E4:Dijn:246—On Human BondageE4:Dijn:24919ServitudeE4:Parkinson:280132, Scr:Dijn's on Salvation    
Of Human Bondage
or the Strength of the Emotions
Circulated - 1673
Posthumously Published - 1677

    Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677 
IntroductionPurpose  -  Spinozistic Ideas  -  Mark Twain & Spinoza 
The Ethics:   Part I  -  Part II  -  Part III  -  Part IV  -  Part V 
Spinozistic Glossary and Index  

JBY Notes:

1.  The  text  is the  1883 translation of the "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers. 
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number. 

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I. 

4.  Symbols: 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }.    G-D   
   Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here. 

6.  Please  e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreements, 
     or  suggestions  to 
7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read
on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively 
        Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its          EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions,
or best, study the printed book
    book page numbers
are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's IntroductionEL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for  every-          E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the 
       "Organic  interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,    for  example  E4:II:192,   become   more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the 
       Cash Value.  
      To  help  further  understand  many  of  the  Propositions,  use  the        {Examples
      analogy  of  you  as  G-D  and  all  parts of you (past, present, and        1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
      future)   as   the   modes   ( particular  things );  also  useful  is  the
    individual organism to the social organism—the State.            AnalogiesApparent Contradiction 

11. Wolfson's  summaries: Part IIIPart IV, and Part V.
      De Dijn's summary of Part IV.

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff. 
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxiii. 
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
For a "study of the plan of Ethics 4" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:340-1. 
For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:   Bk.XII:xi—The Burden of Man.
                                                                     Bk.XIV:xxiii—Chapter XIX,  E4:Wolfson:2:221Virtues.




Part IV Propositions: Book I:Pg. vii
    If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral.
    If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 



JBY Endnotes


Part IV Proposition List: Book I:Pg. xiv;  { Hypotheses }

            Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as  you would a novel;
                                 but  select a Proposition, click its number to the left
                                 and  then  follow  all  its  links in turn wherever they 
                                 may  lead.  You  will then be putting hypertexting to 
                                 its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion 
                                 of a thread.  If  you  do  not stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site  will seem very convoluted and 
{Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                             so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.
                      All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea

Prop. I.
No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed
by  the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true.
Prop. II. We are only passive,  in so far as we are a part of Nature,
which  cannot  be  conceived  by itself without other parts.
Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited,
and  is  infinitely  surpassed  by  the  power of external
Prop. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of  Nature,
or  that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
save such as can be understood through his nature only 
as their adequate cause. 
Prop. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its persis-
tence  in existing are not defined by the power, whereby
we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the 
power of an external cause compared with our own. 
Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
rest  of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion
becomes obstinately fixed to him. 
Prop. VII. An  emotion  can  only be controlled or destroyed by an-
other emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
controlling emotion. 
Prop. VIII. The  knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the
emotions   of   pleasure  
 or  pain, in  so  far  as  we  are 
conscious  thereof. 
Prop. IX.
An  emotion,  whereof we conceive the cause to be with
us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not con-
ceive the cause to be with us. 
Prop. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close
at  hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we con-
ceive  that  its  time for existence is separated  from  the 
present by a longer interval; so too by the remembrance 
of  what  we  conceive to have not long passed away we 
are  affected  more  intensely, than if we conceive that it 
has long passed away. 
Prop. XI. An  emotion towards that which we conceive as neces-
  is, when other conditions are equal, more intense
than an emotion towards that which impossible, or con- 
tingent, or non-necessary. 
Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist
at the present time, and which we conceive as possible,
is  more  intense,  other conditions being equal, than an 
emotion towards a thing contingent. 
Prop. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not
to  exist  in  the present, is, other conditions being equal,
fainter than an emotion towards a thing past. 
Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as
it is considered as an emotion. 
Prop. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can
be  quenched  or checked by many of the other desires
arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed.
Prop. XVI. Desire  arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in
so  far  as such knowledge regards what is future, may
be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire 
for what is agreeable at the present moment. 
Prop. XVII. Desire arising  from the true knowledge of good and 
evil, in so far as such knowledge  is  concerned with 
what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily 
still, than desire for things that are present. 
Prop. XVIII.
Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions being
equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
Prop. XIX.
Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be
good or bad. 
Prop. XX. The  more  every man endeavours, and is able to seek
what  is  useful  to him—in other words, to preserve his
own being—the more is he endowed with virtue; on the 
contrary,  in proportion as a man neglects to seek what 
is  useful  to  him, that is, to preserve his own being, he 
is wanting in power. 
Prop. XXI.
No  one  can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to
live  rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act,
and to live—in other words, to actually exist. 
Prop. XXII. No  virtue  can be conceived as prior to this endeavour
to preserve one's own being.
Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action
because  he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolute-
ly  said  to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so 
described,  in  so far as  he is determined for the action 
be cause he understands. 
Prop. XXIV. To  act  absolutely  in  obedience  to  virtue is in us the
same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being
(these three terms are identical in meaning)  in  accord- 
ance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking 
what is useful to one's self. 
Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of any-
thing else.
Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
nothing  further  than to understand; neither does the
mind,  in  so far as it makes use of reason, judge any- 
thing  to  be  useful to it, save such things as are con- 
ducive to understanding. 
Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such
things  as  really  conduce  to understanding, or such as
are able to hinder us from understanding. 
Prop. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is the knowledge of G-D, and
the mind's highest virtue is to know G-D.
Prop. XXIX.
No  individual  thing,  which is entirely different from our
own nature, can help or check our power of activity,
absolutely  nothing  can  do  us  good or harm, unless it 
has something  in  common  with  our nature. 
Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which
it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
so far as it is contrary to our nature. 
Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is
necessarily good.
Prop. XXXII.
In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in
that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed
by  those  emotions,  which  are  passions,  or passive
states;  and  to  this  extent  one  and the same man is 
variable and inconstant.
Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
passions, they can be contrary one to another.
Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do
they always necessarily agree in nature.
Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common
to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
Prop. XXXVII. The  good  which  every  man, who follows  after  virtue,
desires  for  himself  he  will  also  desire  for other men,
and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater 
knowledge of G-D. 
Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render
it capable of  being affected  in  an  increased  number
of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased 
number  of  ways, is useful to man; and is so, in propor- 
tion  as  the body  is thereby rendered more capable of 
being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased 
number   of   ways;  contrariwise,   whatsoever  renders 
the  body  less capable  in this respect is hurtful to man. 
Prop. XXXIX.
Whatsoever  brings  about  the  preservation  of the pro-
portion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human
body  mutually   possess,  is good; contrariwise, whatso- 
ever causes a change in such proportion is bad. 
Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
men  to  live together in harmony, is useful, whereas
whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad. 
Prop. XLI.
Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise,
pain in itself is bad.
Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrari-
wise, Melancholy is always bad.
Prop. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or
pleasure is bad. 
Prop. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive
Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good.
Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeav-
, as far as possible, to render back love, or kind-
ness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., 
towards him. 
Prop. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are
always bad.
Prop. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud
Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
is in itself bad and useless.
Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
therewith and arise therefrom.
Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which
arises from reason is the highest possible.
Prop. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason
Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly
wretched or infirm. 
Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
of self.
Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of
Prop. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and
parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.
Prop. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
arise therefrom.
Prop. LIX.
To  all  the actions, whereto we are determined by emo-
wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
without  emotion  by  reason. 
Prop. LX. Desire  arising  from  a pleasure or pain, that is not attrib-
utable, to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole. 
Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
Prop. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates
of reason, it is affected  equally, whether the idea be of a
thing future, past, or present. 
Prop. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape
evil, is not led by reason.
Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge. 
Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.
Prop. LXVI. We  may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
good  in  the future in preference to a lesser good in the
present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in 
preference to a greater evil in the future. 
Prop. LXVII.
LXVII - End 
free man thinks of death least of all things; and his
wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
Prop. LXVIII. If  men  were born free, they would, so long as they
remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it
declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
Prop. LXX. The  free  man,  who lives among the ignorant, strives,
as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
Prop. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.
Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
good faith.
The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a
State, where he lives under a general system of law,
than in solitude, where he is independent. 



page 187

lack of power [                                                          [ affects ]
(Prf:1)   Human  infirmity  in  moderating  and  checking  the  emotions              Bk.XIV:2:2551.
             servitude—E3:Wolfson:2:1838.     ] at the mercy of [
I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not
is  subject  to        [
his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he             Bk.XIV:2:2312.
                                                                  Bk.XV:278110 on E3:II(25)N:134 > 
is  often  compelled,  while seeing that which is better for him, to fol-
bad [ 
low that which is worse. (Prf:2) Why this is so, and what is good or evil              E4:Dijn:246

in the emotions,  I  propose  to  show  how in this part of my treatise.

(Prf:3)  But,  before  I  begin,  it  would  be well to make a few prefatory
        E4:Endnote Prf:4           }                     { bad }
observations  on  perfection  and  imperfection,  good  and  evil.                  Subjective terms  
                                                Bk.III:247; Bk.XVIII:3714Preface.                                LT:L3421:336

(Prf:4)  When  a  man  has  purposed  to  make  a given thing,  and has
Bk.XIII:342379completion [
brought  it  to  perfection,  his  work  will be pronounced perfect, not             Calculus:6.2b & c  

only  by  himself,  but by everyone who rightly knows,  or thinks that

he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  (Prf:5) For instance, sup-

pose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not yet completed),

and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house,

he will call the work imperfect;  he will, on the other hand, call it per-

fect,  as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end,  which

its author had purposed for it.  (Prf:6) But if a man sees a work, the like

whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention

of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect

or  imperfect.  (Prf:7)  Such  seems  to be the primary meaning of these


(Prf:8)  But,  after  men began to form general ideas,  to think out types

of  houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to oth-

ers,  it  came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw

agree  with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question,

and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own pre-

conceived  page 188   type, even though it had evidently been comple-

ted in accordance with the idea of its artificer. (Prf:9) This seems to be

the only reason for calling natural phenomena,  which,  indeed,  are

not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont

to  form general ideas of things natural,  no less than of things artifi-

cial,  and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature (who

they  think  does  nothing  without an object) has them in view,  and

has set them as types before herself.  Prf:10) Therefore, when they be-

hold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the pre-

conceived  type  which  they  have  formed  of the thing in question,

they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left
her work incomplete.   (Prf:11)  Thus we see that men are wont to style

natural   phenomena  perfect  or  imperfect  rather  from  their  own
preconceptions [
prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.

(Prf:12)  Now  we showed  in  the  Appendix to Part I., that Nature does

not  work with an end in view.  (13)  For the eternal and infinite Being
                     Bk.XV:xx; Bk.XIV:1:3731Bk.XIA:12414.     Bk.XVIII:30II/206/26, 116II/206/26.           Stewart06:158
which  we  call G-D, or Nature,  acts by the same necessity as that              {
The terms
       Bk.XIX:1003.             ^ Bk.VII:24; Bk.III:206; Bk.XX:24370.                                         G-D and Nature 
whereby it exists.  (14)  For we have shown,  that by the same neces-         are interchangeable. }

sity of its nature,  whereby it exists, it likewise works (I:xvi.).  (15)  The
reason or cause why G-D or Nature exists,  and the reason why he

acts,  are one and the same.  (16) Therefore,  as he does not exist for

the  sake  of an end,  so  neither does he act for the sake of an end;

of  his  existence  and  of  his  action  there is neither origin nor end.

(Prf:17)  Wherefore,  a  cause  which  is  called final is nothing else but

human  desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of

anything.  (18)  For  example,  when we say that to be inhabited is the

final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a

man,  conceiving  the conveniences of household life,  had a desire
to build a house. (Prf:19) Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it
is  regarded  as  a final cause,  is nothing else but this particular de-

sire, which is really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary

cause,  because  men  are  generally ignorant of the causes of their

desires.   (Prf:20) They are,  as I have often said already, conscious of

their own actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby

they  are  determined  to  any  particular  desire.
  (:Prf:21) Therefore, the
common saying that Nature sometimes falls short,  or blunders, and

produces  page 189   things which are imperfect,  I set down among the
< fabrications >
glosses  treated  of  in  the  Appendix to Part 1(Prf:22) Perfection and

imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or notions

which  we form from a comparison among one another of individuals

of  the same species;  hence  I  said above (, that by reality
classify [
and perfection I mean the same thing.  (Prf:23) For we are wont to refer
                                                                                  < class >
all  the  individual  things in Nature to one genus,  which is called the
  < most general >                                  < notion >      ] Entity [
highest  genus,  namely, to the category of Being, whereto absolute-
            Bk.XIX:27712.                < appertain >
ly  all individuals in Nature belong.  (24) Thus, in so far as we refer the

individuals  in Nature to this category,  and comparing them one with

another, find that some possess more of being or reality than others,
we,  to  this  extent,  say  that  some  are  more  perfect  than others.

(Prf:25)  Again,  in so far as we attribute to them anything implying nega-

tion—as  term,  end,  infirmity,  etc.,  we,  to  this extent, call them im-

perfect,  because  they do not affect our mind so much as the things

which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency,

or  because  Nature has blundered.   
(Prf:26)  For nothing lies within the

scope of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity

of  the  nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the

necessity  of  the  nature  of its efficient cause necessarily comes to


 E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190 > 
Likewise perfect and imperfect. }                                                   Ferguson
(Prf:27)  As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality 
in  things  regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking,           E4:Dijn:34

or  notions  which  we  form  from  the comparison of things one with
4P59, 65                                                                         <------- small print, Logical Index.
another.   (28)  Thus  one and the same thing can be at the same time
subjective terms }                                      Bk.XII:251
good,  bad, and indifferent.  (Prf:29) For instance, music is good for him

that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is
neither good nor bad.

Bk.XIA:12939; Bk.XII:325      .                     { good/bad; perfect/imperfect }                         Ferguson
(Prf:30)  Nevertheless,  though  this  be  so,  the terms should still be re-

tained.  (31)   For,  inasmuch  as we desire to form an idea of man as a
model }
type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for        Bk.XIV:2:2232E4:D1
                     { subjective }
us  to  retain  the ^  terms in  question, in the sense I have indicated.

(Prf:32)  In what follows,  then,  I shall mean by,  "good"  that,  which we

certainly  know  to  be  a  means  of approaching more nearly to the
                < E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190, 
204 on TEI:[42]:15,
186 on TEI:[13]:6 >                         Bk.XIA:13786.
type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad,"
Model         E4:Dijn:247; Bk.XVIII:296II/208/14.
that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching

the said type.
   page 190   (Prf:33)  Again,  we shall say that men are more

perfect,  or  more imperfect,  in proportion as they approach more or

less  nearly  to the said type.  (Prf:34) For it must be specially remarked

that,  when  I  say  that  a man passes from a lesser to a greater per-

fection { ° P },  or vice versâ,  I do not mean that he is changed from
one  essence or reality to another; for instance, a horse would be as
completely  destroyed  by  being  changed  into  a man,  as by being

changed  into  an insect. 
 (Prf:35)  What I mean is,  that we conceive the

thing's  power  of action,  in so far as this is understood by its nature,           

to  be increased or diminished(pef:36)  Lastly, by perfection in general

I  shall,  as  I  have  said,   mean  reality in other words,  each thing's

essence,  in  so far  as it exists, and operates in a particular manner,

and  without  paying  any  regard  to  its  duration.  (Prf:37)  For no given

thing  can  be said to be more perfect, because it has passed a long-
Bk.XIX:24934.                      Bk.XVIII:235II/209/61p24c.
er  time  in  existence.  (Prf:38)  The  duration  of things cannot be deter-

mined  by  their  essence, for the essence of things involves no fixed

and  definite period of existence;  but everything, whether it be more

perfect  or  less  perfect,  will  always  be able to persist in existence
with  the  same force wherewith it began to exist;  wherefore,  in this

respect, all things {animate and inanimate} are equal.  { EL:L15(32):290 }


  < E1:Parkinson:2601 >
DEFINITIONS    { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis
. }

E4:Parkinson:280136E3:IX(5)N:137, E4:Prf.(27):189. >             Bk.XIX:2398. 
Def. I.   By  good  I mean that which we certainly know to be useful         Bk.XIV:2:2296.
            to us.             ^ E4:Dijn:246real freedom.            E4:Dijn:251 
4P8, 26, 31.   <------- small print, Logical Index.

