Of the Power of the Understanding
 E5:Dijn:253.   or of Human Freedom   E5:Deleuze:130.

Circulated - 1673
Posthumously Published - 1677

Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677

IntroductionPurpose  -  Spinozistic Ideas  -  Mark Twain & Spinoza 
The Ethics:   Part I  -  Part II  -  Part III  -  Part IV  -  Part V
Spinozistic Glossary and Index  -  New in Spinoza 

JBY Notes:

1.  The  text  is  the  1883  translation  of the "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
     Elwes,  as  printed
  by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was
     scanned  and  proof-read by JBY.  For other Versions see Note 7.

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):   y = Proposition Number, if given;   xx = Sentence Number.

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ),
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ],
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >,
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <,
           { JBY Comment }    G-D   
   Metaphors       LINKS

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please  e-mail  errors,   clarification  requests,  disagreement,
     or  suggestions  to  

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read
on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively         Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its         EL:[3]:vi. 
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and           Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions,
or best, study the printed book
    book page numbers
are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's IntroductionEL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi.
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for   every-           E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the
       "Organic  Interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all
       his   puzzling   sayings,    for  example  E4:II:192,   become   more,
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the
       Cash Value.

10a.  To  help  further  understand  many  of  the Propositions and Ideas,       { Examples
                    use  the  analogy  of  you  as  'G-D (substance                      1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
                   I WAS                I AM            I WILL BE   
                   ( antecedents,  present,  and  descendents ),                                         E2:Endnote N.11

                                                    heart, lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc.                      Organic
                   and all parts of you as modes ( particular  things ).
         Example—you  are  a  part  of  G-D  as your heart is a part of you.          Indivisible 
         You should serve G-D as you would want your heart to serve you.  

        Apparent  Contradiction of the analogy. E5:Endnote 18:1N.

11. Wolfson's summary of Part V.

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxiv.
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi.
For a "study of the plan of Ethics 5" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:341-2.
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:   Bk.XII:xi, 278—The Deliverance of Man.
                                                                     Bk.XIV:xxiv—Chapter XX,  Bk.XIV:2:261-2Love,
                                                                                                         Immortality, and Blessedness.

Preface: 244

Axioms: 247

Part V Propositions: Book I:Pg. xix
           If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral.
           If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here.


Part V Proposition List: Book I:Pg. xix; { Hypotheses }

             Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as you would a novel;
                                but select a Proposition, click its number to the left
                               and  then  follow  all  its links in turn wherever they
                               may  lead.  You  will then be putting hypertexting to
                               its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion
                               of a thread.  If  you  do  not  stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site will seem very convoluted and 

              {Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                             so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.
                      All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea

