will involve

G-D's eternal and infinite essence.  (46:2) Wherefore, that which gives
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of G-D, is common to

all,  and is equally in the part and in the whole;  therefore (II: xxxviii.)
Bk.XIX:14339; 27919.
this knowledge will be adequate.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XLVII.
 Bk.XVIII:125p39-47; Bk.III:230; Bk.XX:23780. 

Proof. (47:1)The human mind has ideas (II:xxii.),  from which (II:xxiii.)

it perceives itself and its own body (II:xix.) and external bodies (II:xvi.

Coroll.I, II:xvii.)  as actually existing;
therefore  (II:xlv., xlvi.)  it has an

adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of G-D.


2P49S; 4P36; 5P10, 20S, 36S.
Note. (47:2) Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity 
of G-D are known to all.  (47:3)  Now as all things are in G-D,  and are
^ a priori }                                                   ] deduce [
conceived  through  G-D,  we  can  from this knowledge  infer  many               unfolding

things,  which  we  may  adequately  know,  and  we  may  form that

third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the (note to II:xl.), and
of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak

in Part V.  
(47:4)  Men  have  not so clear a knowledge of G-D as they
{universal}                                                          Bk.XIX:29725.
have  of  general notions,  because they are unable to imagine G-D            E2:Wolfson:2:1623 

as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name
G-D with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as in-            E2:Wolfson:2:1631

deed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and con- 
waves }
tinually  affected by page 119  external bodies.  (47:5) Many errors, in truth,  
{ cause }                             Bk.XVIII:168p47s.
can  be  traced  to this head,  namely, that we do not apply names to

things rightly.  (6) For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn

from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then,

at  all  events,  assuredly  attaches  a meaning to the word circle dif-

ferent  from  that  assigned  by mathematicians.  (47:7) So again, when

men  make  mistakes  in  calculation,  they have one set of figures in

their  mind,  and  another on the paper.  (47:8) If we could see into their

minds,  they  do  not  make  a  mistake; they seem to do so, because

we  think,  that  they  have  the  same  numbers in their mind as they

have  on  the  paper.  (47:9)  If  this  were not so, we should not believe

them  to  be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error,

whom  I  lately  heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into

a  neighbour's  hen,  for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.

(47:10) Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do

not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the mean-

ing  of  others.  (47:11)  For, as a matter of fact,  as they flatly contradict

themselves,  they  assume  now  one side, now another, of the argu-

ment,  so  as  to  oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken

and  absurd  in  their opponents.  ] (47:11)  For, in reality, while they are

hotly contradicting one another, they are either in agreement or have

different  things  in  mind, so that the apparent errors and absurdities

of their opponents are really not so. [ 

Prop.  XLVIII. Bk.III:214, 233; Bk.XIB:241126; Bk.XII:2051.
2p48; 1252p48,49; 159p48. 

                                        ] definite and determinate [          Bk.III:233.
Proof. (48:1) The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought  (II:xi.),
Bk.XIV:2:1732; Bk.XVIII:3162p48dE1:D.VII:46. 
therefore  it  cannot be the free cause of its actions  (I:xvii.Coroll.ii.);               Mark Twain

in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or neg-
willing [
ative volitionbut  (by I:xxviii.)  it  must  be  determined  by  a cause,    { Bk.XIV:2:1722—applies also

which has also been determined by another cause,  and this last by     to understanding, desire, etc. }
another, &c.  Q.E.D.

(48:2) In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no
E2:Wolfson:2:1722         Weinphal:104
absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.  (3) Whence it           Bk.XIV:1:2387, 2:1732. 
  { The mind is like a computer ^ }                            Bk.XIB:241126Bk.XIV:2:1686. 
follows,  that  these  and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious,
 metaphysical entities or universals [ 
or are merely abstract or general terms, such as we are accustomed 
metaphysical or universal—Bk.XIV:2:438. 
to put together from particular things (48:4) Thus the intellect and the           Durant96:177 
                                 Bk.XIV:2:1695.     2P49C.      Bk.III:77 
will stand in the same relation to this or that idea, or this or that page 120
] stoniness [
volition, as "lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul

The  cause  which  leads  men to consider themselves free has

been  set forth in the Appendix to Part 1.  (48:6)  But, before I proceed
                                                     < Bk.XV:276100Bk.XV:278112 on E3:VII:136 > 
Bk.XV:278113 on E3:IX(3)N:137. >
further,  I  would here remark that,  by  the  will  to affirm and decide,
I  mean the faculty, not the desire.   (48:7)  I mean,  I repeat, the faculty,  
                      ^  ] capability [
whereby  the  mind  affirms  or  denies what is true or false,  not the           Bk.XIV:2:1704. 
desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given               Bk.XIV:2:1676.

thing.  (48:8)  After  we  have  proved,  that  these faculties  of  ours are
 universal {common}Bk.III:56. 
general notions
, which cannot be distinguished from the particular in-

stances  on which they are based, we must inquire whether volitions
                                                           ] G:Shirley:2513ideateE2:XLIX:120 [ 
themselves  are  anything  besides the ideas of things.
(48:9)  We must

inquire,  I  say,  whether  there is in the mind any affirmation or nega-

tion  beyond  that,  which  the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves.