4d1,2, 2924d1,2, 2964d1,2, 2984d1,2,8, 319d1,2

Def. II.  By   evil   I   mean  that  which  we  certainly  know  to  be  a                Satan  
            hindrance to us in the attainment of any good. 
            (Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards 
            the end {
and E4:Dijn:246}.)  

                                                       < E1:Parkinson:26844 >
Def. III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regard- 
             ing  their  essence  only,  we  find  nothing  therein,  which 
             necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.   4P12; 13.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

                         Bk.XVIII:121f, 210.
                                                     < E1:Parkinson:268
44 >
Def. IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as,  while regarding
              the  causes whereby they must be produced,  we know not, 
              whether  such  causes  be  determined  for producing them.  
4P12, 20.
             (In I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction between possible and 
             contingent,  because  there  was  in  that  place  no need to 
             distinguish them accurately.) 

page 191
[ affects ]
Def. V.   By  conflicting  emotions I mean those which draw a man in
              different directions, though they are of the same kind, such 
              as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love,  and 
              are contraries, not by nature, but by accident. 
                                                                   ] indirectly [

                         Bk.XVIII:1994d6, 2026, 2754d6, 2922,.

Def. VI.  What I mean by emotion felt  towards a thing,  future,  pres-
             ent, and past, I explained in III:xviii., notes.i., & ii., which see.
             (But  I  should here also remark,  that we can only distinctly 
             conceive  distance  of space or time up to a certain definite 
             limit;  that is,  all objects distant from us more than two hun- 
             dred feet,  or  whose distance from the place where we are 
             exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive,  seem to be 
             an equal distance from us,  and all in the same plane; so al- 
             so objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed 
             from  the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly  
             conceive,  seem  to  be  all equally distant from the present, 
             and are set down,  as it were, to the same moment of time.) 

Def. VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean             Bk.XIV:2:2361.
              a desire [ appetite ].   

Bk.XVIII:298d8, 309d8.
Def. VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is
               (III:vii.),  virtue,  in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's
               nature  or  essence,  in so far as it has the power of effect- 
               ing what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.   E3:Wolfson:2:1841, 2:2374
                                                   4P18S, 22, 24, 35C2, 56; 5P25, 42.                             <------- small print, Logical Index.



There  is  no  individual  thing in nature,  than  which  there  is  not
another  more  powerful  and  strong.    Whatsoever thing be given,
there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.  4P3, 7; 5P37S.                    E4:Dijn:247.
          Bk.III:248, 250; Bk.XIB:135
84; 217; Bk.XVIII:2834axiom, 286stronger. 

                  For all Propositions see Scroll P1.

Prop. I. Bk.III:225; Bk.XVIII:1754p1, 286p1p14d. 

                                                                { lackdefect }
Proof.— (1:1)  Falsity  consists  solely  in  the  privation of  knowledge

which inadequate ideas involve (II:xxxv.), nor have they any positive

quality on account of which they are called false (II:xxxiii.);  contrari-

wise,  in  so  far  as  they are referred to G-D, they are true (II:xxxii.).

(1:2) Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were

removed  by  the presence of what is true,  in virtue of its being true,

page 192   a  true  idea  would then be removed by itself,  which  (III:iv.)

is  absurd.  (1:3) Therefore,  no  positive  quality possessed by a false

idea, &c.  Q.E.D.

(1:4)  This  proposition  is  more  clearly  understood from II:xvi.         E2:Parkinson:27597
                             Bk.XIV:2:2263.                                        Bk.XIX:1477.
Coroll.ii.  (1:5)  For  imagination  is  an  idea,  which indicates rather the
Bk.XIV:2:2264; Bk.XVIII:1804p1s. 
present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external

body;  not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass,
that the mind is said to err.  (1:6) For instance, when we look at the sun,
we  conceive  that  it is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this

judgment  we  err, so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance;
when its true distance is known, the error is removed, but not the ima-

gination;  or,  in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains

the nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby:

wherefore,  though we know the real distance, we shall still neverthe-
less imagine the sun to be near us.  (1:7) For, as we said in III:xxxv.note,

we do not imagine the sun to be so near us, because we are ignorant

of  its  true distance,  but  because the mind conceives the magnitude

of  the  sun  to  the extent that the body is affected thereby.  
(1:8)  Thus,

when  the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected

into  our  eyes,  we  imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though

we  are  aware  of  its  real  position; and similarly other imaginations,

wherein  the  mind  is  deceived whether they indicate the natural dis-

position of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or dimin-
ished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at its presence. 

(1:9)  It  happens  indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear

vanishes  when  we  hear  the  true  tidings; but the contrary also hap-

pens,  namely,  that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our

fear  vanishes  when  we  hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not
vanish  at  the  presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but be-

cause  other  imaginations,  stronger than the first, supervene and ex-            

clude  the  present  existence  of  that  which  we  imagined, as I have
shown in II:xvii.

Prop. II.  Bk.XVIII:2834p2,3,4. 

Proof.—  (2:1)  We  are  said  to  be  passive,  when something   page 193

arises  in  us,  whereof  we  are only a partial cause (III:Def.ii.), that is

(III:Def.i.),  something  which  cannot be deduced solely from the laws

of our nature(2:2)  We are passive therefore in so far as we are a part
independently [
of  Nature,  which  cannot  be  conceived by itself without other parts.


Prop. III. Bk.XVIII:2834p2,3,4 & p3. 

Proof.— (3:1)  This  is evident from the axiom of this part.   (2)  For, when

man  is  given, there is something else—say A—more powerful; when

A  is  given,  there  is something else—say B— more powerful than A,

and  so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of

some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external

causes.  Q.E.D.


Prop. IV.  Bk.XVIII:364p4, 2834p2,3,4; Bk.XIX:2197; Bk.XX:24087. 

                                                                 ] single [
Proof.—  (4:1)  The  power,  whereby  each  particular thing, and conse-
quently  man,  preserves  his  being, is the power of G-D or of Nature                G-D

(I:xxiv.Coroll.);  not  in  so  far  as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be   
Bk.XIX:9121; 9122; 22723; { Analogy }.
explained by the actual human essence (III:vii.).  (2) Thus the power of
man,  in  so far as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a
part  of  the  infinite power of G-D or Nature, in other words, of the es-

sence thereof (I:xxxiv.).  (4:3) This was our first point.  (4) Again, if it were

possible,  that man should undergo no changes save such as can be
by 3P4 & 3P6 ]
understood  solely  through  the nature of man, it would follow that he

would  not  be  able  to  die,  but  would always necessarily exist; this

would  be  the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was

either  finite  or infinite; namely, either of man's power only, inasmuch

as  he  would  be capable of removing from himself all changes which

could  spring  from  external causes; or of the infinite power of Nature,

whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that man should be

incapable  of  undergoing  any changes save such as tended towards

his  own  preservation. 
 (4:5)  But  the  first alternative is absurd (by the

last Prop.,  the  proof  of  which is universal, and can be applied to all

individual  things). 
(4:6) Therefore,  if  it  be  page 194  possible,  that man

should not be capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can

be explained solely through his own nature, and consequently that he

must  always  (as  we  have  shown)  necessarily  exist; such a result

must  follow  from  the  infinite power of G-D, and consequently (I:xvi.)
from  the  necessity  of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as

affected  by  the  idea of any given man, the whole order of Nature as

conceived  under  the  attributes  of  extension  and  thought must be

(4:7)  It  would  therefore  follow  (I:xxi.)  that  man  is infinite,

which  (by  the first part of this proof) is absurd.  (4:8) It is, therefore, im-

possible,  that  man  should  not  undergo  any  changes  save  those

whereof he is the adequate cause Q.E.D.

(4:9)  Hence  it  follows,  that  man  is necessarily always a
 subject to [
prey  to  his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of

Nature,  and  that  he  accommodates himself thereto, as much as the

nature of things demands.


Prop. V.

Proof.— (5:1)  The  essence  of a passion cannot be explained through

our  essence  alone  (III:Def.i.&.ii.),  that  is  (III:vii.),  the  power  of  a

passion  cannot  be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves en-

deavour  to  persist in existing, but (as is shown in II:xvi.) must neces-

sarily  be  defined  by  the power of an external cause compared with

our own.  Q.E.D..  { an alcoholic }


Prop. VI.

Proof.— (6:1)  The  force  and  increase  of  any  passion and its persis-

tence  in  existing are defined by the power of an external cause com-

pared  with  our  own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV:iii.) it can
surpass [
overcome a man's power, &c.  Q.E.D.    { an alcoholic }

Prop. VII.  Bk.XIA:12943; Bk.XVIII:2864p7d, 3324p7.

                                                             ] related [
Proof.— (7:1)  Emotion,  in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea,

whereby  the  mind  affirms  of its body a greater or less force of exist-

ence  than  before  (cf.  the general Definition of the Emotions  at  the
troubled ]
end  of  Part III.)  page 195   (7:2)   When, therefore, the mind is assailed by

any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification

whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished.  (7:3)  Now this

modification  of  the  body  (IV:v.) receives from its cause the force for

persistence  in  its being; which force can only be checked or destroy-
corporeal ]
ed by a bodily cause (II:vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a

modification  contrary to (III:v.) and stronger than itself (IV.Ax.); where-

fore  (II:xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a modification contrary

to,  and  stronger than the former modification, in other words, (by the

general definition of the emotions)  the  mind  will  be  affected  by an

emotion  contrary  to and stronger than the former emotion, which will

exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion; thus an emo-
an opposite ]
tion  cannot  be  destroyed  nor  controlled  except  by a contrary and

stronger emotion.  Q.E.D.   Bk.XVIII:2414p7d3p37d; 2864p7d. 

Corollary.  (7:4)  An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can

only  be  controlled  or  destroyed through an idea of a modification of
experiencing [
the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing.

(7:5)  For  the  emotion  which  we  undergo  can only be checked or de-
by 4P7 ]
stroyed  by  an  emotion  contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other

words,  (by the general Definition of the Emotions)  only  by an idea of

a   modification   of   the   body   contrary  to,  and  stronger  than,  the

modification which we undergo.  Bk.XVIII:287p7d,3. 

Prop. VIII. Bk.XVIII:235p8284p8296p8,Note 4318f;
 Bk.XIX:23911; 24219.

                                                                                   ] advantageous [
Proof.— (8:1)  We  call  a  thing  good or evil, when it is of service or the          E3:Wolfson:2:204

reverse  in  preserving our being (IV:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), when it

increases  or  diminishes,   helps  or  hinders,  our  power  of  activity. 
by Def. of Joy & Sadness in 3P11S ]
(8:2)  Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure

or pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and

evil  is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which neces-

sarily   follows   from   that   pleasurable   or  painful  emotion  (II:xxii.).

(8:3)  But  this  idea  is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is
& note [
united  to body (II:xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this
by GDE ]
idea  and  the emotion or idea of the modification of the body, save in

 page 196   conception only.  (8:4)  Therefore  the  knowledge  of  good and

evil  is  nothing  else  but  the  emotion,  in so far as we are conscious

thereof.  Q.E.D.  Bk.XVIII:1914p8d3p9d.

Prop. IX.  Bk.XVIII:200-2022104p9,10,132834p9-13319p9,10. 

Proof.— (9:1)  Imagination  or  conception is the idea, by which the mind
regards  a thing as present (II:xvii.note), but which indicates the dispo-

sition  of  the  mind  rather  than the nature of the external thing (II:xvi.
by GDE ]    [ an imagination ]
Coroll.ii).   (9:2)  An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indi-
constitution ]                                   ] an imagining [    Durant65:176
cates  the  disposition  of  the body.  (9:3) But a conception (by II:xvii.) is

stronger,  so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present

existence  of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also strong-

er  or more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the

present  time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us.


(9:4)  When  I  said above in III:xviii. that we are affected by the

image  of  what  is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing

conceived  were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so

far  as  we  look  solely  to the image of the thing in question itself; for

the thing's nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not;

I  did  not  deny  that  the image becomes weaker, when we regard as

present  to  us other things which exclude the present existence of the

future  object:  I  did  not expressly call attention to the fact, because I

purposed  to  treat  of  the  strength  of the emotions in this part of my


 Bk.XVIII:200-2022104p9,10,132834p9-13319p9,10.                4P12C, 16, 60S.
Corollary.  (9:5)  The  image  of  something past or future, that is, of a 

thing  which  we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the

exclusion  of  time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weak-

er than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt

towards  what  is past or future is less intense, other conditions being

equal, than an emotion felt towards something present.

Prop. X.   Bk.XVIII:200-2022104p9,10,132834p9-13319p9,10.  

page 197
                                                            ] imminent [
Proof.— (10:1)  In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not

long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of

the object less, than if its period of future existence were more distant

from the present, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) there-

fore  (by the foregoing Prop.)  we are, so far, more  intensely affected

towards it.  Q.E.D.  
 { Elwes: Pg. 197. }
Corollary. (10:2)  From the remarks made in of this part it fol-

lows that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period

than we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be

widely  separated  one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.

Curley: Pg. 552. } 
[ Schol. {Note}: 
(10:2)  From  what  we noted at D6, it follows that we are

still affected equally mildly  toward objects separated from the present

by  an  interval  of  time  longer  than  we  can determine by imagining,

even  though  we  may  understand  that
 they are separated from one

another by a long interval of time. ]


Prop. XI.  Bk.XVIII:3384p11. 

                                                                                  ] inevitable [
Proof.—  (11:1)  In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to

that  extent,  affirm  its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's

existence,  in  so  far  as  we  conceive  it  not to be necessary (I:xxxiii.

note.i.); wherefore (IV.ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary

is,  other  conditions  being  equal, more intense than an emotion that

which is non-necessary.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XII.  Bk.XVIII:2844p12.  

Proof.— (12:1)  In  so  far  as  we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
not]  ]not[                                                                                      ] posit [
affected  by  the conception of some further thing, which would assert

the  existence  of  the  former  (IV:Def.iii.);  but,  on the other hand, we

(by hypothesis)  conceive  certain  things,  which  exclude  its present

existence.  (12:2)   But, in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in
by 4D4 ]
the  future,  we  thereby  conceive  things  which  assert its existence

(IV:iv.),  that  is  (III:xviii.),  things  which  promote hope or fear: where-
intense [
fore   an   emotion  towards  something  possible  is  more  vehement.


(12:3)  An  emotion  towards a thing, which we know not to
exist  in  the  present,  and  which  we  conceive  as contingent, is far
 feebler [
fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us. 

page 1988

Proof. (12:4)  Emotion  towards  a thing, which we conceive to exist, is

more  intense  than  it  would  be,  if  we conceived the thing as future

(IV:ix.Coroll.),  and  is much more vehement, than if the future time be

conceived  as  far  distant  from  the present (IV:x.). 
(12:5) Therefore an

emotion  towards  a  thing,  whose period of existence we conceive to

be  far  distant  from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive the
by 4P12 ]
thing  as  present;  it  is,  nevertheless,  more  intense, than if we con-

ceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing,

which  we  regard  as  contingent,  will  be  far  fainter, than if we con-

ceived the thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XIII.  Bk.XVIII:2104p9,10,13. 