Prop. I.
I - XX

Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged 
and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of  
body or the images of things precisely in the same way 
arranged and associated in the body. 
Prop. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from 
the  thought  of  an  external cause, and unite it to other 
thoughts,   then  will  the  love  or  hatred  towards  that 
external cause, and also  the vacillations of spirit which 
arise  from  these  emotions, be destroyed. 
See Note 10.
Prop. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion,
as  soon  as  we  form  a clear and distinct idea thereof.
Prop. IV. There is no modification of the body,  whereof  we can-
not form some clear and distinct conception.
Prop. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible,
is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other 
Prop. VI. The mind has greater power {°PcM} over the emotions
and  is  less subject thereto, in so far as it understands
all things as necessary. 
Prop. VII. Emotions  which  are  aroused or spring from reason, if
we take account of time, are stronger than those, which
are  attributable  to  particular objects that we regard as 
Prop. VIII. An  emotion  is stronger in proportion to the number of
simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
Prop. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as  simultaneous with
the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less sub- 
ject  thereto  and  less  affected  towards  each  of its 
causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful 
emotion  attributable  to  fewer  causes  or  to a single 
Prop. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary
to  our  nature,  we have the power of arranging and
associating  the  modifications of our body according 
to the intellectual order. 
Prop. XI.
In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
objects,  so  is it more frequent, or more often vivid,
and occupies the mind more. 
Prop. XII. The mental images of things are more easily associ-
ated  with  the  images  referred  to things which we
clearly and distinctly understand, than with others. 
Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it
is associated with a greater number of other images.
Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily  modifications
or images of things may be referred to the idea of G-D.
Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself  and
his  emotions  loves G-D, and so much the more in pro-
portion  as  he  more  understands  himself  and  his 
Prop. XVI. This love towards G-D must hold the chief place in the
Prop. XVII. G-D is without passions, neither is he affected by any
emotion of pleasure or pain. 
Prop. XVIII. No one can hate G-D.
Prop. XIX. He, who loves G-D, cannot endeavour that G-D should
love him in return. 
Prop. XX. This love towards G-D cannot be stained  by  the emo-
tion  of  envy  or  jealousy:  contrariwise,  it is the more 
fostered,  in  proportion as we conceive a greater num- 
ber  of  men to be joined  to  G-D by the same bond of 
Prop. XX1.
The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
is past, while the body endures. 
Prop. XXII. Nevertheless  in  G-D  there  is  necessarily  an  idea,
which expresses the essence of  this  or  that  human 
body under the form of eternity. 
Prop. XXIII.
The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
the  body,  but  there remains of it something which is 
Prop. XXIV.
The more we understand particular things, the more do
we understand G-D. 
Prop. XXV.
The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
virtue  is  to  understand  things  by  the third kind of 
     { ^
the knowledge that comes from a mystical experience} 
Prop. XXVI.
In proportion as the mind is more capable of under-
standing  things  by  the  third kind of knowledge, it 
desires more to understand things by that kind. 
Prop. XXVII.
From  this  third kind  of  knowledge arises the highest
possible mental acquiescence. 
Prop. XXVIII. The  endeavour  or  desire  to know things by the third
kind of knowledge cannot  arise from the first, but from 
the second kind of knowledge. 
Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever  the mind understands under  the form of
eternity, it does not  understand  by  virtue  of conceiv- 
ing  the  present  actual  existence  of the body, but by 
virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the 
form of eternity. 
Prop. XXX. Our  mind,  in so far as it knows itself and the body
under the form of eternity, has to that extent neces- 
sarily  a  knowledge of G-D, and knows that it is in 
G-D, and is conceived through G-D. 
Prop. XXXI.
The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
its  formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal. 
Prop. XXXII.
Whatsoever we understand by the third  kind of know-
ledge,  we  take  delight  in,  and our delight is accom- 
panied by the idea of G-D as cause. 
Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of G-D, which arises from the third
kind of knowledge, is eternal. 
Prop. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to
those  emotions  which  are  attributable to passions. 
Prop. XXXV. G-D loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.
Prop. XXXVI. The   intellectual  love  of  the mind towards G-D is that
very  love of G-D whereby G-D loves himself, not in so 
far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained 
through   the   essence  of  the  human  mind  regarded 
under  the  form of eternity; in other words, the intellect- 
ual  love  of  the mind towards G-D is part of the infinite 
love wherewith G-D loves himself. 
Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this
intellectual love, or which can take it away.  
Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by
the  second  and  third  kind  of  knowledge,  it is less 
subject  to  those emotions which are evil, and stands 
in less fear of death. 
Prop. XXXIX. He,  who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, possesses a mind whereof  the 
greatest part is eternal. 
Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfec-
tion,  so  is it more active, and less passive; and, vice 
versâ,  in  proportion as it is more active, so is it more 
Prop. XLI.
Even  if  we  did not know that our mind is eternal, we
should  still  consider  as  of primary  importance piety 
and religion, and generally all things which, in Part  IV., 
we showed to be attributable to courage and high- 
Prop. XLII.



Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself;
neither  do  we  rejoice therein, because we control our 
lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we 
are able to control our lusts. 



page 244

PREFACE:   E5:Dijn:253; Bk.XII:278, 279.

(Prf:1)  At  length  I  pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is
   Bk.XIV:1:385&6.—Liberty, Blessedness—E5:Wolfson:2:3113 
concerned  with  the way leading to freedom(2) I shall therefore treat           Scr:Dijn'sSalvation 

therein  of  the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can                 Conclusion 

control  the  emotions,  and  what is the nature of Mental Freedom or  
Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful               Enlight-ened
      ^ E5:Wolfson:2:3113     Bk.XIV:2:2591.                Bk.XVIII:52277/13.
the wise man is than the ignorant. (3)  It is no part of my design to point

out  the  method  and  means whereby the understanding may be per-

fected,  nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as

to  be  capable of the due performance of its functions.  (Prf:4) The latter
question  lies  in  the  province of Medicine, the former in the province               Bk.XII:279 