(48:10)  On  which  subject  see  the following proposition, and II:Def.iii.,
] lest thought {is thought to be} pictures. [ 
lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself.  (48:11) For by ideas I do
not  mean  images  such  as  are formed at the back of the eye, or in             Bk.XIV:2:473. 
^ clear ideas            distinct ideas
the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.

{48:11 paraphrased—Clear and Distinct Ideas: A flying horse is a clear idea; but if you analyse the size and strength of the wings and the innate power of the horse and see that it could not possibly fly, it fails to be a distinct (objective) idea—it is a contradiction.}

Prop. XLIX.  Bk.III:206, 233, 234; Bk.XIV:2:1734; Bk.XVIII:1252p48,49; 159p49; 164p49.

                                                    [ 2P48 ]                         {   arbritrary
Proof. (49:1) There  is  in  the mind no absolute faculty of positive or
      choices              }                   { judgmental choices ,  based on }                                 Mark Twain
negative  volition,  but  only  particular  volitions, namely, this or that
 approval }                               { rejection }
affirmation,  and  this  or  that  negation.  (2)  Now  let  us  conceive a

particular  volition,  namely,  the mode of thinking whereby the mind

affirms,  that  the  three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two              Durant:648150

right  angles.  (3) This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a

triangle, that is, without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.

(49:4)  It  is  the  same thing to say, that the concept A must involve the

concept  B,  as  it  is  to  say,  that  A cannot be conceived without B.

(49:5)  Further,  this  affirmation  cannot  be  made (II:Ax.iii.)  without the

idea of a triangle.  (49:6) Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor

be  conceived,  without the idea of a triangle.  (7) Again, this idea of a

triangle  must  involve  this  same  affirmation,  namely, that its three

interior angles are equal to two right angles.  (8) Wherefore, and vice

versâ,  this  idea  of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived with-

out this affirmation, therefore, PAGE 121  this affirmation belongs to the

essence  of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing besides.  (49:9) What

we  have  said  of  this  volition  (inasmuch as we have selected it at

random)  may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing

but an idea.  Q.E.D.

intellect [           Bk.III:233; Bk.XVIII:160p49c.
Corollary. (49:10)  Will and understanding are one and the same.                    Bk.XIV:2:1701.
                                          { ^ Durant65:177}                              [ singular ]
intellect [                                        ] particular [
Proof. (49:11) Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individ-
{ choice }
ual volition and idea (II:xlviii. and note).  (49:12) But a particular volition
by 2P49 ]
and a particular idea are one and the same (by the foregoing Prop.);

therefore,  will  and  understanding  are  one  and the same.  Q.E.D.

 (49:13)  We  have thus removed the cause which is commonly
              < Bk.XV:277102 >
assigned for error(49:14)  For we have shown above, that falsity con-
lack, defect } 
sists  solely  in  the  privation  of  knowledge involved in ideas which

are fragmentary and confused. 
(49:15)  Wherefore,  a false idea,  inas-
                                              < Bk.XV:277103E3:Def.XV(3):177, 
199 on TEI:[35:1]:13. >
much  as  it is false,  does not involve certainty(49:16)  When we say,
then,  that  a  man  acquiesces  in what is false,  and that he has no 
doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that

he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch

as  there  are  no  reasons,  which  should  cause his imagination to

waver  (see II:xliv.note).  
(49:17)  Thus,  although the man be assumed

to  acquiesce  in what is false,  we shall never say that he is certain.

(49:17a)  For by certainty we mean something positive (II:xliii.,and note),

not merely the absence of doubt.