Proof.—  (13:1)  In  so  far  as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are

not  affected  by  the image of any other thing, which asserts the exist-

ence  of the said thing (IV:Def.iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothe-

sis), we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. (2) But,

in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to
that is, which activates [
conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the
image  thereof (II:xviii. & Note), which is so far the same as regarding

it  as  present (II:xvii.Coroll.).  (13:3) Therefore (IV:ix.) an emotion toward

a  thing  contingent,  which  we  know does not exist in the present, is

fainter,  other  conditions  being  equal,  than  an  emotion  towards a

thing past.  Q.E.D..

Prop. XIV.   Bk.XVIII:285fp14-17p8. 

Proof.—  (14:1)  An  emotion  is  an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
body  a  greater or less  force  of existing than before (by the general
IV.i. [
Definition of the Emotions);  therefore it has no positive quality, which
annulled [
can  be  destroyed  by the presence of what is true; consequently the

knowledge  of  good  and evil cannot, by virtue of being true, restrain
any  emotion.   (14:2)  But,  in  so  far  a  such  knowledge is an emotion
(IV:viii.)  if  it  have more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that
check [               [ by 4P7 ]
extent be able to restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XV. 

Proof.— (15:1) From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it           E4:Dijn:247- 8
                    [ by 4P8 ]
is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the

strength  of  which  is  proportioned  to  the  strength  of  the emotion

wherefrom it arises (III:xxxvii.).   (2)  But, inasmuch as this desire arises

(by hypothesis)  from  the  fact  of our truly understanding anything, it
III:iii. ]
follows  that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active (III:i.),

and must therefore be understood through our essence only (III:Def.ii.);

consequently   (III:vii.)   its force and increase can be defined solely by

human   power.  
(15:3)   Again,  the  desires  arising  from  the  emotions

whereby  we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said emo-
violent ]                                                     [ IV:v. ]
tions  are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be

defined  solely  by  the  power  of  external causes, which, when com-

pared  with  our  own  power, indefinitely surpass it (IV:iii.); hence the
stronger [
desires  arising  from  like  emotions may be more vehement, than the

desire  which  arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, and may,
4P7 ]
consequently, control or quench it.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XVI.   Bk.III:249; Bk.XII:2531; Bk.XVIII:285p16. 

Proof.— (16:1)  Emotion  towards  a  thing, which we conceive as future,

is  fainter  than  emotion  towards a thing that is present (IV:ix.Coroll.).

(16:2)  But  desire,  which  arises  from  the true knowledge of good and

evil,  though  it  be  concerned  with  things which are good at the mo-
some rash ]
ment,  can  be  quenched  or controlled by any headstrong desire (by

the   last Prop.,   the   proof   whereof   is   of   universal   application).

(16:3)  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when concerned

with the future, can be more easily controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.

Prop. XVII.  Bk.III:249; Bk.XIV:2:2048; Bk.XVIII:319n. 

Proof.— (17:1)  This  Prop.  is  proved  in  the  same  way  as  the
last Prop from IV:xii.Coroll.

page 200

Note. (17:2) I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
uncritical belief [
by  opinion  more  readily  than  by  true reason, why it is that the true
Bk.III:249—disturbances.          ] mind [
knowledge  of  good  and  evil  stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often
> lust <
yields  to  every  kind of passion.  (17:3) This state of things gave rise to

the exclamation of the poet:   Bk.XV:278110 on E3:II(25)N:134 >

          (Ov. Met. vii.20)
         "Video meliora proboque,               
[ I see and approve the better,
          Deteriora sequor."                           but follow the worse. ]

        The better path I gaze at and approve,
        The worse— I follow.

Ecc. 1:18—Bk.III:249.
(17:4)  Ecclesiastes  seems  to  have  had  the same thought in his mind,

when  he  says,  "He  who  increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.
(17:5) I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclu-
sion,  that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise

man  is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it
lack of power ]
is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before

we  can  determine  what  reason  can do in restraining the emotions,

and what is beyond her power.  (6) I have said, that in the present part
weakness [
I shall merely treat of human infirmity.   (17:7) The power of reason over

the emotions I have settled to treat separately.

Prop. XVIII. 

                                                                                                [ by 3P7 ]
Proof.— (18:1)  Desire  is  the  essence  of  a  man (III:De.I.), that is, the
conatus ]                 { when Rational }
endeavour  whereby  a man ^ endeavours to persist in his own being.
III:.xi.note ]
(18:2)  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of pleasure

being  felt,  increased  or  helped; on the contrary, desire arising from

pain  is,  by  the fact of pain being felt, diminished or hindered; hence

the  force  of  desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human
Bk.XIX:24014; 24321.
power  together with the power of an external  cause, whereas desire

arising  from  pain  must be defined by human power  only.  
(18:3) Thus

the former is the stronger of the two. 

 E2:Parkinson:278111 & 112 }
Note.  (18:4)  In  these  few  remarks  I  have  explained  the causes of         E4:Wolfson:2:223
               impotence and instability—E3:Wolfson:2:1837. 
human  infirmity and inconstancy,  and  shown why men do not abide            Bk.XIV:2:2311.
                 [ ^ lack of power ]
by the precepts of reason.   (18:5)  It  now  remains for me to show what     Dictates of Reason
                                                                                     [ affects ] 
course  is  marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are in

harmony  with  the  rules  of  human  reason,  and  which of them are

contrary thereto.

page 201
                                                                             [ cumbersome ]
(18:6)  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometri-

cal  fashion,  it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that

everyone may more readily grasp my meaning. 
(18:7)  As  reason  makes  no  demands  contrary  to nature, it demands,        Bk.XII:253, 254.
                                       Bk.XIV:2:2372.                                     Bk.XIV:2:2364. 
that  every man  should love himself, should seek that which is useful         
 Cash Value 
                                            { judging }
to him—I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire every-
Bk.XIB:20420; 21863.                                           { °P }
thing  which  really  brings  man  to  greater  perfection,  and  should,            
                                         [ strive ]     Bk.XIA:13992, 93.
each  for  himself,  endeavour  as far as  he can to  preserve his own            Bk.XIV:2:2381.

being.  (18:8) This is as necessarily true, as that a whole is greater than

its part{s}. (Cf. III:iv.)
(18:9)  Again, as  virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the

laws  of  one's own nature (IV:Def.viii.), and as no one endeavours to             
                                    [ by 3P7 ]
preserve  his  own  being,  except  in accordance with the laws of his
Bk.XIV:2:2383.                conatum           E4:Damasio:170-1
own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeav-
better PcM }                                Mark Twain
our  to  preserve  one's  own being,  and  that  happiness  consists in

man's  power  of  preserving his own being; secondly, that virtue is to             

be  desired  for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent

or  more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly

and lastly that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by exter-
Bk.XII:2541 & 2       { human }
nal  causes  repugnant  to  their ^ nature.  (18:10)  Further, it follows from
E2:Postulate iv., that we can never arrive at doing without all external

things  for  the  preservation  of  our being  or living, so as to have no

relations  with  things  which  are outside ourselves. (18:11)  Again, if we

consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect,

if  mind   were   alone,   and  could  understand nothing besides itself.          

(18:12) There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful

to  us, and are, therefore, to be desired.  (13)  Of such none can be dis-

cerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with

our  nature.   (18:14)  For  if,  for  example,  two  individuals of entirely the
Bk.XIA:13993; Bk.XIX:26424. 
same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as          Bk.XIV:2:2453.
either of them singly.

(18:15)  Therefore,  to man there is nothing more useful than man—noth-         E2:Wolfson:2:243.

ing,  I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished

for  by  men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds

and  bodies  of  all  should  form, as it were, one single mind and one

single  page 202   body,  and  that  all should, with one consent, as far as

they  are  able,  endeavour  to  preserve  their being, and all with one
consent  seek  what  is  useful  to them all.  (18:16) Hence, men who are
governed  by  reason—that is, who seek what is useful to them in ac-             Bk.XIA:13785.

cordance  with  reason,  desire for themselves nothing, which they do
and vice versa, }
not  also  desire  for  the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just,

faithful, and honourable in their conduct.

(18:17)  Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to

indicate,  before  beginning to prove them in greater detail.  (18)  I have

taken  this  course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those

who  believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what
really }
is  useful  for  himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety

and  virtue(18:19)  Therefore,  after briefly showing that the contrary is

the  case,  I  go  on to prove it by, the same method, as that whereby

I have hitherto proceeded. 


Prop. XIX.  Bk.III:242; Bk.XII:257—The first deals ...; Bk.XVIII:296n, 303fp19. 

Proof.—  (19:1)  The  knowledge of good and evil is (IV:viii.) the emotion

of  pleasure  or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore,
III.xxviii. [                                  [ judges ]           Bk.XIV:2:2364. 
every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from

what  he  thinks bad.  (2)  Now  this  appetite  is nothing else but man's

nature  or  essence  (Cf.  the  Definition of Appetite given in III:ix.note

and  III:De.I).   (19:3)  Therefore,  every  man,  solely  by  the laws of his
wants ]                      [ repells ]
nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XX.  Bk.XIB:21250; 21454; Bk.XIV:2:2364. 

Proof.—  (20:1)  Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's
by 3P7 ]
essence  (IV:D.viii.),  that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour

made  by  man  to persist in his own being.  (2)  Wherefore, the more a

man  endeavours,  and is able to preserve his own being, the more is

he  endowed  with   page 203   virtue,  and, consequently (III:iv. &, vi.), in

so  far as a man neglects to preserve his own being, he is wanting in

power.  Q.E.D.

(20:3) No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or pre-

serving  his  own  being,  unless  he be overcome by causes external       E2:Parkinson:278111 & 112
and  foreign  to  his nature(4) No one, I say, from the necessity of his

own   nature,   or   otherwise  than  under  compulsion  from  external

causes,  shrinks  from food, or kills himself: which latter may be done

in  a  variety  of  ways.  (20:5)  A  man,  for  instance,  kills  himself {D:1.9}

under  the  compulsion  of  another  man,  who  twists  round his right

hand,  wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces

him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be com-

pelled,  like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins—
unobsevable [
that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent

external  causes  may  so  disorder  his imagination, and so affect his

body,  that  it  may  assume  a  nature contrary to its former one, and

whereof  the  idea  cannot exist in the mind (III:x.)  (20:6) But that a man,

from  the  necessity  of  his own nature, should endeavour to become

non-existent,  is as impossible as that something should be made out

of  nothing,  as  everyone  will  see  for himself, after a little reflection.

Prop. XXI.  XXI- XXVIIIBk.XVIII:298p24-28, 2404p21.

Proof.—  (21:1)  The  proof  of this proposition, or rather the proposition

itself,  is self-evident,  and  is  also  plain from the definition of desire.
happily [       ] well [
(21:2) For the desire of living, acting, &c., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of

the Emotions, i.)  the essence of man—that is (III:vii.), the endeavour

made by everyone to preserve his own being.  (21:3) Therefore, no one

can desire, &c.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXII. 

                         ] conatus [
Proof.— (22:1) The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing

(III:vii.);  therefore,  if  any  virtue  could be conceived as prior thereto,
by 4D8 ]
the  essence  of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself,
    self-evident       }
which is obviously absurd [ as is known through itself ]. (22:2) Therefore

no virtue, &c.  Q.E.D.

(22:3)  The  effort  for  self-preservation  is  the  first  page 204
E5:XLI(1):269; Bk.XIB:21250.                                  [ by 4P22 ]
and only foundation of virtue.  (4) For prior to this principle nothing can           Bk.XIV:2:2383.

be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived ]independent

of it.  IV.xxi.[         
4P24, 25, 26, 56; 5P41. 

Prop. XXIII.   Bk.XIB:21250. 

Proof.—  (23:1)  In  so  far  as  a man is determined to an action through

having  inadequate  ideas,  he  is passive (III:i.), that is (III:Def.i., &iii.),

he  does  something,  which  cannot  be perceived solely through his

essence, that is (by IV:Def.viii.), which does not follow from his virtue.

(23:2)  But, in so far as he is determined for an action because he under-

stands,  he  is  active; that is, he does something, which is perceived
 by IV:Def.viii. ]
through  his  essence  alone,  or  which  adequately  follows from his

virtue.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXIV.  Bk.XII:2572; Bk.XVIII:308f4p24, 309p24; Bk.XIX:26115. 

Proof.—  (24:1)  To  act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else
first }                     [ by 4D8 ]
but  to act according to the ^ laws of one's own nature.  (2) But we only

act,  in  so far as we understand (III:iii.) : therefore to act in obedience

to  virtue  is  in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's

being  in  obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what

is useful for us (IV:xxii.Coroll.).  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXV.  Bk.XIB:21250; Bk.XVIII:2464p25. 

Proof.—  (25:1)  The  endeavour,  wherewith  everything  endeavours to

persist  in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself

(III:vii.);  from  this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it

necessarily  follows  (III:vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his

being.  (25:2) Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV:xxii.Coroll., for if

a  man  should  endeavour  to preserve his being for the sake of any-
primary [
thing else, the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,

which,  by  the  foregoing  corollary, is absurd  ] as is self-evident [

(25:3) Therefore no one, &c.  Q.E.D.

page 205

Prop. XXVI. Bk.XII:257—The first deals ...Bk.XVIII:1824p26, 304fp26, 3524p26,27. 

Proof.—  (26:1)  The  effort  for  self-preservation is nothing else but the

essence  of  the  thing in question (III:vii.), which, in so far as it exists

such  as  it  is,  is conceived to have force for continuing in existence

(III:vi.)  and  doing  such  things  as  necessarily  follow from its given

nature  (see the Def. of AppetiteIII:ix.Note).  (26:2) But the essence of

reason is nought else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly

understands   (see   the   definition   in   II:xl.Note:ii.);  therefore (II:xl.)
conformity ]
whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing else but

to  understand.  
(26:3) Again, since this effort of the mind wherewith the

mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to preserve its own being is

nothing else but understanding; this effort at understanding is (IV:xxii.
only foundation ]
Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to

understand  things  for the sake of any ulterior object (IV:xxv.); on the 

other hand,  the  mind, in so far as it reason,  will  not  be able to con-
     lead      ]
ceive  any  good  for  itself,  save  such  things  as  are  conducive to

understanding [ by 4DI ].

Prop. XXVII.  Bk.III:35; Bk.XVIII:3524p26,27. 

(27:1)  The  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  reasons,  desires  nothing

beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save
lead ]
such  things  as  conduce  to  understanding (by the foregoing Prop.).

(27:2) But the mind (II:xli. , xliiiNote) cannot possess certainty concern-

ing  anything,  except  in  so  far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by

II:xl.N1&2, is the same thing) in so far as it reasons (27:3) Therefore we

know  nothing  to  be good or evil save such things as really conduce,

&c.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVIII.  Bk.III:35; Bk.XIA:12834,13890Bk.XIB:21561; Bk.XVIII:305p28. 

Proof.— (28:1) The mind is not capable of understanding anything high-
G-D }
er  than  G-D,  that  is (, than a Being absolutely infinite, and

without  which  (I:xv.)  nothing can  page 206  either be  or be conceived;
greatest advantage ]      [ by ]
therefore (IV:xxvi. & xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV:Def.i.) good
is the knowledge of G-D.  (28:2)  Again, the mind is active, only in so far
III:i & III.iii [                                    ] IV:xxiii [
as  it  understands,  and  only  to the same extent can it be said abso-
by 4P23 ]
lutely to act virtuously.   (28:3)  The  mind's absolute virtue is therefore to
 < Bk.XV:283164 on E5:Prf(30):247 >  
(28:4)  Now,  as  we  have  already shown, the highest that

the  mind  can  understand  is G-D; therefore the highest virtue of the

mind is to understand or to know G-D.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXIX.  Bk.XII:257—The first deals ...; Bk.XVIII:2414p29,31c; Bk.XIX:28123, 292f4p29. 