of Logic.  (5)  Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of   

the  mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature

of  its  dominion  over  the  emotions, for their control and moderation.
                                               < E5:Parkinson:283162Bk.XV:26316 on E1:X(2)N:51,  
                                                  E2:VII(4)N:86, E2:VII(7)N:87, E4:Ap.XXXII(1):242. >
(Prf:6)  That  we  do  not possess  absolute  dominion  over them, I have
                                                Bk.III:254; Bk.XX:24291
already shown.  (Prf:7)  Yet  the  Stoics  have thought, that the emotions

depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern              Mark Twain 

them.  (Prf:8)  But  these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of

experience,  not  from  their  own principles, to confess, that no slight

practice  and  zeal  is needed to control and moderate them: and this

someone  endeavoured  to  illustrate  by  the  example (if I remember

rightly)   of   two  dogs,   the   one   a   house-dog   and   the  other  a

hunting-dog.  (Prf:9)  For  by long training it could be brought about, that

the  house-dog  should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-
                                                                                < E5:Parkinson:283162 >
dog to cease from running after hares. (Prf:10) To this opinion Descartes

not  a  little  inclines. (11)  For  he  maintained,  that  the soul or mind is

specially  united   to  a  particular part of the brain, namely,  page 245  to
                                 Bk.XIV:2:1165, 2:1894.
that  part  called  the  pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is en-             Wolf:P95, L22 
                                                     ^ Descartes Pineal Gland
abled  to  feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and         Hampshire32:111 
                                                                                                 ] willing [

also  external  objects,  and  which the mind by a simple act of volition                Mark Twain

can  put  in motion in various ways.  (Prf:12)  He asserted, that this gland
                                       ] middle [
is  so  suspended  in  the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by
the  slightest  motion  of  the  animal  spirits: further, that this gland is

suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as

the  animal  spirits  can  impinge thereon; and, again, that as many dif-

ferent  marks  are  impressed on the said gland, as there are different

external  objects  which  impel  the animal spirits towards it; whence it

follows,  that  if  the  will  of the soul suspends the gland in a position,

wherein  it  has  already  been suspended once before by the animal

spirits  driven  in  one  way  or another, the gland in its turn reacts on

the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein

they  were,  when  repulsed  before  by a similar position of the gland.
                                                                    ]     willing        [
(Prf:13)  He  further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in

nature to a certain given motion of the gland.  (14)  For instance, when-

ever  anyone  desires  to  look  at  a remote object, the act of volition

causes  the  pupil  of  the  eye  to  dilate,  whereas,  if  the  person in

question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish

to  dilate  it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the
 {    part of the brain      }                                        { electrical signals }                              A Computer
motion  of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards

the  optic  nerve  in  a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is

not  associated  in  nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil,

but  with  the wish to look at remote or very near objects.  (Prf:15) Lastly,

he  maintained  that,  although  every  motion  of  the aforesaid gland

seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of

the  whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life,

yet  it  can  nevertheless become through habituation associated with
                                                                               ] Passions of the Soul [
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'âme,

I. 50.  (Prf:16) He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it
                                                                                        { some }
cannot,   under   proper  direction,  acquire  absolute  power  over  its
passions.   (17)  For  passions  as  defined  by him are "perceptions, or
feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as

page 246  species,  and  which (mark the expression) are produced, pre-

served,  and  strengthened  through  some  movement  of  the spirits."

(Passion del l'âme, I.27.) (Prf:18) But, seeing that we can join any motion

of  the  gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the deter-

mination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore,

we  determine  our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to

which  we  wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the

passions  which  we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall

acquire  an  absolute  dominion  over  our passions.  (Prf:19)  Such is the

doctrine  of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his

own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly

believe  to  have  proceeded  from so great a man.  (Prf:20) Indeed, I am

lost  in  wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he                 Descartes

would  draw  no  conclusions  which  do  not  follow  from self-evident

premisses,  and  would  affirm  nothing  which  he  did not clearly and

distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics
                                                         < Bk.XV:283163Bk.XV:279118 on E3:XV(10)N:141 >
for  wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could main-

tain  a  hypothesis,  beside  which  occult  qualities are commonplace.