(49:18)  However,  in  order  that the foregoing proposition may be fully,

explained,  I  will draw attention to a few additional points,  and I will

furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against
shred of doubt, [
our  doctrine(49:19)  Lastly,  in order to remove every scruple,  I have

thought  it  worth  while to point out some of the advantages,  which

follow  therefrom.   (49:20)  I say "some,"  for they will be better appreci-

ated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make

an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind,

and  the  images  of things which we imagine.  
(22)  It is further neces-
                                                                                 { sham 
sary that they should distinguish between idea and words, whereby
Bk.XIV:2:1741.                             { undefined }
we signify things.  (49:23) These three—namely,  images,  words,  and

ideas—are by
page 122 many persons either entirely confused together,

or  not  distinguished  with  sufficient  accuracy  or care,  and  hence

people  are  generally  in ignorance,  how absolutely necessary is a
understanding }       ] theoretical [
knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic purposes

and  for  the  wise ordering of life.  
(49:24)  Those who think that ideas

consist  in  images  which  are formed in us by contact with external

bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, where-

of  we  can form no mental picture,  are not ideas,  but only figments,

which  we  invent  by  the  free  decree  of our will;  they thus regard
ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled

with  this misconception,  do not see that an idea,  inasmuch as it is
Say the definition (idea) of "G-D "; it is either affirmed or denied. } 
an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.  (49:25)  Again, those who
{ undefined } 
confuse  words  with ideas,  or with the affirmation which an idea in-
desire }
volves,  think  that  they  can  wish something contrary to what they
prejudice ]
feel,  affirm, or deny. 
(26) This misconception will easily be laid aside
thought ]
by one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it

in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly

understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist

in the image of anything, nor in words.  
The essence of words

and  images  is  put  together  by  bodily  motions,  which in no wise

involve the conception of thought.

(49:28)  These  few  words on  this  subject  will suffice:  I will therefore

pass  on  to  consider  the objections,  which may be raised against

our  doctrine.   
Of these,  the  First  is advanced by those,  who

think  that  the  will  has a wider scope than the understanding,  and

that therefore it is different therefrom.  (49:30) The reason for their hold-

ing the belief,  that the will has wider scope than the understanding,

is  that  they  assert,  that  they have no need of an increase in their

faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent

to an infinity of things  which we do not perceive,  but that they have

need  of an increase in their faculty of understanding.  (49:31)  The will

is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the

former  infinite.  
(49:32)  Secondly
,  it  may  be objected that experience

seems  to  teach  us especially clearly,  that we are able to suspend

our  judgment  before assenting to things which we perceive;  this is

confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so page 123
 far  as  he  perceives  anything,  but  only in so far as he assents or


imagines [
(49:33) For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore

admit  that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless
he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.   (49:34)   Nothing

therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,  than that

the  will  or  faculty  of assent is free and different from the faculty of
understanding.  (49:35) Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation

does  not  apparently  contain  more  reality  than  another;  in other

words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is

true,  any greater power than for affirming,  that what is false is true.

(49:36)  We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or per-

fection  than  another,  for  as objects are some more excellent than

others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than oth-

ers; this also seems to point to a difference between the understand-

ing and the will.   
(49:37) Fourthly
,  it may be objected,  if man does not

act  from  free  will,  what  will  happen if the incentives to action are
< Bk.XV:277104 >
equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  (49:38)  Will he per-

ish of hunger and thirst?   (49:39)  If I say that he would,  I shall seem to

have  in  my  thoughts  an  ass or the statue of a man rather than an

actual man.  (49:40) If I say that he would not, he would then determine

his  own  action,  and would consequently possess the faculty of go-
wants[, [wills]
ing  and  doing whatever he liked.   (49:41)  Other objections might also

be  raised,  but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that
replying to [
anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those

I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.

(49:42) To  the  first  objection  I  answer, that I admit that the will has a
] intellect [                            ] intellect [
wider  scope  than  the  understanding,  if  by  the understanding be

meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wi-

der  scope  than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming concep-

tions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite,

any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same

faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after the

other,  for  we  cannot  affirm  an infinite number simultaneously), so

also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in suc-

cession)  an  infinite  number  page 124   of  bodies.   (49:43)  If  it be said

that  there  is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive,
retort [
I  answer,  that  we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
willing [
consequently,  by  any  faculty  of  volition(49:44)  But,  it  may  still be

urged,    if   G-D    wished    to   bring   it   about   that   we   should

perceive  them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater fac-

ulty  of  perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have

already.  (49:45) This is the same as to say that, if G-D wished to bring

it  about  that we should understand an infinite number of other enti-
ties,  it  would be necessary for him to give us a greater understand-

ing,  but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have
already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.  (49:46) We have shown

that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particu-

lar volitions—in  other  words,  that  which  is  common  to  all  such 


(49:47) As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or uni-

versal  to  all volitions,  is a faculty,  it is little to be wondered at that

they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond
intellect [
the  limits  of  the  understanding:  for what is universal is predicated

alike  of  one,  of  many,  and  of  an  infinite  number  of  individuals.