Proof.—  (29:1)  The  power  of every individual thing, and consequently
2P10C ]                                                   ] acts [
the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be deter-

mined  by  an  individual  thing  (I:xxviii.), whose nature (II:vi.) must be
attribute [
understood  through  the  same nature as that, through which human

nature  is  conceived.   
(29:2) Therefore our power of activity, however it

be conceived, can be determined and consequently helped or hinder-

ed by the power of any other individual thing, which has something in

common  with  us,  but  not  by  the  power  of  anything,  of which the

nature  is  entirely  different  from  our own; and since we call good or

evil  that  which  is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV:viii.), that is (III:xi.

Note),  which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of

activity;  therefore, that which is entirely different from our nature can

neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXX.  Bk.XVIII:296n4; Bk.XIX:28224. 


Proof.—  (30:1)  We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV:viii.),

that  is  (by  the  Def.,  which  see  in III:xi.Note), when it diminishes or

checks  our power of action(2) Therefore, if anything were bad for us

through  that  quality which it has in common with our nature, it would

be  able  itself  to  diminish  or check that which it has in common with

our  nature,  which  (III:iv.)  is  absurd.   (30:3)  Wherefore nothing can be

bad  for  us  through  that quality which it has in common with us, but,

on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just
 by  III:v. ]
shown),  in  so  far  as   page 207   it  can diminish or check our power of

action, it is contrary to our nature.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXXI.  Bk.XIX:2398. 

Proof.—  (31:1)  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it can-
by ]    [ by 1A3. ]
 not  be  bad  for  it.  (1a)  It  will  therefore necessarily be either good or

indifferent. (2)  If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing

will  follow  from  its nature (IV:Def.i.), which tends to the preservation

of  our  nature,  that is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preser-

vation  of  the thing itself; but this (III:vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far

as  a  thing  is  in  harmony  with  our  nature,  it  is  necessarily good.


 (31:3)  Hence  it  follows,  that, in proportion as a thing is in

harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and vice

versâ,  in  proportion  as  a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in

harmony  with  our  nature.   (31:4)  For,  in so far as it is not in harmony
with  our  nature,  it will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary

thereto.   (5) If different, it can neither be good nor bad (IV:xxix.); if con-

trary,  it  will  be  contrary  to that which is in harmony with our nature,
 IV:xxx. [    [ by 4P31 ]
that  is,  contrary  to  what is good—in short, bad.  (31:6) Nothing, there-
4P35, 35C1, 72
fore, can be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;

and  hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony with our

nature, and vice versâ.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXXII. XXXII - XXXVIIE2:Wolfson:2:243; Bk.XVIII:302p32; Bk.XIX:24425, 26526; 28534. 

                                                                ] agree in nature [  
Proof.—  (32:1)  Things,  which  are said to be in harmony naturally, are

understood  to  agree  in power (III:vii.), not in want of power or nega-

tion,  and consequently not in passion (III:iii.Note); wherefore men, in

so  far  as  they  are  a  prey  to  their passions, cannot be said to be

naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.

(32:2)  This  is  also  self-evident;  for,  if  we say that white and

black  only  agree  in  the  fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm

that  they  do  not  agree  in any respect.  (32:3) So, if we say that a man

and  a  stone  only  agree  in  the  fact that both are finite—wanting in

power,  not  existing  by  the  necessity  of  their own nature, or, lastly,

indefinitely  surpassed  by  the  power of external causes—we should

certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike; page 208               Inertia  

therefore,  things  which  agree  only in negation, or in qualities which
neither possess, really agree in no respect.

Prop. XXXIII.  Bk.XVIII:2574p33Bk.XIX:24425. 

Proof.—  (33:1)  The  nature  or  essence  of the emotions cannot be ex-

plained solely through our essence or nature (III:Def.i.&ii.), but it must

be  defined  by  the  power,  that  is  (III:vii.),  by the nature of external

causes  in  comparison  with  our own; hence it follows, that there are

as  many  kinds  of each emotion as there are external objects where-

by  we  are  affected (III:lvi.), and that men may be differently affected

by  one  and  the  same object (III:li), and to this extent differ in nature;

lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towards

the same object, and may therefore be variable and inconstant.


Prop. XXXIV.  Bk.XVIII:2704p33,34; Bk.XIX:24425; Bk.XX:24396. 

Proof.—  (34:1)  A  man,  for  instance  Peter, can be the cause of Paul's

feeling  pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that

which  Paul hates (III:xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a

thing  which  Paul  also loves (III:xxxii. & Note), or for other causes (of

which  the  chief  are  enumerated  in III:lv.Note); it may therefore hap-

pen that Paul should hate Peter (Def. of Emotions:vii.), consequently
by 3P40&N ]
it  may  easily happen also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and

that  each  should endeavour to do the other an injury, (III:xxxix.), that

is  (IV:xxx.),  that they should be contrary one to another.  (34:2) But the
affect of sadness ]
emotion  of  pain  is  always a passion or passive state (III:lix.); hence

men,  in  so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions,

can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.

imagines ]
Note.  (34:3)  I  said  that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives

that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this

it  seems,  at  first  sight,  to  follow, that these two men, through both

loving the same thing, and, consequently, through agreement of their

respective natures, stand in one another's way; if this were so, IV:xxx.
and IV:xxxi. would be untrue. (4) But if we give the matter our unbiased

attention,   we   shall   see   that    page 209    the  discrepancy  vanishes.

(34:5)  For  the  two  men  are  not  in  one  another's way in virtue of the

agreement  of  their  natures,  that  is,  through  both  loving the same

thing,  but  in virtue of one differing from the other.  (6) For, in so far as

each  loves  the  same  thing,  the  love  of  each  is  fostered thereby

(III:xxxi.),  that  is  (Def. Emotions:vi.)  the pleasure of each is fostered

thereby.  (34:7)  Wherefore  it  is far from being the case, that they are at

variance  through  both loving the same thing, and through the agree-

ment  in  their  natures.  
(34:8)  The  cause for their opposition lies, as I

have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ.  (9) For we

assume  that  Peter  has the idea of the loved object as already in his

possession,  while  Paul  has  the  idea  of  the  loved  object  as  lost.

(34:10)  Hence  the one man will be affected with pleasure, the other will

be  affected  with  pain, and thus they will be at variance one with an-

other.   (34:11)  We  can easily show in like manner, that all other causes

of  hatred  depend  solely  on  differences,  and not on the agreement

between men's natures.

Prop. XXXV. Bk.III:37; Bk.XIA:12938; Bk.XVIII:302p35; Bk.XIX:26116; 26525.; Bk.XX:24396.


Proof.— (35:1)  In  so  far as men are assailed by emotions that are pas-

sions,  they  can  be different in nature (IV:xxxiii.), and at variance one
IV.xxxiv. [
with  another.  (2)  But  men are only said to be active, in so far as they

act  in  obedience  to  reason  (III:iii.);  therefore, what so ever follows

from human nature in so far as it is defined by reason must (III:Def.ii.)

be  understood  solely  through human nature as its proximate cause.

(35:3) But, since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which

he  deems  good,  and  endeavours  to  remove that which he deems

bad IV:xix.); and further, since that which we, in accordance with rea-

son,  deem  good  or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II:xli.); it follows

that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily do

only  such things as are necessarily good for human nature, and con-

sequently  for  each  individual  man  (IV:xxxi.Coroll.);  in  other words,

such things as are in harmony with each man's nature. (35:4) Therefore,

men  in  so  far  as  they  live in obedience to reason, necessarily live

always in harmony one with another.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.
(35:5) There is no individual thing in nature, which   page 210
4P35C2, 37, 37S2, 71.
is  more useful to man,  than a man who lives in obedience to reason.

(35:6)  For  that  thing  is  to  man most useful, which is most in harmony
with  his  nature (IV:xxxi.Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.  (35:7) But man

acts  absolutely  according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in

obedience  to  reason  (III:Def.ii.),  and  to  this  extent  only is always

necessarily  in  harmony  with  the nature of another man (by the last

Prop.);  wherefore  among  individual things nothing is more useful to

man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.


Corollary II.— 
(35:8)  As  every  man  seeks most that which is useful to

him,  so  are  men most useful one to another.  (9) For the more a man

seeks  what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the

more  is  he  endowed  with  virtue (IV:xx.), or, what is the same thing

(IV:Def.viii.),  the  more is he endowed with power to act according to
by 3P3 ]
the  laws  of  his  own  nature,  that  is  to live in obedience to reason.

(35:10)  But  men  are  most  in natural harmony, when they live in obedi-

ence to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing Coroll.)

men  will  be  most useful one to another, when each seeks most that

which is useful to him.  Q.E.D.

Note. (35:11)  What  we  have just shown is attested by experience so
conspicuously,  that  it  is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man is to           

man  a  G-d."  (12)  Yet  it rarely happens that men live in obedience to

reason, for things are so ordered among them, that they are general-

ly  envious  and troublesome one to another.  (35:13)  Nevertheless they

are  scarcely  able  to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of man
as  a  social  animal  has met with general assent; in fact, men do de-

rive  from  social life much more convenience than injury.  (14)  Let sati-
            ] deride
rists  then  laugh their fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let            E4:Dijn:250.  

misanthropes  praise  to  their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let

them  heap contempt on men and praises on beasts;
when all is said,          Durant:651168 

they  will  find that men can provide for  their wants much more easily

by  mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they escape

from  the  dangers  that  on  every  side  beset  them: not  to say how

much  more  excellent  and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the
actions  of  men than the actions of beasts.  (35:15) But I will treat of this
Ethics 5P1-20. }
more at length elsewhere.

page 211

Prop. XXXVI.  Bk.XIB:5657, 20625; Bk.XVIII:309p36,56,67,72.

Proof.—  (36:1)  To  act  virtuously  is  to  act  in  obedience with reason

(IV:xxiv.),   and   whatsoever  we  endeavour  to  do  in  obedience  to

reason  is  to  understand  (IV:xxvi.);  therefore  (IV:xxviii.)  the highest

good  for  those  who follow after virtue is to know G-D; that is (II:xlvii. 

Note)  a  good which is common to all and can be possessed by all

men  equally,  in  so  far  as  they  are  of  the  same  nature.   Q.E.D.

(36:2) Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of

those  who follow after virtue were not common to all?  (3) Would it not
                        ] guidance [
then  follow,  as  above  (IV:xxxiv.),  that  men  living  in  obedience  to

reason, that is (IV:xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would

be  at  variance  one  with  another?   
(36:4)  To  such an inquiry, I make

answer,  that  it  follows  not  accidentally  but from the very nature of

reason,  that  main's  highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is

deduced  from  the  very  essence  of  man,  in  so  far  as defined by

reason;  and  that  a  man could neither be, nor be conceived without
        ability   to  enjoy           [
the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. (36:5) For it belongs to
the  essence  of the human mind (II:xlvii.), to have an adequate know-

ledge of the eternal and infinite essence of G-D.

Prop. XXXVII. Bk.XII:2603; Bk.XIA:12837,12939, 40,13476; Bk.XIB:21250, 239119,120. 

Proof.—  (37:1)  Men,  in  so far as they live in obedience to reason, are

most  useful  to  their  fellow  men (IV:xxxv;Coroll.i.); therefore (IV:xix.),

we  shall  in  obedience  to  reason  necessarily  endeavour  to  bring

about  that  men  should live in obedience to reason.  (2)  But the good

which  every  man,  in  so  far  as he is guided by reason, or, in other
IV.xxiv. [
words,  follows  after  virtue,   desires  for  himself,  is  to  understand

(IV:xxvi.); wherefore the good, which each follower of virtue seeks for
Analogy. }
himself, he will desire also for others.  (37:3) Again, desire, in so far as it            E4:Dijn:251 

is  referred to the mind, is the very essence of the mind  (Def. of  the

Emotions:i.);  now  the  essence  of  the  mind consists  in knowledge

(II:xi.),  which  involves  the knowledge of G-D (II:xlvii.), and without it

page 212  (I:xv.),  can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in propor-

tion  as  the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of G-D, so

also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that other men
organic interdependence }
should  possess  that  which  he  seeks  as  good for himself.  Q.E.D.

Another Proof.  
(37:4) The good, which a man desires for himself and
E5:IV(7):249 } 
loves,  he  will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also
So, by 3P31C, ]
(III:xxxi.);  he  will  therefore  endeavour that others should love it also; 
                               ] IV.xxxvi. [
and  as  the  good  in question is common to all, and therefore all can            E4:Dijn:251 

rejoice  therein,  he  will  endeavour,  for  the  same  reason,  to bring
Bk.XIV:2:2441, 2:2671. 
about  that  all  should  rejoice  therein,  and  this  he will do the more

(III:xxxvii.),  in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

    .                                               { passions }
Note I.—  (37:5)  He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause

others  to  love  what  he  loves  himself,  and  to make the rest of the

world  live  according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is,

therefore,  hateful, especially, to those who take delight in something

different,  and  accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour,

to   make   men  live  in  accordance  with  what  pleases  themselves.
to know G-D}
(37:6)  Again,  as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of

emotion  is  often such, that it can only be possessed by a single indi-

vidual,  it  follows  that  those who love it are not consistent in their in-

tentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.

(37:7)  But  he,  who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by
impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consis-

(37:8)  Again,  whatsoever  we  desire and  do, whereof we are the
active}                                                     E5:Dijn:257.
cause  in  so  far  as  we possess the idea of G-D, or know G-D, I set                E5:Pollock:286
] refer [        4App15    { because it brings Peace of Mind. } 
down  to  Religion ^  (37:9)  The desire of well-doing, which is engender-         Spinoza's Religion
Bk.XIX:26838.    { E5:IV(7):249 4P25; 5P4S 
ed  by  a life according to reason, I call piety (37:10) Further, the desire,

whereby  a  man  living  according  to  reason  is  bound  to associate
Bk.III:37  4P58
others  with  himself  in friendship, I call honour (Honestas); by honour-

able  I  mean  that which is praised by men living according to reason,
dishonourable ] 4P45C2
and  by  base  I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friend-

(37:11) I have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a
Bk.XIV:2:2443.                                                              [ lack of power ]
state;  and  the  difference  between  true  virtue  and infirmity may be

readily  gathered  from  what  I  have  said;  namely, that true virtue is

nothing  else  but   page 213   living  in  accordance  with  reason;  while

infirmity  is nothing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things

which  are  external to himself, and to be by them determined to act in

manner  demanded by the general disposition of things rather than          E3:Wolfson:2:1842.
by his own nature considered solely in itself.

Note [
(37:12) Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in IV:xviii., where-

by it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is found-
compassion [
ed  rather  on  vain  superstition  and  womanish  pity  than  on sound            Durant:651165 

reason.  (13)  The  rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches

us  the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men, but—

not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we
jungle }
have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.

(37:14)  Nay,  as  everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men

have  far  greater  rights  over  beasts  than  beasts  have  over  men.

(37:15)  Still  I  do  not  deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may

not  consult  our own advantage and use them as we please, treating

them  in  the  way  which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours,

and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions (III:Ivii.           

Note).  (16)  It remains for me to explain what I mean by, just and unjust,

sin and merit(37:17)  On these points see the following note.

Note II.
(37:18)  In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise 
Bk.XIX:26630.4P39                                                           Mark Twain and Spinoza
and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice. 

(37:19)  Concerning  praise  and blame I have spoken in III:xxix.Note: the             Mark Twain

time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  (20) But I must first
 jungle and societal }
say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in society.            E4:Dijn:251 
                                                                       Bk.XIV:2:2481, 2, 4.