(Prf:21)  What  does  he  understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and                Dennett:433

the  body?   (Pfc:22)  What  clear  and  distinct  conception  has he got of

thought  in  most  intimate  union  with  a  certain particle of extended

matter?  (Pfc:23)  Truly  I  should like him to explain this union through its

proximate  cause. (Pfc:24)  But  he  had  so  distinct a conception of mind

being  distinct  from  body,  that  he  could  not  assign  any particular

cause  of  the  union  between  the  two, or of the mind itself, but was

obliged  to  have  recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is         Refuge of Ignorance

to God. (Pfc:25)  Further, I  should  much  like  to  know,  what degree of

motion  the  mind  can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force

can  it  hold  it suspended? (Prf:26)  For I am  in  ignorance, whether this

gland  can  be  agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than

by  the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which

we  have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined

therefrom  by  physical  causes;  in  which  case  it  would  follow that,

although  the  mind  firmly  intended  to  face a given danger, and had

united to this decision the motions of boldness,  yet at the sight of the

danger  the  gland  might  page 247  become  suspended  in a way, which

would  preclude  the  mind  thinking  of  anything except running away.
                                               <  no relation between  >
(Prf:27)  In  truth,  as  there is no common standard of volition and motion,
                                                    ^ Bk.XVIII:137II/280/13.
so  is  there  no comparison  possible between the powers of the mind

and   the  power  or strength of the body; consequently the strength of

one  cannot  in  any  wise  be  determined by the strength of the other.

(Pfc:28)  We  may  also  add,  that  there  is  no gland  discoverable in the

midst  of  the  brain,  so  placed that it can thus easily be set in motion
                                                                                     ] extended [
in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far

as  the  cavities of the brain. (Prf:29) Lastly, I omit all the assertions which

he  makes  concerning  the  will  and  its freedom, inasmuch as I have               Mark Twain

abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  (Prf:30)  Therefore, since
the  power  of  the  mind,  as  I  have  shown  above is defined by the
 < Bk.XV:283164E4:XXVIII(3):206 >
understanding  only,  we  shall  determine  solely by the knowledge of
                             Bk.VIII:5977Bk.XIV:2:2631; Bk.XVIII:333II/280/24.
the  mind  the  remedies  against  the  emotions,  which  I  believe   all
have  had  experience  of,  but do not accurately observe or distinctly
                         ] this knowledge [                                            ] concerns [
see,  and  from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions,
which have regard to the mind's blessedness.                                                        E5:Wolfson:2:311. 

AXIOMS.  { Common Notions. }

Ax. I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change                   Idolatry
          must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, 
          and continue until they cease to be contrary.           5P7.                   <------- small print, Logical Index.

Ax. II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in 
           so  far  as  its essence is explained or defined by the essence 
           of its cause.   (This axiom is evident from IlI.vii.) .
              { The  essence of man  is what causes 
              the fetus to grow in its mother's womb. } 


PART V PROPOSITIONS.  { Hypotheses }
                       For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

First Section - 5P1-20
Prop. I. Bk.III:253; E5:Dijn:258; E5:Wolfson:2:262; Bk.XVIII:27927, 3315p1; 345p1.

          {Cash Value—If thoughts are objective, reason prevails, III:ii.}
Proof.— (1:1)  The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as

the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the order and con-

nection  of things is the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and

connection of ideas.  (2) Wherefore, even as the order and connection

of  ideas  in  the mind takes place according to the order and associa-

tion  of  modifications  of the body (II:xviii.), so vice versâ (III:ii.) page 248

the  order  and connection of modifications of the body takes place in

accordance  with  the  manner,  in  which  thoughts  and  the ideas of

things are arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.

PROP. II. Bk.XV:283166E5:XX(4)n:257; Bk.XIV:2:1931, 2:2682; Bk.XVIII:2865p2, 334p2; Bk.XIX:28428??

                                                                 < form >
Proof.— (2:1)  That,  which  constitutes  the reality of love or hatred, is

pleasure  or pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an external cause
      Bk.XVIII:337p2d.                                                                 { understood }
(Def. Emotions:vi., & vii.);  wherefore,  when  this  cause is removed,
                                                      {    understood       }
the  reality  of  love  or  hatred  is  removed  with  it;  therefore these
emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed { resulting in

peace of mind }.   Q.E.D.   { My  emendation  is  based on Prop. III and the

"other thoughts"  of  this  Prop. II. }

Prop. III.   E4:Feuer:211, Bk.XIB:212; Bk.XVIII:2865p3, 335p3; Bk.XIX:28427.


Proof.— (3:1)  An emotion,  which  is  a  passion, is a confused idea (by
the general Def. of the Emotions). (2) If, therefore, we form a clear and

distinct  idea  of  a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished
                                                              ] related [
from  the  emotion,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the mind only, by
reason  (II:xxi., & Note); therefore (III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be

a passion.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.—  (3:3)   An  emotion  therefore  becomes  more  under  our

control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as
it is more known to us.            5P42.