(49:48) To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free

power  of  suspending  our judgment: for, when we say that anyone

suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does
< Bk.XV:277105 >
not perceive the matter in question adequately.  (49:49) Suspension of

judgment  is,  therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free

(49:50) In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagin-   
] winged [
ing a ^ horse,
and perceiving nothing else. (49:51)
Inasmuch as this ima-

gination  involves  the  existence of the horse (II:xvii.Coroll.), and the

boy  does  not perceive anything which would exclude the existence

of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: he will

not  be  able  to  doubt  of  its  existence,  although he be not certain

thereof.  (49:52)  We  have  daily experience of such a state of things in

dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would main-

tain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending

his  judgment  concerning  the  things in his dream,  and bringing  it

about  that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that

he  sees;  yet  it  happens,   page 125   notwithstanding,  that  even  in

dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we

are dreaming.

(49:53) Further,  I grant  that no one can be deceived,  so far as actual

perception  extendsthat is,  I  grant  that  the  mind's imaginations,
regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II:xvii.note); but I deny,

that  a  man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation.

(49:54)  For  what  is  the  perception of a winged horse,  save affirming

that  a  horse  has wings?  (55) If the mind could perceive nothing else

but  the  winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself:

it would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty

of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an
idea  which precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the

mind  perceives  that the idea which it possesses of a winged horse

is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the exist-

ence  of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.

(49:56)  I  think that I have anticipated my answer to the  third objection,

namely,   that  the will is something universal which is predicated of

all  ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas,

namely,  an  affirmation,  whose adequate essence must, therefore,

in  so far as it is  thus conceived in the abstract,  be  in  every  idea,

and  be,  in this respect alone,  the same in all,  not in so far as it is

considered  as constituting the idea's essence:  for,  in this respect,

particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.

(49:57) For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,

differs from that which involves  the  idea  of a triangle,  as much as

the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

(49:58) Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal pow-

er  of  thinking,  to affirm that that which is true is true,  and to affirm
,if you look 
that  that  which  is false is true.   (49:59)  These two affirmations, if we
to their meaning and not the words alone, [ 
regard  the  mind,  are in the same relation to one another as being

and  not-being;  for  there is nothing positive in ideas,  which consti-
        form    of   falsity           [
tutes  the  actual  reality  of falsehood (II:xxxv., note,  and xlvii.note).

(49:60) We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
] particulars [               ] mental constructs [ 
we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and
Bk.XVIII:3052p49s—real beings. 
abstractions  with  realities.  (49:60a)  As for the fourth  page 126 objection,

I am quite ready to admit,  that  a  man placed in the equilibrium de-

scribed (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a cer-

tain  food  and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would

die  of  hunger and thirst.  
(49:61)  If I am asked,  whether such an one

should  not rather be considered an ass than a man; I answer, that I

do  not  know,  neither  do I know how a man should be considered,
who hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools, mad-

men, &c.

in life. ]
(49:62)  It  remains  to  point  out the advantages of a knowledge of this

doctrine  as  bearing on conduct,  and this may be,  easily gathered
from what has been said.  
(49:63) The doctrine is good:

Spinozistic meaningD2:Dijn:235.
1.  (49:64)  Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the de-
 ] will [                   ]  that we share   [ 
cree of G-D, and to be partakers in the Divine Nature, and so much
the more,  as  we perform more perfect actions and more and more 
                                                                                                                       { PcM }
understand G-D.  (49:65)  Such a doctrine not only completely tranquil-
mind [                                             < Bk.XV:281144 on E4:XXI:203 > 
lizes  our  spirit,  but also shows us where our highest happiness or

blessedness is,  namely,  solely in the knowledge of G-D,  whereby               Dijn:238-239
                                        {need}    >morality<
we  are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us.   (49:66)  We may

thus clearly,  understand,  how far astray,  from  a  true  estimate of

virtue  are  those  who  expect to be decorated by G-D with high re-

wards for their virtue,  and their best actions, as for having endured

the  direst  slavery;  as  if  virtue and the service of G-D were not in
 better PcM }
itself happiness and perfect freedom.   E2:Endnote 49:66.