(37:21)  Every  man  exists  by sovereign natural right, and, consequently,

by  sovereign  natural  right  performs  those actions which follow from

the  necessity  of  his  own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right
every  man  judges  what  is  good  and  what is bad, takes care of his
thinking [
own  advantage  according  to  his  own disposition (IV:xix. and IV:xx.),

avenges  the  wrongs  done to him (III:xl.Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to

preserve  that  which  he  loves  and  to  destroy—that which he hates

  (37:22) Now, if men lived under the guidance of reason, every-

one  would  remain in possession of  page 214   this his right, without any

injury  being done to his neighbour (IV:xxxv.Coroll.i.).  (37:23)  But seeing
subject [                  ] IV.iv.Cor. [                        Bk.XIX:24426. 
that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power
and, partly because they live in real, or imagined, part-jungle conditions.} 
or virtue (IV:vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and being
while [
at variance one with another (IV:xxxiii., xxxiv.), stand in need of mutual

help  (IV:xxxv.Note).   
(37:24)  Wherefore, in order that men may live toge-
ther  in  harmony,  and  may  aid one another, it is necessary that they

should  forego  their  natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain

from  all  actions  which  can  injure their fellow-men.  
(37:25)  The way in          Bk.XIV:2:2472. 

which  this  end  can  be  obtained, so that men who are necessarily a
IV:xxxiii. [
prey  to  their  emotions (IV:iv.Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should

be able to render each other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is

evident from IV:vii. and III:xxxix.  (37:26) It is there shown, that an emotion

can  only  be  restrained  by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to

itself,  and  that  men  avoid  inflicting injury through fear of incurring a

greater injury themselves.

these terms [
(37:27)  On  this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its
own  hand  the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and 

pronouncing  on  good  and  evil;  and  provided it also possesses the

power  to  lay  down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanc-
 enforced [
tioned,  not  by reason, which is powerless in restraining emotion, but
by  threats (IV:xvii.Note).  (28) Such a society established with laws and

the  power  of  preserving  itself is called a State, while those who live

under  its  protection  are  called  citizens(37:29) We may readily under-
     jungle       }
stand  that  there  is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal

consent  is  pronounced  good  or bad; for in the state of nature every-

one  thinks  solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposi-

tion,  with  reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is

good  or  bad,  being  bound  by  no  law  to  anyone  besides himself.

(37:30)  In  the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only

exist  in  a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common

consent,  and  where  everyone  is  bound to obey the State authority.

(37:31)  Sin,  then,  is  nothing  else but disobedience, which is therefore
punished  by the right of the State only.  (37:32) Obedience, on the other

hand,  is  page 215   set  down  as  merit,  inasmuch as a man is thought
 because he is thereby deemed to deserve to enjoy [
worthy of merit, if  he  takes  delight  in the advantages which a State     


jungle }  Bk.XII:2611   
(37:33)   Again,  in  the  state  of  nature,  no  one  is by common consent
owner[ (dominus)
master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said

to belong to one man rather than another: all things are common to all.
intension[   {secure}
(37: 34)  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render
what is [                     ] rob [
to  every man ^ his own,  or to deprive a man of that which belongs to

him;  in  other words, there is nothing in the state of nature answering

to justice and injustice.  
(37:35)  Such ideas are only possible in a social

state,  when  it  is  decreed  by common consent what belongs to one

man and what to another.

(37:36)  From  all these considerations it is evident, that justice and injus-

tice,   sin  and  merit,  are  extrinsic  ideas,  and  not  attributes  which

display the nature of the mind.  (37) But I have said enough.


Prop. XXXVIII.  Bk.XII:257—The first deals ..., 2631; Bk.XIX:22214, 23029, 2398; Bk.XVIII:3284p38.

Proof.— (38:1)  Whatsoever  thus  increases the capabilities of the body

increases  also  the  mind's  capability of perception (II:xiv.); therefore,

whatsoever  thus  disposes  the  body  and thus renders it capable, is

necessarily  good  or  useful (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); and is so in proportion

to  the  extent  to  which  it  can render the body capable; contrariwise
harmful ]
(II:xiv.IV:xxvi.IV:xxvii.),  it  is  hurtful,  if  it  renders  the  body in this

respect less capable.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXXIX.  Bk.XII:2621; Bk.XIX:2398; Bk.XVIII:114d1,2,p39. 

(39:1) The human body needs many other bodies for its preser-

vation  (II:Post.iv.).   (2)  But  that  which  constitutes  the specific reality

(forma)  of  a  human body is, that its parts communicate their several

motions  one  to  another  in  page 216   a  certain  fixed  proportion (Def.

before  Lemma iv.  after  II:xiii.).   
(39:3)   Therefore,   whatsoever  brings

about  the  preservation  of  the  proportion  between motion and rest,

which  the  parts  of the human body mutually possess, preserves the
form—Bk.XIV:1:2462.                                     ] II:Post.iii & vi. [
specific  reality  of  the  human  body,  and  consequently renders the

human body capable of being affected in many ways and of affecting

external  bodies  in  many  ways;  consequently  it is good (by the last

(39:4) Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid

proportion  causes  the  human body to assume another specific char-

acter,  in  other  words  (see  Preface  to  this  Part  towards  the  end,

though  the  point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and conse-
Bk.XIX:2183, 31632. 
quently  totally  incapable  of being affected in an increased numbers

of ways; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.

.                                                                ] things [
Note.  (39:5)  The  extent  to  which  such  causes  can  injure or be of

service  to  the  mind will be explained in the Fifth Part
(6) But I would
understand [                                     5P38S
here  remark  that  I  consider that a body undergoes death, when the

proportion  of  motion  and  rest  which  obtained  mutually  among its
several  parts  is  changed.  (39:7)  For  I  do  not  venture to deny that a

human  body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other pro-

perties,  wherein the life of a body is thought to consist, may none the

less  be  changed  into  another  nature  totally  different from its own. 
hold [
(39:8)  There  is  no  reason,  which  compels me to maintain that a body

does  not  die,  unless  it  becomes  a  corpse; nay, experience would

seem  to  point  to  the  opposite conclusion.  (9) It sometimes happens,

that  a man undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the

same.   (39:10)  As  I  have  heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had

been  seized  with  sickness,  and though he recovered therefrom yet

remained  so  oblivious  of  his past life, that he would not believe the

plays  and  tragedies  he  had written to be his own: indeed, he might

have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his na-
tive tongue.  (11) If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of

infants?  (12)  A  man  of  ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own,

that  he  can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the

analogy of other men.  (39:13) However, I prefer to leave such questions
undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for raising

new issues. 

Prop. XL.  

(40:1) For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony

also  causes  them to live according to reason (IV:xxxv.), and is there-

fore  (IV:xxvi.  and  IV:xxvii.)  good, and (for the same reason) whatso-

ever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XLI.   Bk.XII:252, 251, 2632; Bk.XIV:2:2044

                                                                              [ an affect ]
Proof.— (41:1)  Pleasure  (III:xi. & Note)  is emotion, whereby the body's

power  of  activity  is  increased  or  helped; pain is emotion, whereby

the   body's   power  of  activity  is  diminished  or  checked; therefore

(IV:xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good, &c.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XLII.  Bk.XIB:20945. 

Proof.— (42:1)  Mirth (see its Def. in III:xi.Note) is pleasure, which, in so

far as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body being

affected   equally:   that   is   (III:xi.),  the  body's  power  of  activity  is

increased  or aided in such a manner, that the several parts maintain

their  former  proportion  of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always

good  (IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive.  (42:2)  But Melancholy (see

its  Def. in the same note to III:xi.Note) is pain, which, in so far as it is

referred  to  the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance

of  the  body's  power of activity; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) it is always bad. 


Prop. XLIII.  Bk.XIB:20945; Bk.XIX:24528 & f; Bk.XVIII:313p43. 

Proof.— (43:1)  Localized  pleasure  or  stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure,

which,  in  so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some

some  of  its parts  being affected more than the rest (III:xi.Note);  the

power  of  this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of

the  body (IV:vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rend-

ering  it  incapable  of  being affected in a variety of other ways: there-
anguish [
fore  (IV:xxxviii.) it may be bad.  (43:2) Again, grief, which is pain, cannot

as  such  be  good (IV:xli.).  (3) But, as its force and increase is defined

by  the power of an external cause compared with our own (IV:v.), we

can  conceive   page 218  infinite  degrees  and modes of strength in this

emotion  (IV:iii.);  we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restrain-

ing stimulation, and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering

the  body's  capabilities;  thus,  to  this  extent,  it will be good.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XLIV.  Bk.XIB:20945; 21865. 

Proof.— (44:1)  Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an extern-

al  cause  (Def. of Emotions:vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied

by  the  idea of an external cause is love (III:xi.Note); hence love may-

be  excessive.  
(44:2)  Again,  the strength of desire varies in proportion

to  the  emotion  from  which  it arises (III:xxxvii.).  (3) Now emotion may

overcome  all  the  rest  of  men's  actions  (IV:vi.);  so, therefore, can

desire,  which  arises  from  the  same  emotion,  overcome  all other

desires,  and  become  excessive,  as we showed in the last proposi-

tion concerning stimulation.

4P58S, 60S, App30.
Note. (44:4)  Mirth,  which I have stated to be good, can be conceived

more  easily  than  it can  be observed.  (5) For the emotions, whereby

we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the body

which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions are general-

ly  excessive,  and  so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object,

that it is unable to think of others; and although men, as a rule, are a

prey  to  many  emotionsand  very  few  are  found who are always

assailed  by  one and the same—yet there are cases, where one and

the  same  emotion remains obstinately fixed.  (44:6) We sometimes see

men  so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not present, they

think  they  have it before them; when this is the case with a man who

is  not  asleep,  we  say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons

who  are  inflamed  with  love,  and  who  dream  all night and all day
about nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less

mad,  for  they  are  made  objects  of  ridicule.  (44:7) But when a miser

thinks of nothing but gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks

of  nothing  but glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they

are   generally   harmful,   and  are  thought  worthy  of  being  hated.
(44:8) But,  in  reality,  AvariceAmbitionLust, &c., are species of mad-               Sin
ness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases.

Prop. XLV.  Bk.XIB:20420; Bk.XIX:26939. 

                                                                            { irrationally }
Proof.— (45:1)  When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy   page 219

him  (III.xxxix.),  that  is (IV:xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that

is bad.  (45:2) Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.          {^ 4P51n}

N.B. (45:3) Here,  and  in  what  follows,  I  mean  by hatred only hatred
              towards men.

Corollary I.  
(45:4)   Envyderisioncontemptangerrevenge,  and

other  emotions  attributable to hatred,  or arising therefrom,  are bad;

this is evident from III:xxxix. and IV:xxxvii.          4P45C2S, 46, 59.

Corollary II. (45:5)  Whatsoever  we  desire  from  motives of hatred is

base,  and in a State unjust.  (6) This also is evident from III:xxxix., and

from   the   definitions   of  baseness  and  injustice  in IV:xxxvii.Notes.

                         Bk.XII:263   [ mockery ]
Note. (45:7)  Between  derision  (which  I have in Coroll. I. stated to be

bad)  and  laughter  I recognize a great difference.  (8) For laughter, as

also  jocularity,  is  merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not ex-

cessive,  it  is  in itself good (IV:xli.).  (9) Assuredly nothing forbids man
to  enjoy himself, save grim and gloomy superstition
(10)  For why is it            E4:Dijn:250. 

more  lawful  to  satiate  one's  hunger  and  thirst  than to drive away

one's  melancholy (45:11)  I  reason, and have convinced myself as fol-

lows:  No  deity,  nor  anyone  else, save the envious, takes pleasure
misfortune [
in  my  infirmity  and  discomfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears,

sobs,  fear,  and  the  like,  which are signs of infirmity of spirit; on the

contrary,  the  greater  the  pleasure  wherewith  we are affected, the

greater  the  perfection  whereto  we  pass;  in other words,  the more

must  we  necessarily partake of the divine Nature.  
(45:12) Therefore, to

make  use  of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as pos-

sible  (not  to  the  point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is

the  part  of  a  wise  man.   (45:13)  I  say  it  is the part of a wise man to             Durant:645127
        ] invigorate [
refresh  and  recreate  himself  with  moderate and pleasant food and

drink,  and  also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants,

with  dress,  with  music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like,
such  as  every  man may make use of without injury to his neighbour.

(45:14)  For  the  human  body  is  composed  of very numerous parts, of

diverse  nature,  which  continually  stand in need of fresh and varied

nourishment,  so  that  the whole body may be equally capable of per-

forming  all  the  actions,  which  follow  from  the necessity of its own
nature;  and, consequently, so that the mind may also be equally cap-
able  of  understanding  many  things  simultaneously.   (15)  This way

 page 220  of  life,  then,  agrees  best  with  our  principles, and also with

general  practice;  therefore,  if there be any question of another plan,

the  plan we have mentioned is the best, and in every way to be com-

mended.  (45:16)  There  is  no  need for me to set forth the matter more

clearly or in more detail.          4App31.

Prop. XLVI.  Bk.XIB:21561; Bk.XIX:26939. 

Proof.— (46:1)  All emotions of hatred are bad (IV:xlv.Coroll.i.); therefore

he  who  lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as

possible,  to  avoid  being  assailed by, such emotions (IV:xix.); conse-

quently,  he  will  also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed

(IV:xxxvii.).   (46:2)  But  hatred  is  increased by being reciprocated, and

can  be  quenched  by love (III:xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love

(III:xliv.);  therefore  he  who  lives  under  the  guidance of reason will

endeavour  to  repay  hatred  with  love, that is, with kindness ]
nobility [

 [ Nobility. See its definition in 3P59S ]     Q.E.D.

(46:3)  He  who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assur-

edly wretched(48:4)  But  he,  who  strives to conquer hatred with love,            Golden Rule

fights  his  battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily

as  one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.  (46:5) Those whom he

vanquishes  yield  joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in

their  powers; all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere
4App15; 5P10S.
definitions  of  love  and  understanding, that I have no need to prove

them in detail.

Prop. XLVII.  Bk.XIX:26939. 

Proof.—  (47:1)  Emotions  of  hope  and  fear  cannot exist without pain.

(47:2)   For  fear  is  pain  (III:De.xiii.),  and  hope  (Def.  of  the Emotions,

Explanation  xii. and  xiii.)  cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.)
indirectly }
these  emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only ^ in so far as

they can restrain excessive pleasure (IV:xliii.).  Q.E.D.

(47:3)  We  may  add, that these emotions show defective know-

ledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same reason con-
fidence,  despair,  joy,  and  disappointment  are  signs  of  a  want of
and love }
mental  power.  (47:4)  For  although confidence and joy are pleasurable
emotions,  they,  nevertheless  imply a preceding pain, namely, hope

and  fear.   page 221    (47:5)  Wherefore  the  more  we   endeavour   to  be

guided  by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to
                     [ conquer ]
free  ourselves  from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune,

directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.

Prop. XLVIII. 

Proof.— (48:1) These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi., xxii.) are
opposed [
repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi., IV:xxvii.) bad.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XLIX.  Bk.XIX:29515. 

Proof.— (49:1) If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's sake,
exult [
we  are  apt  to  become elated (III:xli.n), or to be pleasurably affected

(Def. of the Emotions:xxx.);  the  good which we hear of ourselves we
through self-love [
readily  believe (III:xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves
by De. xxviii. ]
too highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.

Prop. L. Bk.XIB:20522; Bk.XVIII:299p50; Bk.XIX:26939. 