Prop. IV.  Bk.XIB:21351; Bk.XVIII:335p4; Bk.XIX:28533.

Proof.— (4:1)  Properties  which  are  common to all things can only be

conceived  adequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii and Lemma. ii. after

II:xiii.)  there  is  no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form

some clear and distinct conception.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.— (4:2) Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we

cannot  form  some  clear and distinct conception.  (4:3) For an emotion

is  the  idea  of  a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the

Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some

clear and distinct conception.

Note. (4:4)  Seeing  that  there  is nothing which is not followed by an
                                         Bk.XIB:21250; Bk.XIX:15118EL:L42(37):360—E2:XL:111.
effect  (I:xxxvi.), page 249  and  that  we  clearly and distinctly understand

whatever  follows  from  an  idea,  which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it fol-

lows  that  everyone  has  the  power  of  clearly  and  distinctly under-
standing himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part,

and  consequently  of  bringing  it  about, that he should become less
                                    Bk.III:255; Bk.XIX:28428.
subject  to  them.  (4:5)  To  attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly

direct  our  efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct

knowledge   of   every   emotion,  in  order  that  the  mind  may  thus,
                                { conditioned }
through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clear-

ly  and  distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
that  the  emotion  itself  may  be  separated  from  the  thought of an
external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it

will  come  to  pass,  not  only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed

(V:ii.),  but  also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise

from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.).

(4:6)  For  it  must  be  especially  remarked,  that  the  appetite through

which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to

be  passive  is  one  and the same.  (4:7) For instance, we have shown

that  human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-

men  to live after his own fashion (III:xxxi.N & C); in a man, who is not
                                                             5P20S.                         Bk.XIV:2:2442.
guided  by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition,

and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by

the  dictates  of  reason,  it is an activity or virtue which is called piety
(IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and second proof).  (4:8) In like manner all appetites or

desires  are  only  passions,  in so far as they spring from inadequate

ideas;  the  same  results  are  accredited  to  virtue,  when  they  are

aroused  or  generated by adequate ideas.  (4:9) For all desires, where-

by  we  are  determined  to any given action, may arise as much from
                                Bk.XIB:21250; Bk.XIX:28430.
adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.).  (10) Than this remedy for

the  emotions  (to  return to the point from which I started), which con-

sists  in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being with-
   Bk.XVIII:2705p4s; 336p4s.
in  our  power, can be devised.  (4:11) For the mind has no other power

save  that  of  thinking  and  of  forming  adequate ideas, as we have

shown above (III:iii.).

Prop. V.   Bk.XII:284; Bk.XVIII:2835p5,345p5,6; Bk.XIX:29516. 

Proof.— (5:1)  An  emotion  towards  a  thing,  which we conceive to be
free,  is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary

(III:xlix.),  and,  consequently,  still  greater than one towards what we

conceive  as  possible,  or  contingent  (IV:xi.).  (5:2)  But  to conceive a
         Bk.XVIII:3385p5dE3:XLIX:161.                                  ] in itself [
thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we
                       Bk.XVIII:338p5d                                                                         Bk.XVIII:3455p5d
are  in  ignorance  of  the  causes whereby it has been determined to
                                                                                     { G-D }
action  (II:xxxv.Note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we
               ] in itself [
conceive  simply  is,  other  conditions being equal, greater than one,

which  we  feel  towards  what  is  necessary, possible, or contingent,

and, consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.

Prop. VI.    Bk.XVIII:345p5,6, 125p6,19, 283313p49.

Proof.— (6:1)  The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.)

and to  be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain           E5:Wolfson:2:268

of  causes [ to exist and produce effects (by 1P28) ]; therefore (by the forego-

ing Proposition), it  thus  far brings it  about,  that it is less subject to
the  emotions  arising  therefrom,  and  (III:xlviii.) feels less ^  emotion   

towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.