.  (49:67)  Inasmuch  as  it teaches us,  how  we  ought to conduct our-

selves  with respect to the gifts of fortune,  or matters which are not

in  our  own  power,  and do not follow  from our nature.   (49:68)  For it

shows  us,   that  we  should  await  and  endure  fortune's smiles or             { Alcoholics
                      { objective }
frowns  with an equal mind,   seeing  that  all things  follow  from the              Anonymous }

eternal  decree of G-D by the same necessity,  as it follows from the

essence  of  a  triangle,  that  the three angles are equal to two right


Spinozistic meaning—Bk.III:235
3.  (49:69) This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to

hate  no man,  neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry,          

with  any.    (49:70)  Further,  as  it tells us  that each should be content

with his  own,  and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish

pity,  favour,  or  superstition,  page127  but  solely  by the guidance of

reason,  according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show

in Part III.

Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the com-

monwealth;  for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led,

not so as to become slaves,  but so that they may freely do whatso-

ever things are best.

(49:72)  I  have  thus  fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this

note,  and I thus bring,  the  second  part  of  my  treatise to a close.

(49:73) I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the

human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the

subject,  with  sufficient  clearness.   (49:74)  I  have  laid  a  foundation,

whereon  may  be  raised many excellent conclusions of the highest
utility  and  most  necessary to be known,  as  will,  in  what  follows,              Cash Value

be  partly  made  plain.                                                                                SCR:Dijn'sSalvation 

End of Part II of V



From De Dijn's Book III:214 - (Ethics II)—On Man.            { Mark Twain }

E2:Endnote N.11 - From Wolfson's Book XIV:2:8Analogy, Man. 

E2:Endnote N.11 - {Analogies to help understand 'G-D' and 'D-d'}:

E2:Endnote 2P2 - From Wolfson's Book XIV:2:10Spinoza's Daring.

E2:Endnote 2P7- From Will Durant's "Story of Philosophy"; Washington Square Press;
                              18th Printing; 1965; Page 176—Mind and Body.

E2:Endnote 13:5 - From Wolfson's Book XIV:2:53Inseparability. 

E2:Endnote 2P24-32 - From Wolfson's Bk. XIV:2:106-110Adequate Knowledge, Chain.

E2:Endnote 2P28 - From Parkinson's Book XV:27383Clear and Distinct {Real}. 

E2:Endnote 2P28.3- From Parkinson's Book XV:27484Confused Idea. 

E2:Endnote 2P33 - From Wolfson's Book XIV:2:110—Mind's Limited Freedom. 

E2:Endnote 2P35n - From Daniel M. Wegner's The Illusion of the Conscious Will, 2002;
        0262232227, p. 28—Illusion of Free Will:

E2:Endnote 38:4 - From Wolfson's Book XIV:16232nd & 3rd Knowledge Difference. 

E2:Endnote 40:8 - From Parkinson's Book XV:27593—Transcendental Terms

E2:Endnote 40:21 - From Shirley's Book VII:27
20Imagine (imaginari).  Bk.III:186. 

E2:Endnote 40:24 - From The Teaching Company's Tapes; The Great Ideas of Philosophy,         2nd Ed;
2004; Prof. Daniel N. Robinson's Lecture 35; Part 3 Transcript, p. 170; What Is         Enlightenment? Kant on Freedom—Intuition:   

E2:Endnote 40:29 - From Parkinson's Book XV:27593Fourth Number.

E2:Endnote 2P43 - From Parkinson's Book XV:275-697True Idea.

E2:Endnote 2P43 - From Book 32; Hampshire:99-100—True Idea. 

E2:Endnote 45:6 - From Parkinson's Book XV:278111 & 112Conatus 

E2:Endnote 2P48:0 - From Max Jammer's "Einstein and Religion"; ISBN: 0691006997; 1999;
                              p. 95—Free Will.

E2:Endnote 2P48:4 - From Will Durant's "Story of Philosophy"; Washington Square Press;
                              18th Printing; 1965; p. 177—Intellect and will.

E2:Endnote 49:0Spinoza's Doctrine.

W. T. Stace, "The Problem of Free Will," reprinted in Klemke, Philosophy;
                                                                                        ISBN: 0312084781: pp. 118ff.

E2:Endnote 49:0a—All Things are Computerized Machines.             {MT:Dennett, pages 433 & 302}

               {G-D;  infinite Computer,  infinite Machine. 
                               (thought)           (extension)
                G-d;     finite computer,    finite machine. 

E2:Endnote 49:37 - From Wolfson's Book XIV:2:178Free Will                                 Mark Twain

E2:Endnote 49:66

End of Part II of V.


Since November 6, 1997 Part II hits.

Revised: May 10, 2006

 "A Dedication to Spinoza's Insights

The Ethics - Part I - Part II - Part III - Part IV - Part V