                { Altruistic, Charity}                                  [ Sadness ]
Proof.— (50:1)  Pity  (Def. of the Emotions:xviii.) is a pain, and therefore         cherishing the foetus

(IV:xli.)  is  in itself bad.  (2) The good effect which follows, namely, our
III.xxvii,c3 [
endeavour  to  free  the  object  of  our  pity  from misery, is an action                 slums

which  we  desire  to  do  solely  at  the dictation of reason (IV:xxxvii.);

only  at  the  dictation  of  reason  are  we  able to perform any action,

which  we  know  for certain to be good (IV:xxvii.); thus, in a man who

lives  under  the  guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.          Mark Twain


(50:3)   He  who  rightly  realizes ,  that  all  things  follow  from
4P73S     Bk.XIB:217.
the  necessity of the divine Nature, and come to pass in accordance

with  the  eternal  laws  and  rules  of  Nature,  will  not  find anything              Mark Twain 

worthy  of  hatred,  derision,  or  contempt, nor  will he bestow pity on             Mark Twain 

anything,  but  to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavour     organic interdepence

to  do  well, as the saying is, and to rejoice(50:4) We may add, that he,           Durant:649152 

who  is  easily  touched  with  compassion, and is moved by another's

sorrow  or  tears,  often  does something which he afterwards regrets;

partly  because  we  can  never  be  sure  that  an  action  caused  by

emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears.

(50:5)  I  am  in  this  place  expressly speaking of a man living under the

guidance of  reason.  (50:6)  He  who  is moved to help others neither by
reason  nor  by  compassion,
   page 222   is  rightly  styled  inhuman,  for             E4:Dijn:250. 

(III:xxvii.) he seems unlike a man. 

Prop. LI.  Bk.XVIII:313p51-54,58. 

Proof.— (51:1)  Approval  is  love  towards  one  who  has done good to
can be related [
another (Def. of the Emotions:xix.); therefore it may be referred to the

mind, in so far as the latter is active (III:lix.), that is (III:iii.), in so far as
it—understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.  Q.E.D.

Another Proof.
(51:2)  He,  who  lives  under  the  guidance of reason,

desires  for others  the  good  which  he  seeks for himself (IV:xxxvii.);            Durant:649156

wherefore  from  seeing  someone  doing  good  to his fellow his own

endeavour  to  do  good is aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure

(III:xi.Note)  accompanied  by the idea of the benefactor.  (3) Therefore
he approves of him.  Q.E.D.

(51:4)  Indignation  as  we defined it (Def. of the Emotions:xx.) is

necessarily  evil (IV:xlv.);  we  may,  however,  remark  that, when the

sovereign  power  for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen           Durant:646138 

who  has  injured  another,  it  should not be said to be indignant with  

the  criminal,  for  it  is  not  incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a
 to protect the public.    }                                                                            Nazi-Germany
sense of duty to punish him.  { IV:XLV , EL:L25(78):306}

Prop. LII.  Bk.XIB:20420. 

Proof.— (52:1)  Self-approval  is  pleasure  arising from a man's contem-

plation  of  himself  and  his  own  power  of action (De.xxv.).  (2)  But a

man's  true  power of action—or virtue is reason herself (III:iii.), as the

said  man  clearly  and distinctly contemplates her (II:xl., II:xliii.); there-

fore self-approval arises from reason.  (52:3)  Again, when a man is con-

templating  himself,  he  only  perceived  clearly  and distinctly or ade-

quately,  such  things  as  follow  from  his  power of action (III:Def.ii.),

that is (III:iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such con-

templation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.

4P58S                                                                     ] good [
Note. (52:4)  Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we             Mark Twain

can hope.  (5) For (as we showed in IV:xxv.) no one endeavours to pre-
        end          ]
serve  his  being  for  the  sake  of  any  ulterior  object,  and,  as this

approval  is  more  and  more  fostered  and  strengthened  by praise

(III:liii.Coroll.),  and  on  page 223  the  contrary (III:lv.Coroll.) is more and
honor [
more  disturbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of incite-

ments   to  action,  and  life  under  disgrace  is  almost  unendurable. 

Prop. LIII.  Bk.XVIII:299p53; Bk.XIX:26939. 

Proof.— (53:1) Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his

own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions:xxvi.).  (2)   But, in so far as a man

knows  himself  by  true  reason,  he  is  assumed  to  understand his            Einstein

essence,  that  is,  his  power  (III:vii.).    (53:3)  Wherefore,  if  a  man  in

self-contemplation perceives any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue

of  his  understanding  himself,  but  (III:lv.)  by  virtue  of his power of

activity  being  checked. 
(53:4)  But, if we assume that a man perceives

his  own  infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than

himself,  by  the knowledge of which he determines his own power of

activity,  this  is  the  same  as  saying  that  we  conceive that a man            Active Emotion
                                                                              { Elwes Note 1, Pg 223 }
understands himself distinctly (IV:xxvi.), because  (Land reads: "Quod ipsius

agendi potentia juvatur"- which I have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to

‘quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).)  his  power  of  activity is aided.

(53:5) Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a man's contem-

plation  of  his own infirmity, does not arise from the contemplation or

reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.  Q.E.D.

Prop. LIV.   Bk.XIB:20522. 

Proof.— (54:1)   The  first  part  of this proposition is proved like the fore-

going  one.  (2)  The  second  part is proved from the mere definition of

the  emotion  in question (Def. of the Emotions:xxvii.).  (3)  For the man

allows himself to be overcome, first by evil desires; secondly, by pain.

Note. (54:4)  As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these             E4:Dijn:250. 

two  emotions,  namely,  Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and

Fear,  bring  more  good  than  harm;  hence, as we must sin, we had

better  sin  in that  direction.  (5)  For,  if all men who are a prey to emo-

tion  were  all  equally  proud,  they  would  shrink  from  nothing, and

would   fear   nothing;   how  then  could  they  be  joined  and  linked
 mob is fearsome [    Bk.XIA:3016.
together  in  bonds of union?  (54:6) The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
Bk.XIB:196112; Bk.XII:423. 
is  not  in  
page 224   fear;  hence we need not wonder that the prophets,

who  consulted  the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously com-
mended  HumilityRepentance,  and  Reverence.  
(54:7)  Indeed those            E4:Dijn:250. 

who  are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
others  to  live  under  the guidance of reason, that is, to become free

and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

Prop. LV.  Bk.III:251. 

Proof.— (55:1) This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and xxix.

Prop. LVI.  Bk.XVIII:309p36,56,67,72p24, d8. 

Proof. (56:1)  The  first foundation of virtue is self-preservation (IV:xxii.

Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.).  (2) He, therefore, who

is  ignorant  of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, and

consequently  of all virtues.  (3) Again, to act virtuously is merely to act
under  the  guidance  of reason (IV:xxiv.): now he, that acts under the

guidance  of  reason,  must necessarily know that he so acts (II:xliii.).

(56:4)  Therefore  he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and conse-

quently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words
extremely weak-minded ]             [ by 4P55 ]    
(IV:Def.viii.),  is most infirm of spirit (56:5) Thus extreme pride or dejec-
 weakness of mind ]
tion indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.  Q.E.D.

(56:6) Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the
   self-abased are most subject     [
dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

despondency ]
Note. (56:7) Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for

the  latter  being  a  pleasurable emotion,   and  the  former  a  painful

emotion,  the  pleasurable  is  stronger  than  the  painful  (IV:xviii.).

Prop. LVII.  Bk.XIB:21863; Bk.XVIII:234p57. 

                  { self-love }
Proof.— (57:1) Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of

himself (Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud

man  will  endeavour  to  foster  by all  the  means in his power (III:xiii.

Note);  he  will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and para-

sites  (whose  character  is  too  well  known  to need definition here),

and  will  avoid  the  company  of  high-minded  men,  who  value him

according to his deserts.  Q.E.D.

page 225

Note. (57:2)  It  would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil
results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all the emotions,

though to none of them less than to love and pity. (3) I cannot, however,

pass over in silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his

underestimation  of  other  people;  and, therefore, pride in this sense

may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a

man  may consider himself superior to his fellows.  
(57:4)  The dejection,

which  is  the  opposite quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as

pain  arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself

inferior  to  his  fellows.   (57:5)  Such being the case, we can easily see

that  a  proud  man  is  necessarily  envious  (III:lv.Note),   ] and hates

most  those  who  are  praised  for  their virtues—a hatred that cannot

easily be conquered by their love and kindness (III.xli.Note) [  
and only
  of  those  who  humour  his  weakness  of
takes  pleasure  in  the  company,  who  fool  his  weak  mind to the top
  spirit  and  turn  his  folly  to  madness. [
of his bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.

opposite [
(57:6)  Though  dejection  is  the  emotion  contrary  to  pride,  yet is the
dejected  man  very  near akin to the proud man.  (7) For, inasmuch as 

his  pain  arises  from  a  comparison  between  his  own infirmity and
assuaged [
other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he

will  feel  pleasure,  if  his  imagination  be  occupied in contemplating
misery loves company. ]
other  men's  faults;  whence  arises  the  proverb,  "The unhappy are
comforted  by  finding  fellow-sufferers.
(57:8)  Contrariwise, he will be

the  more  pained in proportion as he thinks himself inferior to others;

hence  none  are so prone to envy as the dejected, they are specially

keen  in  observing  men's  actions,  with a view to fault-finding rather

than  correction,  in order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to

glory therein,
though all the time with a dejected air. (57:9) These effects

follow  as  necessarily  from  the  said  emotion,  as it follows from the

nature  of  a  triangle,  that  the  three  angles  are  equal  to two right

angles.  (57:10) I have already said that I call these and similar emotions

bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  (11) The laws of Nature

have  regard  to  Nature's  general  order,  whereof  man is but a part.

(57:12)  I  mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have wish-
absurdities [
ed  to  set  forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than the

nature  and  properties of things.  (57:13)  For, as I said in the preface to

the third Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the

same  footing  with other natural phenomena.  page 226   (57:14)  Assuredly

human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity of Nature, if not of

human  nature,  quite  as  fully as other things which we admire, and

which  we  delight  to  contemplate.  (57:15)  But  I pass on to note those

qualities  in  the  emotions,  which  bring  advantage to man, or inflict

injury upon him. 

Prop. LVIII.  Bk.XVIII:313p51-54,58p61d.

Proof.— (58:1)  This  is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxx., and also

from the definition of an honourable man (IV:xxxvii.note.i.).

(58:2)  Empty honour] Vainglory [ as it is styled, is self-approval,

fostered  only  by  the  good  opinion of the populace; when this good

opinion  ceases  there  ceases  also the self-approval, in other words,
  good which everyone loves   [
the  highest  object  of each man's love (IV:lii.note); consequently, he

whose   honour   is  rooted  in  popular  approval  must,  day  by  day,

anxiously  strive,  act,  and  scheme  in  order  to retain his reputation.

(58:3)  For  the  populace  is variable and inconstant, so that, if a reputa-

tion  be  not kept up, it quickly withers away.  (58:4) Everyone wishes to

catch  popular  applause  for himself,  and readily represses the fame

of  others.   (5)  The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest

of  all  goods,  each  combatant  is  seized  with  a fierce desire to put

down  his  rivals  in  every  possible way, till he who at last comes out

victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having
vain [
done  good  to  himself.   (58:6)  This sort of honour, then, is really empty,

being nothing.

(58:7)   The  points  to  note  concerning  shame  (pudor)  may easily be            Durant:646138 

inferred  from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.              Altruism

(58:8)  I  will  only  add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,

is  yet  good,  in  so  far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really

imbued  with the desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffer-
yet decayed ]
ing   is   good,   as   showing  that  the  injured  part  is  not  mortified.

(58:9)  Therefore,  though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet

more  perfect  than  he,  who  is shameless, and has no desire to live


(58:10)  Such  are  the  points which I undertook to remark upon concern-

ing  the  emotions  of  pleasure  and pain; as for the desires, they are

good  or  bad  according  as  they  spring  from good or evil emotions.

(58:11)   But  all,  in  so  far  as  they  are   page 227  engendered  in  us  by,

emotions  wherein  the  mind  is passive, are blind (as is evident from

what  was  said  in  IV:xliv.note),  and  would be useless, if men could

easily  be  induced  to  live  by  the  guidance of reason  only, as I will

now briefly show.

Prop. LIX. 

Proof.— (59:1)  To  act rationally, is nothing else (III:iii. and III:Def.ii.) but

to  perform  those  actions,  which  follow  from  the  necessity  of our
sadness ]
nature { to persist } considered in itself alone. (59:2)  But pain is bad, in so

far  as  it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV:xli.); wherefore

we  cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be
Bk.XVIII:309p59d                        [ joy ]
unable  to  perform  under the guidance of reason (3) Again, pleasure

is  bad  only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV:xli.,

IV:xliii.);  therefore  to  this  extent we could not be determined by it to

any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason.

(59:4)  Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason

(for   it   consists   in  the  fact  that  a  man's  capability  for  action  is
increased  or  aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in so far

as  a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording
him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III:iii., & Note).

(59:5)  Wherefore,  if  a  man  who  is pleasurably affected be brought to
             °P              }
such  a  state  of  perfection,  that  he  gains an adequate conception

of  himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable

of  those  actions,  to which he is determined by emotion wherein the
joy ]
mind  is passive.  (59:6) But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to
sadness ]
pain,  or  to  desire  (Def. of  the Emotions:iv.explanation); and desire

( Def. of  the  Emotions:i. )   is  nothing  else  but  the  attempt  to  act;
emotion [
therefore, to all actions  to  which we  are  determined from an affect

which  is a passion, we can be led by reason alone, without the affect. ]


Another Proof.— 
(59:7)  A  given  action  is  called  bad,  in  so  far as it
see 4P45C1 ]
arises  from  one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.  (8)  But

no  action,  considered  in  itself  alone,  is  either good or bad (as we

pointed  out  in  the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being
< Therefore to that same >
sometimes  good,  sometimes  bad;  wherefore  to  the action which is
< now >                                                                               { understand }
sometimes  bad,  or  arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by

reason (IV:xix.).  Q.E.D.

page 228

Note. (59:9)  An  example  will  put  this point in a clearer light.  (10) The

action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far

as  we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his

fist,  and  moves  his  whole  arm  violently  downwards, is a virtue or

excellence  which  is  conceived  as  proper  to  the  structure  of  the
human body.  (59:11) If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to

clench  his  fist  or  to  move  his  arm,  this  result takes place (as we

showed  in  Pt.II.),  because  one  and the same action can be associ-
ated with various mental images of things; therefore we may be deter-

mined  to  the  performance  of one and the same action by confused

ideas,  or  by  clear  and  distinct  ideas.  (59:12)  Hence it is evident that

every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive,
ineffective [
would  become  useless,  if men could be guided by reason.  (59:13)  Let

us  now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind

is passive, is called by us blind.

Prop. LX.

Proof.— (60:1)  Let  it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body,

is  so  strengthened  by some external cause, that it prevails over the      Uncontrolled Capitalism

remaining  parts  (IV:vi.).  (2)  This  part  will not endeavour to do away

with  its  own  powers,  in  order  that the other parts of the body may
function [
perform  its  office; for this it would be necessary for it to have a force

or  power  of doing away with its own powers, which (III:vi.) is absurd.
III.vii. & xii. ]
(60:3)  The  said  part, and, consequently, the mind also, will endeavour

to   preserve   its   condition.   (60:4)  Wherefore  desire  arising  from  a
takes no account [
pleasure  of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as

a  whole.   (5)  If  it  be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be

checked  so  that  the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the
regard ]
same  manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to         Uncontrolled Labor

a man as a whole.  Q.E.D.

(60:6)  As  pleasure  is  generally (IV:xliv.note) attributed to one

part  of  the  body, we generally desire to preserve our being without

taking  into  consideration  our  health  as a whole: to which it may be

added,  that  the  desires  which  have  most  hold  over us (IV:ix.Cor)
take account of the present and not of the future. 

page 229

Prop. LXI.  Bk.XVIII:313fp61, 3174p61. 

Proof.— (61:1)  Desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) considered absolutely is

the  actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way

determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.

(61:2)  Hence  desire,  which  arises from reason, that is (III:iii.), which is
are active, [
engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature

of   man,  in  so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities

as  are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III:Def.ii.).
61:3)  Now,  if  such desire could be excessive, human nature consider-
that is, [
ed  in  itself  alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to

do  more  than  it  can, a manifest contradiction.  (61:4) Therefore, such

desire cannot be excessive.  Q.E.D.