Note.(6:2)  The  more  this  knowledge, that things are necessary, is

applied  to  particular  things,  which  we conceive more distinctly and
vividly,  the  greater  is  the  power  of the mind over the emotions, as

experience also testifies. (3)  For  we see, that the pain arising from the

loss  of  any  good  is  mitigated,  as  soon as the man who has lost it   
                                                                           Bk.XVIII:3395p6s; Bk.XIX:28635.          Happen by necessity
perceives,  that  it  could  not  by  any  means  have  been preserved.             E5:Wolfson:2:269
                                   Bk.XIV:2:270; Bk.XVIII:342p6s; Bk.XIX:2198; Bk.XX:24290.
(6:4)  So  also  we  see  that  no  one  pities an infant, because it cannot

speak,  walk,  or  reason, or lastly,  because it passes so many years,

as  it  were,  in  unconsciousness.  (6:5)  Whereas,  if most people were

born  full-grown  and  only  one here and there as an infant, everyone
would  pity  the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on

as  a  state  natural  and  necessary,  but  as a fault or delinquency in

Nature;  and  we  may  note  several other instances of the same sort.

Prop. VII.  Bk.XVIII:2705p7,28331,3325p7, 345p7; Bk.XIX:29518.

Proof.— (7:1)  We  do  not  regard  a  thing as absent, by reason of the

emotion  wherewith  we conceive it, but by reason of the body being

affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing
(II:xvii.).  (7:2)  Wherefore,  the  emotion,  which  is  referred to the thing

which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of

a  man's  activities  and  power  (IV:vi.),  but  is,  on  the contrary, of a

nature  to  be  in some sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude

the  existence of  its  external cause (IV:ix.).  (7:3) But an emotion which
                                                                             { objective }
springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties

of  things  (see  the  def.  of  reason  in II:xl.Note.ii.), which we always

regard  as  present  (for there can be nothing to exclude their present
                                                            imagine—Bk.XIX:29414, 29517.
existence),   and  which  we  always  conceive  in  the  same  manner

II:xxxviii.).  (7:4)  Wherefore  an emotion of this kind always remains the

same;  and consequently (V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary there-

to  and  are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to

adapt  themselves  to  it  more  and  more,  until  they  are  no  longer

contrary  to it; to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is

more powerful.  Q.E.D.

Prop. VIII.  Bk.XIV:2:271; Bk.XVIII:345p8,9,11; Bk.XIX:29519. 

Proof.— (8:1) Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few

(III:vii.):  therefore  (IV:v.),  in  proportion  to  the  increased number of

simultaneous  causes  whereby  it  is  aroused,  an emotion becomes

stronger.  Q.E.D.

Note. (8:2) This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii.

Prop. IX.  Bk.XVIII:345p8,9,11, 350p9; Bk.XIX:29621. 

Proof (9:1)  An  emotion  is  only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders
                                                 { objectively }
the  mind  from  being  able to think ^ (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an

emotion,  whereby  the  mind  is  determined  to the contemplation of

several  things  at  once,  is  less page 252  hurtful  than another equally

powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contem-
plation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything

else;  this  was  our  first  point.  (9:2)  Again,  as the mind's essence, in

other  words,  its  power  (III:vii.), consists solely in thought (II:xi.), the

mind  is  less  passive  in  respect  to  an emotion, which causes it to
                                                 { best of all the immanence of G-D, its cause, }
think  of  several things at once, ^ than in regard to an equally strong
                                                            { subjective }
emotion,  which keeps it engrossed in the ^ contemplation of a few or

of a single object: this was our second point.  (9:3) Lastly, this emotion

(III:xlviii.),  in  so  far  as  it  is  attributable  to  several  causes, is less

 powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.

Prop. X.  Bk.III:256; Bk.XII:285; Bk.XVIII:345p1,10; Bk.XIX:24117, 28737.


Proof.(10:1)  The  emotions,  which  are  contrary  to our nature, that is

(IV:xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from
{ controlling lusts                      Bk.XII:285
understanding (IV:xxvii.). (10:2) So long, therefore, as we are not assailed
         ^ Bk.XIB:21351, 21866.
by  emotions  contrary  to  our nature, the mind's power, whereby it en-

deavours to understand things (IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore
it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from
                                                                               ] V:i. [
another  (II:xl.Note.ii. and II:xlvii.Note); consequently   we have in such
               ] ability [        [ ordering and connecting ]            ] affections [
cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the
                                          < order of the intellect >
body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.
                                { reason }; Bk.XIX:28531.