Prop. LXII.  Bk.XVIII:31962. 

Proof.— (62:1)  Whatsoever  the  mind conceives under the guidance of

reason,  it  conceives  under  the  form  of  eternity or necessity (II:xliv.

Coroll.ii.),  and  is  therefore affected with the same certitude (II:xliii. &

Note).  (62:2)  Wherefore,  whether  the thing be present, past, or future,

the  mind  conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with

the  same  certitude;  and  whether  the idea be of something present,

past,  or  future, it will in all cases be equally true (II:xli.); that is, it will

always  possess  the same properties of an adequate idea (II:Def.iv.);

therefore,  in  so  far as the mind conceives things under the dictates

of  reason,  it is affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of

a thing future, past, or present.  Q.E.D.

(62:3)  If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the dura-

tion  of  things,  and  could determine by reason their periods of exist-

ence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as

things  present; and the mind would desire as though it were present

the  good  which it conceived as future; consequently it would neces-

sarily  neglect  a  lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater

good  in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in

the  present  but  a  source of evil in the future, as we shall presently

  (62:4)  However,  we  can  have  but  a very inadequate   page 230 

knowledge  of  the  duration of things (II:xxxi.) and the periods of their

existence (II:xliv.note) we can only determine by imagination, which is

not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.
(62:5) Hence

such  true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  as  we  possess is merely        See Bk.XIV:2:124-5—for
                    < universal.
158Bk.XV:27594-E2:XL(19)N2:113. >                              difference between
abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of     universal & common notions
things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what
is  good  or  bad  for  us  in the present, is rather imaginary than real.

(62:6)  Therefore  it  is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such

knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be

more  readily  checked than the desire of things which are agreeable

at the present time (Cf. IV:xvi.)

Prop. LXIII.  Bk.XIB:10231; 20522; 21559. 

Proof.— (63:1)  All  the  emotions  which  are attributable to the mind as
III.iii. [
active,  or  in  other  words  to  reason, are emotions of pleasure and
by De.XIII ]
desire  (III:lix.);  therefore,  he  who  is  led  by fear, and does good in

order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

censure [
Note.  (63:2)  Superstitious  persons, who know better how  to  rail  at

vice  than  how  to  teach  virtue,  and who strive not to guide men by
by fear [
reason,  but  so  to restrain  them ^ that they would rather escape evil

than  love  virtue,  have no other aim but to make others as wretched

as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally
resented and hated [
troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.

4P65, 65C, 67; 5P10S.  
Corollary. (63:3)  Under  desire  which  springs from reason, we seek           E4:Dijn:247- 8
{ E5:X(11):253 }         [ flee ]
good directly, and shun evil indirectly.                                           Hampshire:165

Proof.—  (63:4)  Desire  which springs from reason can only spring from
a  pleasurable  emotion,  wherein  the  mind  is not passive (III:lix.), in

other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV:lxi.), and

not  from  pain;  wherefore  this desire springs from the knowledge of

good,  not  of  evil (IV:viii.);  hence  under  the guidance of reason we
to that extent   [
seek  good  directly  and  only  by  implication  shun  evil.  Q.E.D.

(63:5)  This  Corollary  may  be  illustrated  by  the example of a

sick  and  a  healthy man.  (6) The sick man through fear of death eats

what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in

his  food,  and  thus  gets a better enjoyment  page 231 out of life, than if
he  were  in  fear  of  death, and desired directly to avoid it.  (63:7) So a

judge,  who  condemns  a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger

but  from  love  of  the  public  well-being,  is guided solely by reason.

Prop. LXIV.  Bk.XVIII:364f64. 

Proof.— (64:1)  The  knowledge  of  evil  (IV:viii.) is pain, in so far as we

are  conscious thereof.  (64:2)  Now pain is the transition to a lesser per-

fection (Def. of the Emotions:iii.) and therefore cannot be understood

through  man's  nature  (III:vi. & vii.);   therefore  it  is  a  passive state

(III.Def.ii.)  which  (III:iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently

the  knowledge  thereof  (II:xxix.),  namely,  the  knowledge  of evil, is

inadequate.  Q.E.D.

(64:3)  Hence  it follows that, if the human mind possessed        LT:L3614:343
             4P68                      ] could [                      notion—Bk.III:249.
only  adequate  ideas,  it  would  form  no  conception  of  evil. 

Prop. LXV.  Bk.XVIII:31965. 

Proof.— (65:1)  A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good

is in reality an evil;  for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in

so  far  as  we  compare  them  one  with another (see preface to this
IV.lxiii.Cor. ]
Part);  therefore,  evil  is  in  reality  a  lesser  good;  hence under the

guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the

lesser evil.  Q.E.D.

(65:2)  We  may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the            E4:Dijn:250

lesser  evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the

lesser  good,  which would be the cause of the greater evil.   (65:3)  For

the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser

good  is  really  evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the
IV.lxiii.Cor. ]
latter.  Q.E.D.  

Prop. LXVI.  Bk.XVIII:31966. 

Proof.— (66:1)  If  the mind could have an adequate knowledge  page 232 

of  things  future,  it  would  be  affected towards what is future in the

same  way  as  towards  what  is present (IV:lxii.); wherefore, looking

merely  to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there

is  no  difference,  whether  the  greater  good or evil be assumed as

present, or assumed as future; hence (IV:lxv.) we may seek a greater

good  in  the  future in preference to a lesser good in the present, &c.


(66:2) We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a less-            E4:Dijn:250

er evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the

future,   and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is

the cause of a greater evil in the future.  (66:3) This Corollary is related

to  the  foregoing  Proposition  as  the Corollary to IV:lxv. is related to

the said IV:lxv.

(66:4)  If  these  statements  be  compared  with  what we have

pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to          Calculus:Fig.3
Prop. xviii.,  we  shall readily see the difference between a man, who
is  led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason.

(66:5)  The  former,  whether  he will or no, performs actions whereof he
does no one's will but his own [
is  utterly  ignorant;  the  latter  is  his  own master and only performs

such  actions,  as  he  knows  are  of  primary  importance in life, and
therefore  chiefly  desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and the
Bk.XIB:2004.                                ] character [
latter  a  free man, concerning whose disposition and manner of life it           Mark Twain 
^ 2P49
will be well to make a few observations.

Prop. LXVII.  Bk.III:33, 246; Bk.XIA:13889, 16081; Bk.XIB:20420; Bk.XVIII:316p67-731d7; 320p63,c,67;
18, 27142; Bk.XX:24294. 

Proof.—  (67:1)  A  free  man  is  one  who  lives  under  the guidance of
of death [
reason,  who  is not led by fear (IV:lxiii.), but who directly desires that

which  is good (IV:lxiii.Coroll.), in other words (IV:xxiv.), who strives to

act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own         {Hampshire:165

true advantage; wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of       finite mode of Nature}
death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life.  Q.E.D.

Prop. LXVIII.  Bk.III:246; Bk.XVIII:318fp68; Bk.XIX:24831, 25344, 4526219, c. 

                      < E1:Parkinson:2627 >                          Bk.XIA:13787.
Proof. (68:1)   I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore,            Mark Twain
                                                                         Bk.XIA:13475; Bk.XIX:25446.
who  is  born  free,  and  who  remains free, has only adequate ideas;        Errorless Data Base

therefore  (IV:lxiv.Coroll.)  he  has  no   page 233   conception  of  evil,  or
             { Calculus:Fig.4The more perfect the less EMOTION.}
consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good.  Q.E.D.

 (68:2)   It  is  evident,  from  IV:iv.,  that  the  hypothesis  of  this

Proposition  is  false  and  inconceivable,  except in so far as we look

solely  to  the  nature  of  man,  or  rather  to G-D; not in so far as the
immanent }
latter  is  infinite,  but  only  in  so  far  as  he  is the ^ cause of man's


(68:3)  This,  and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
have been signified by Moses in the history of the first man.  (4) For in
Garden of Eden } 
that  narrative  no  other power of G-D is conceived, save that where-
immanently } 
by  he ^ created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely
?? }
for  man's  advantage;  it  is  stated  that  God forbad man, being free,
To be subjective.
to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon
E5:XXXVIII:266 } 
as  man  should  have  eaten  of  it,  he would straightway fear death
rather   than  desire  to  live.   (68:5) Further, it is written that when man 

had  found  a  wife,  who  was  in  entire  harmony with his nature, he

knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more use-

ful  to  him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he
?? }
straightway  began to imitate their emotions (III:xxvii.), and to lose his

freedom;  this  freedom  was  afterwards recovered by the patriarchs,
Bk.XIV:1:2432, 2:3522.        
led  by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of G-D, whereon alone
it  depends,  that  man  may  be  free, and desire for others the good

which  he  desires  for  himself,  as  we have shown above (IV:xxxvii.).

Prop. LXIX.  Bk.III:246; Bk.XVIII:317p69. 

Proof.— (69:1) Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion

contrary  to  itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion

(IV:vii.).  (2)  But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be con-

ceived as equally great (IV:v. and IV:iii.): hence, no less virtue or firm-

ness  (III:lix.Note) is required in checking daring than in checking fear;

in  other words (Def. of the Emotions:xl. and xli.), the free man shows

as  much  virtue,  when  he  declines  dangers, as when he strives to

overcome them.  Q.E.D.

Corollary. (69:3)  The  free  man is as courageous in timely retreat as

in  combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind,
choose [
whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.

page 234

Note. (69:4)  What  courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,

I  explained  in  III:lix.Note.  (5) By danger I mean everything, which can
cause [
give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.

Prop. LXX. Bk.XIB:8155; Bk.XVIII:317p70. 

                                                                                            ] thinking [
Proof.— (70:1)  Everyone  judges what is good according to his disposi-           Temperament

tion  (III:xxxix.Note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a
value [
benefit  on  another,  puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears

to  be  estimated  less  highly  by  the  receiver,  will  feel pain (III:xlii.).

(70:2)   But  the  free  man only desires to join other men to him in friend-
favours [
ship  (IV:xxxvii.),  not  repaying their benefits with others reckoned as

of  like  value,  but  guiding himself and others by the free decision of

reason,  and  doing  only  such  things  as he knows to be of primary

importance.  (70:3) Therefore the free man, lest be should become hate-

ful  to  the  ignorant,  or  follow  their  desires  rather than reason, will

endeavour,   as   far   as  he  can,  to  avoid  receiving  their  favours.

(70:4)  I  say,  as  far  as he can(5) For though men be ignorant,

yet  are  they  men,  and in cases of necessity could afford us human

aid,  the  most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to
accept  favours  from  them, and consequently to repay such favours

in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest

we  should  have  the  appearance  of  despising  those  who bestow

them,  or  of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them,

and  so  give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.

(70:6)  Thus,  in  declining  favours, we must look to the requirements of

utility and courtesy.

Prop. LXXI. Bk.XVIII:317p71. 

Proof.— (71:1) Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and
associated  among  themselves by the closest necessity of friendship

(IV:xxxv.,  &  Coroll.i.),  only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of
by De.xxxiv ]
love, to confer benefits on each other (IV:xxxvii.), and, therefore, only
thankful ]
they are thoroughly grateful one to another.  Q.E.D.

Note. (71:2)  The  goodwill,  which  men  who  are  led  by  blind  desire
inducement [
have  for one another, is generally a bargaining or   page 235  enticement,        
gratitude [                             Bk.III:245.
rather  than  pure  goodwill.   (71:3) Moreover, ingratitude  is  not an emo-

tion.  (71:4) Yet  it  is  base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is

affected  by  excessive  hatred,  anger,  pride,  avarice, &c.  (5)  He who,
stupidity [                               ] repay [
by  reason  of  his  folly,  knows  not  how  to  return benefits, is not un-
won [   
grateful,  much  less  he  who  is  not  gained  over  by  the  gifts  of  a
loose woman [
courtesan  to  serve  her  lust,  or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by
any similar persons.  
(71:6)  Contrariwise, such an one shows a constant            E4:Dijn:251

mind,  inasmuch  as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or

the general hurt.

Prop. LXXII.  Bk.III:245; Bk.XIA:13889; Bk.XVIII:309p72 . 

{ Missing in Elwes's translation. }

(72:1)  If  the  free man, in so far as he is free, were to act deceit-

he would be doing so in accordance with the dictates of reason (for
it is in this respect that we call him free), and thus to act deceitfully would

be  a  virtue  (IV.xxiv.),   and  consequently  (by  the  same  proposition),

in  order  to  preserve his own being, it would be better for every man to

act  deceitfully,  that  is  (as is self-evident)
 it would be better for men to

agree  in  words
 only, but to be contrary to one another in reality, which

is absurd (IV.xxxi.Cor.).
(72:2)  Therefore the free man . . . etc. [

 Note. [                                                                      { Martyr Laws }
Proof.— (72:3)  If  it  be  asked:  What  should  a  man's conduct be in a

case  where  he  could by breaking faith free himself from the danger
   < Bk.XV:282160E3:VI:136, E2:XLV(3)N:117. >  
of  present  death?   (72:4)  Would not his plan of self-preservation com-

pletely  persuade  him  to  deceive?   (72:5)  This  may  be answered by

pointing  out  that,  if  reason  persuaded him to act thus, it would per-

suade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would

persuade  men  not  to  agree  in good faith to unite their forces, or to

have  laws  in  common,  that is, not to have any general laws, which

is absurd.

Prop. LXXIII.  Bk.XVIII:317p73; Bk.XIX:26837.

Proof.— (73:1)  The  man,  who  is  guided  by  reason,  does  not obey

through fear (IV:Ixiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his

being  according  to the dictates of reason, that is (IV:lxvi.note), in so

far  as  he  endeavours  to live in freedom, he desires to order his life

according  to  the general good (IV:xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we

showed  in  IV:xxxvii.note.ii.),  to  live  according  to  the  laws  of  his

country.   (73:2)  Therefore  the  free  man, in order to enjoy greater free-

dom,  desires  to  possess  the  general  rights  of citizenship.  Q.E.D.

(73:2)  Therefore  the  man who is guided by reason desires to adhere

to the laws of the state so that he may live more freely. [

(73:3)  These  and  similar  observations,  which we have made

on  man's  true  freedom,  may be referred to strength, that is, to cour-
age  and  nobility  of  character (III:lix.Note).   (4)  I do not think it worth

while  to  prove  separately  all  the properties of strength; much less

need  I  show,  that  he that is strong  hates no man, is angry with no            Durant:649154 

man,  envies  page 236  no  man,  is indignant with no man, despises no          Spinoza's Dictum 

man, and least of all things is proud(73:5) These propositions, and all
4App15                                                 <--------- small print, Logical Index. 
that  relate  to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from
Analogy: can your heart "hate" your lung? }
IV:xxxvii.  and  IV:xlvi.;  namely,  that  hatred should be overcome with

love,  and that every man should desire for others the good which he

seeks for himself. 
(73:6) We may also repeat what we drew attention to
in  the  note to IV:L., and in other places; namely, that the strong man
in strong character ] ^
has  ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity           E5:Wolfson:2:268

of  the  divine Nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and

evil,  and  whatsoever,  accordingly,  seems  to  him impious, horrible,

unjust,  and  base,  assumes  that  appearance  owing to his own dis-                Mock

ordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. (73:7) Where-

fore  he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are,

and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred,

anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have men-

tioned above.  (73:8) Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as

in  him  lies,  to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing.  (73:9) How far

human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its
< E4:Parkinson:283161 >
powers may be, I will prove in the following Part V.       4App15     <------- small print, Logical Index.


APPENDIX.   Bk.XII:257—The first deals ...
 TEI:[3], [11]:3 }
What  I  have said in this Part concerning the right way  of life has not           

been  arranged,  so  as  to  admit  of being  seen at one view, but has

been  set  forth  piece-meal,  according  as I thought each Proposition

could  most  readily  be  deduced  from  what  preceded it.  I  propose,

therefore,  to  rearrange  my remarks and to bring them under leading


Ap.I.   All  our  endeavours  or desires so follow from the necessity of

our nature,  that  they  can  be  understood either through it alone, as

their  proximate  cause,  or  by  virtue  of  our  being  a part of Nature,

which  cannot  be  adequately  conceived through itself without other
things }

Bk.XIV:2:2042; Bk.XVIII:262AD13p9s.. 
Ap.II.    Desires,  which  follow  from  our  nature  in  such  a    page 237 

manner,  that  they  can  be  understood  through  it  alone, are those

which  are  referred  to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to

consist  of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to

the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force

and  increase  are  generally defined not by the power of man, but by
the  power  of things  external  to  us: wherefore the former are rightly

called  actions, the latter passions, for the former always indicate our
impotence and imperfect               E4:Feuer:21148.
power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragment 

ary knowledge.

Ap.III.  Our  actions,  that  is, those desires which are defined by man's

power or reason, are always good. The rest maybe either good or bad.           Ferguson 

E5:Dijn:26113 on Bk.III:247. 
Ap.IV.  (1)  Thus  in life it is before all things useful to perfect the under-
< intellect >
standing or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest           A Spinoza insight
better °PcM }      Bk.XVIII:3714App4.
happiness  or  blessedness  consists,  indeed blessedness is nothing
 satisfaction of mind ]          { °PcM }
else  but  the contentment of spirit {peace-of-mind}, which arises from               Religion
        {    intellectual love of G-D     }
the  intuitive knowledge of G-D: now, to perfect the understanding is                Ferguson

nothing else but to understand G-D, G-D's attributes, and the actions

which  follow from the necessity of his Nature.  (2) Wherefore of a man,        Organic - Cash Value

who  is led by reason, the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he
 moderate ] { influence }
seeks  to  govern  all  his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the

adequate  conception  of  himself and of all things within the scope of
understanding ]
his intelligence.

(1) Therefore,  without  intelligence there is not rational life: and

things  are  only  good,  in  so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of

the  intellectual  life,  which is defined by intelligence.  (2) Contrariwise,

whatsoever  things  hinder  man's perfecting of his reason, and capa-

bility to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.

Ap.VI.   As  all  things  whereof  man  is the efficient cause are neces-

sarily  good,  no  evil can befall man except through external causes;

namely,  by  virtue  of  man  being  a  part of universal Nature, whose

laws  human  nature  is  compelled  to  obey,  and  to  conform  to  in

almost infinite ways.

Ap.VII.   It  is  impossible,  that  man should not be a part of Nature, or
Bk.XIV:2:227, 2:2282—common. 
that  he  should  not  follow  her  general  order;  but  if  he be thrown            E4:Dijn:246.
among  individuals  whose  nature  is  in  harmony  with  his own,  his     

power  of action will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be

thrown  among  such  as  page 238  are but very little in harmony with his

nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without         

undergoing a great change himself.             4App9                         <------- small print, Logical Index.

Ap.VIII.  (1)  Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable

of  injuring  our  faculty  for  existing and enjoying the rational life, we

may  endeavour  to  remove  in whatever way seems safest to us; on

the  other  hand,  whatsoever  we  deem  to be good or useful for pre-

serving  our  being,  and enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may
appropriate  to  our  use  and  employ  as  we think best.  (2)  Everyone

without  exception  may,  by  sovereign right of nature, do whatsoever

he thinks will advance his own interest.

(1)  Nothing  can  be  in  more  harmony  with the nature of any 

given  thing  than  other  individuals  of  the  same  species; therefore
(cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of

the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who              

is  led  by reason.  (2) Further, as we know not anything among individ-

ual  things which is more excellent than a man led by reason, no man

can  better  display  the  power  of his skill and disposition, than in so

training men, that they come at last to live under the dominion of their

own reason.

Ap.X.   In  so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred,

one  towards  another,  they  are at variance, and are therefore to be           Jungle self-interest

feared  in  proportion,  as  they  are  more powerful than their fellows.

Ap.XI.   Yet  minds  are  not  conquered  by  force,  but  by  love  and               {
      ] nobility [                                                                                                     interdependence }

Ap.XII.   It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of

life,  to  bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most

fitted  to  gather  them  all  into unity, and generally to do whatsoever

serves to strengthen friendship.

(Ap13:1)  But  for  this  there  is  need  of  skill  and watchfulness.

(Ap13:2) For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the guid-

ance  of  reason  are  few),  yet  are they generally envious and more

prone to revenge than to sympathy. (Ap13:3)  No small force of character               Charity

is  therefore  required to take everyone as he is, and to restrain one's

self  from  imitating  the emotions of others. 
(Ap13:4) But those who carp 

at  mankind,  and  are  more  skilled  in  railing at vice than in instilling
virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions, page 239
are  hurtful  both  to  themselves  and  others.   (Ap13:5) Thus many from             Durant:649153 

too  great  impatience  of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have

preferred  to  live  among  brutes  rather than among men; as boys or
youths,  who  cannot  peaceably  endure the chidings of their parents,

will  enlist  as  soldiers  and choose the hardships of war and the des-

potic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admoni-

tions  of  their  father:  suffering  any  burden  to be put upon them, so

long as they may spite their parents.

(1)  Therefore,  although men are generally governed in every-

thing by their own lusts, yet their association in common brings many

more  advantages  than  drawbacks.   (Ap14:2)  Wherefore  it  is better to

bear  patiently  the  wrongs  they  may do us, and to strive to promote

whatsoever  serves  to bring  about  harmony  and  friendship.

Ap.XV. (1) Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attribu-

table to justice, equity, and honourable living.  (Ap15:2) For men brook ill             Conclusion

not  only  what  is  unjust  or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned dis-

graceful,  or  that  a  man  should  slight the received customs of their

society.  (Ap15:3)  For  winning  love those qualities are especially neces-

sary  which  have  regard  to  religion  and  piety (cf. IV:xxxvii.Notes.i.,

&. ii.IV:xlvi.Note;  and  IV:lxxiii.Note).

(1)  Further,  harmony  is  often  the  result  of  fear:  but such
 loss of peace-of-mind }
harmony  is  insecure.   (2)  Further,  fear  arises from infirmity of spirit, 

and  moreover belongs not  to  the  exercise  of
 reason: the same is

true  of  compassion,  though  this  latter  seems  to  bear  a  certain

resemblance to piety.

(1)  Men  are  also gained over by liberality, especially such as

have  not  the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life.  (2) How-

ever,  to  give  aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the
resources [
advantage  of any private person.  (3) For the riches of any private per-

son  are  wholly  inadequate to meet such a call.  (Ap17:4) Again, an indi-

vidual  man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able
to make all men his friends.  (5)  Hence providing for the poor is a duty,             Durant:653177 
which  falls  on  the  State  as  a  whole,  and  has  regard only to the
common good [
general  advantage.

Ap.XVIII.  In  accepting  favours,  and  in  returning  gratitude our duty

must  be  wholly  different  (cf.  IV:lxx.NoteIV:lxxi.Note).

page 240
] love of a mistress [                      Bk.III:251. 
Ap.XIX.   Again,   meretricious  love,  that  is,  the  lust  of  generation
arising  from  bodily  beauty,  and  generally every sort of love, which
 objectivity      }
owns  anything  save  freedom  of  soul  as  its cause, readily passes           Hamption:166
into  hate;  unless  indeed,  what is worse, it is a species of madness;

and  then  it promotes discord rather than harmony (cf. III:xxxi.Coroll.).

Ap.XX.  As  concerning  marriage,  it  is certain that this is in harmony

with reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely

by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train
them  up  wisely;  and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man

and  of  the  woman,  is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by
compatibility Bk.XIB:20841.
freedom of soul.  

Ap.XXI. (1) Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of

the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.  (2) None are more readily

taken  with  flattery  than  the  proud, who wish to be first, but are not.

(1) There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and

religion.  (2) Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that

abases himself most akin to the proud (IV:lvii.Note).

(1)  Shame  also  brings  about  harmony,  but  only  in  such

matters  as  cannot  be hid. (2)  Further, as shame is a species of pain,

it does not concern the exercise of reason.

Ap.XXIV.  The  remaining  emotions  of  pain towards men are directly

opposed  to  justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although
fairness ]
indignation  seems  to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life

but  lawless,  where  every  man  may  pass  judgment  on  another's

deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's rights.

                                 <           Modesty              >
Ap.XXV.  (Ap25:1)  Correctness  of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire

of  pleasing  men  which  is  determined  by  reason, is attributable to

piety  (as we said in IV:xxxvii.Note.i.).  (2)  But, if it spring from emotion,

it  is  ambition,  or  the  desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of

piety,  generally  stir  up  discords  and  seditions.   (Ap25:3)  For  he who

desires  to  aid his fellows. either in word or in deed, so that they may
together  enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things strive   

to,  win  them over with love: not to draw them into admiration, so that

a  system  may  be  called  after  his  name, nor to give any cause for 

envy.   (Ap25:4)   Further,  in  his  conversation he  page 241  will shrink from

talking  of  men's  faults,  and will be careful to speak but sparingly of                 Mock

human  infirmity: but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power,

and  the  way  whereby  it  may be perfected.  (Ap25:5) Thus will men be

stirred  not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to

endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to reason.

Ap.XXVI.   Besides  men,  we  know  of no particular thing in Nature in

whose  mind  we  may  rejoice, and whom we can associate with our-

selves  in  friendship  or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever

there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not
call  on  us  to  preserve,  but  to  preserve or destroy according to its

various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may.

(Ap27:1)  The  advantage which we derive from things external          {Durant:191}

to  us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from

observing  them,  and  from  recombining  their  elements  in different  
forms,  is  principally  the  preservation  of the body; from this point of

view, those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the

body,  that  all  its  parts  may rightly fulfil their functions(Ap27:2) For, in

proportion  as  the body  is  capable  of  being  affected  in  a  greater

variety of ways,  and of affecting external bodies in a great number of

ways,  so  much  the  more  is the mind capable of thinking (IV:xxxviii.,

IV:xxxix.).  (Ap27:3)   But  there  seem  to be very few things of this kind in

nature;  wherefore  for  the due nourishment of the body we must use

many foods of diverse nature. (Ap27:4) For the human body is composed

of  very  many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need

of   varied   nourishment,   so  that  the  whole  body  may  be  equally
capable  of  doing  everything that can follow from its own nature, and

consequently  that  the  mind  also may be equally capable of forming

many perceptions.

(1)  Now  for  providing  these  nourishments the strength of

each  individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another

mutual aid. (2) But money has furnished us with a token for everything:
populace [
hence  it is with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is

chiefly  engrossed:  nay,  it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure,

which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause. Bk.XIB:20627.

page 242

Ap.XXIX.  (1)  This  result  is  the  fault  only of those, who seek money,

not  from  poverty  or  to  supply  their necessary wants, but because
 making money ]
they,  have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves

to  great  splendour.  (2) Certainly they nourish their bodies, according

to  custom,  but  scantily,  believing  that  they  lose  as  much of their

wealth  as  they  spend  on the preservation of their body.  (3) But they

who  know  the true use of money, and who fix the measure of wealth
solely   with   regard  to  their  actual  needs,   live  content  with  little.

   (Ap30:1)  As,  therefore,  those things are good which assist the

various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their functions;

and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in

so  far  as  he  is composed of mind and body; it follows that all those
things which bring pleasure are good.  (Ap30:2) But seeing that things do

not work with the object of giving us pleasure, and that their power of

action  is  not  tempered  to suit our advantage, and, lastly, that pleas-

ure  is  generally  referred  to  one  part  of the body more than to the

other  parts; therefore most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and

watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the desires arising there-
from, may become excessive.  (Ap30:3)  Moreover we may add that emo-

tion  leads  us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present,

nor   can  we  estimate  what  is  future  with  emotions  equally  vivid.

(IV:xliv.Note,  and  IV:lx.Note.)

                         ] assert [
Ap.XXXI.  (1)  Superstition,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  to account as            E4:Dijn:250. 
good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure (2) How-

ever,  as  we  said  above (IV:xlv.Note), none but the envious take de-

light in my infirmity and trouble. (3)  For the greater the pleasure where-

by  we  are  affected,  the  greater  is the perfection whereto we pass,

and  consequently  the  more  do  we partake of the divine Nature: no
controlled [
pleasure  can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our

advantage.  (4)  But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does good

only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

E5:Parkinson:283162Bk.XV:26316 on E1:X(2)N:51, 
                               E2:VII(4)N:86, E2:VII(7)N:87. >
(Ap32:1) But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely

surpassed  by  the  power of external causes; we have not, therefore,

an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are with-
external to [
out us.  (2) Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that hap-
        that  is  contrary           [
pens  to  us in  page 243  contravention  to the claims of our own advant-

age,  so  long  as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and

that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to pro-

tect  ourselves  completely; remembering that we are a part of univer-
sal  Nature, and that we follow her order. 
(Ap32:3) If we have a clear and            E4:Dijn:250. 

distinct  understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined

by  intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assur-

edly  acquiesce  in  what  befalls  us,  and  in such acquiescence will           Hampshire32:167 

endeavour to persist.  (Ap32:4)  For, in so far as we are intelligent beings,

we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield ab-

solute  acquiescence  to  anything,  save  to that which is true: where-

fore,  in  so  far  as we have a right understanding of these things, the

endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order
of Nature as a whole.        < E4:Parkinson:283161 >


End of Part IV of V.



E4:Sub-Title - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:280132On Human Servitude 

E4:Sub-Title - From De Dijn's Bk.III:246—On Human Bondage.

E4:Sub-Title - From De Dijn's Bk.III:24919On Salvation.

E4:Prop. List - From De Dijn's Bk.III:247Summary of Part IV.                           E4:Wolfson:2:223

E4:Endnote N.11. - From Wolfsons's Book XIV:2:223—Summary of Part IV.                E4:Dijn:247

E4:Contents - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:221Virtues, Power, Strength (viribus).

E4:Endnote Prf(4). - From Shirley's Book VII:1521Perfect and Imperfect. 

E4:Endnote Prf(12) - From Matthew Stewart's The Courier and the Heretic 2006;
0393058980; p.158—G-D, or Nature:

E4:Endnote Prf(27). - From De Dijn's Bk.III:34—Good, Bad, and Conatus.         E3:6:0, 6:0a, & 11:0

E4:Endnote Prf(32). - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:280136Good and Bad. 

E4:Endnote Prop. 7 - From Will and Ariel Durant's "The Story of Civilization: Part VIII",
Chapter XXII - Spinoza.
ISBN: 0671012150, 1963, Pages 646, 647:
Continued from E3:Def. 2.

E4:Endnote Prop. 34 - From De Dijn's Bk.III:251Useful.    Continued from E4:Dijn:250—Theology.

E4:Endnote 35:14 - From De Dijn's Bk.III:250—Theologians.

E4:Endnote 37:19 - From Prof. Hall's Tape 1:L21:TB2:109—Problem of Evil, Praise and Blame,                                                                                                 Spinoza's Dictum.

E4:Endnote 4P67 - From Hampshire's Book 32:165-6—Death:

E4:Endnote Appendix - From Parkinson's Book XV:283161—Human Virtue: 

E4:Endnote Ap.II - From Feuer's Book XIB:21148—Therapy.

E4:Endnote Ap.IV - From Steven B. Smith's Book XIA:135Reason.

E4: Endnote 4P18:9  - From Damasio's Book XXVI:170-1Conatus.

End of Endnotes of Part IV of V.

Since November 6, 1997 Part IV hits.

Revised: January 28, 2006

 "A Dedication to Spinoza's Insights