                                                  duly orderingBk.XII:285
Note(10:3)   By  this  power  of  rightly  arranging and associating  the
bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affect-
                                                           { lesser effort? }
ed by evil emotions. (10:4) For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for con-
                                                           [   ordered and connected    ]
trolling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated accord-
            {            reason            }             Bk.XVIII:2875p10s.     { confused }
ing  to  the  intellectual  order,   than  when  they  are  uncertain  and
[ random ]                      E5:Dijn:257- 8.
unsettled.  (10:5)  The  best we can do,  therefore, so long as we do not                Conclusion
E5:Parkinson:283167 >
possess  a  perfect  knowledge  of our emotions, is to frame a system

            ] method [                                [ maxims ]
of  right conduct,  or  fixed  practical precepts, to commit it to memory,
                         ] continually [
and  to  apply  it  forthwith  (Continuo.  Rendered  "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the

ground  that  the  classical  meaning  of  the  word does not suit the context. I venture to think,

however,  that  a  tolerable sense may be obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholar-

ship.)  to  the  particular  page 253  circumstances  which  now  and  again
                                               ] casual thinking [                       ] permeated [
meet  us  in  life,  so  that  our  imagination  may become fully imbued
therewith,  and  that  it  may  be  always  ready  to our hand.  (10:6)  For
instance,  we  have laid down among the rules of life (IV:xlvi., & Note),
                                                                                [ nobility ]
that  hatred  should  be  overcome with love or high-mindedness, and

not  requited  with  hatred  in  return.  (10:7)  Now,  that  this  precept of

reason  may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should

often  think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by

men,  and  in  what  manner and way they may be best warded off by
 ] nobility of character [
high-mindedness:  we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the

idea  of  this  precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use

when a wrong is done to us (II:xviii.). (10:8) If we keep also in readiness

the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from

mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember
      [ highest satisfaction of mind ]
that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life (IV:lii.),

and  that  men,  no  less than everything else, act by the necessity of

their  nature:  in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which com-            Spinoza's Dictum

monly  arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagina-

tion and will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a

grievous  wrong  be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be over-

come, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had

not  thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  (9) As is indeed evident

from  V:vi., V:vii., V:viii. (10:10)  We  should,  in the same way, reflect on
[ tenacity ]
courage  as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life

should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the
                                         ]     resourcefulness       [
means  whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind

we  can  avoid  and  overcome  them.  (10:11)  But  we must note, that in

arranging  our  thoughts  and  conceptions we should always bear in

mind  that  which  is  good in every individual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and

III:lix.),  in  order  that  we  may always be determined to action by an

emotion  of  pleasure.  (10:12) For instance, if a man sees that he is too
                                  [ esteem ]
keen  in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end

for  which  it  should  be pursued, and the means whereby he may at-

tain it. (10:13) Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the

fickleness  of  mankind,  and  the  like, whereof no man thinks except
                                    [ sickness of mind ]
through  a  page 254  morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these

do  the  most  ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair

of  gaining  the  distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent
                       [  they wish to seem  ]
to their anger  would fain appear wise.  (14) Wherefore it is certain that

those,  who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the

vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it.  (10:15) This is

not  peculiar  to  the  ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used

by  fortune,  and  who  are  infirm  in  spirit.  (10:16) For a poor man also,

who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the

vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the

world  that  he  is  intolerant,  not  only of his own poverty, but also of

other  people's  riches.   (10:17)   So,  again,  those  who  have  been  ill

received  by  a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy,

treachery,  and  other  stock  faults  of  the  fair  sex; all of which they

consign  to  oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their

sweetheart.   (10:18)   Thus   he  who  would  govern  his  emotions  and
appetite  solely  by  the  love  of  freedom strives, as far as he can, to

gain  a  knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit

with  the  joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in

no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
revel  in  a  false  show of freedom.  (10:19) Whosoever will diligently ob-

serve and practise these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will

verily,  in  a  short  space  of time, be able, for the most part, to direct
                                                 ruleE5:Pollock:286 on Idea of G-D
his  actions  according  to  the  commandments  of  reason.

Prop. XI Bk.III:231; Bk.XII:2871; Bk.XIV:2:273; Bk.XIX:29520.

Proof.—  (11:1)   In  proportion  as  a  mental  image  or  an  emotion  is
 {combined}                                             Bk.XVIII:345p8,9,11.
referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be

aroused  and  fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contem-

plates  simultaneously  in  association  with  the given emotion; there-

fore  the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in full vigour, and

(V:viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XII.  Bk.III:231, 256; Bk.XIX:29414. 

page 255
Proof.— (12:1)  Things,  which we clearly and distinctly understand, are

either  the common properties of things or deductions therefrom (see

definition of Reason, II:.xl.Note ii.),  and are consequently (by the last

Prop.)  more  often  aroused in us. (12:2) Wherefore it may more readily

happen,  that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with

these  than  in  conjunction  with  something  else, and consequently

(II:xviii.)  that  the  images  of  the  said  things  should be more often

associated  with  the  images  of these than with the images of some-

thing else.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XIII.  Bk.III:231, 256. 

 Proof.— (13:1)  In  proportion  as  an image is associated with a greater

number  of other images, so (II:xviii.) are there more causes whereby

it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XIV. Bk.III:231, 256; Bk.XIV:2::281ff; Bk.XVIII:346p14; Bk.XIX:30814, 30918, 2916, 29724. 

Proof.— (14:1)  There  is  no modification of the body, whereof the mind

may  not form some clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it

can  bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of G-D

(I:xv.).  Q.E.D.

Prop. XV.  Bk.XII:282; Bk.XIV:2:281ff; Bk.XIX:29932. 

Proof.(15:1)  He  who  clearly and distinctly understands himself and

his  emotions  feels  pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last
       Bk.XIV:2:2731; Bk.XVIII:2745p15d, 346p15d; Bk.XIX:29727.
Prop.) accompanied by the idea of G-D; therefore ( such an

one  loves  G-D,  and  (for  the  same  reason)  so  much  the more in

proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XVI.  Bk.XVIII:346p16.

 Proof.— (16:1)  For  this  love is associated with all the modifications of

the  body (V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:xv.); therefore (V:xi.),

it must hold the chief place in the mind.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XVII.  Bk.XII:2871; Bk.XIV:1:3294; 2:2075; Bk.XIX:29729.  

page 256
                                                                                       ] related [
Proof.— (17:1)  All  ideas, in so far as they are referred to G-D, are true

(II:xxxii.),  that  is  (II:Def.iv.adequate; and therefore (by the general              Bk.XIB:21662.
                                                          { EMOTION }
Def. of the Emotions) G-D is without passions(2) Again, G-D cannot
pass  either  to a greater or to a lesser perfection {
C:Fig. 3 and C:Fig. 4 }                 by hypothesis

(I:xx.Coroll.ii.);  therefore  (by Def. of the Emotions:ii., & iii.)  he is not
                                                   [ joy ]       [ sadness ]
affected  by  any  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain{ Calculus:3.2, C:4.4. }

                                                                                          5P19   Bk.XIV:2:3102
Corollary.(17:3)  Strictly speaking, G-D does not love or hate anyone.           G-D at 100% °P

(4) For  G-D (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of

pleasure  or  pain,  consequently  (Def. of the Emotions:vi., & vii.) he                  E5:Dijn:257- 8
does not love or hate anyone {the terms are meaningless}.                              Calculus:4.44.7, E3:GN:2N. 
{Since love and hate involve an external cause, and there is nothing external to G-D
 (by hypothesis), G-D does not love or hate anyone. Man can become extinct or prosper,
 all as determined by natural selection.

Prop. XVIII.  Bk.XIB:21662; Bk.XIV:2:287; Bk.XV:283168. 

Proof.— (18:1)  The  idea of G-D which is in us is adequate and perfect            E5:Pollock:286
                                                                      [ consider ]
(II:xlvi., II:xlvii.);  wherefore, in so far as we contemplate G-D, we are
                                                                          { no loss of °PcM }
active (III:iii.); consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied

by  the idea of G-D, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one
can hate G-D.  Q.E.D.
Corollary.—  (18:2)  Love  towards  G-D cannot ^ be  turned  into  hate.

Note. (18:3)  It  may  be  objected  that, as we understand G-D as the

cause  of  all things, we by that very fact regard G-D as the cause of

pain.  (18:4)  But  I  make  answer,  that,  in so far as we understand the
  Bk.XVIII:346p18s; Bk.XIX:28636.
causes of pain, it to that extent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is,
   {     E5:Endnote 18:3       }
it  ceases  to  be  pain  (III:lix.);  therefore, in so far as we understand              Purpose
                            { ^ suffering, loss of PcM}                           { better °PcM }
G-D  to  be  the  cause  of  pain,  we  to  that  extent  feel  pleasure.               Safir:170

Prop. XIX.    Bk.XIB:21662; Bk.XIV:2:263; Bk.XVIII:125P6,19, 17717.

Proof.— (19:1)  For,  if  a  man  should  so  endeavour,  he would desire

(V:xvii.Coroll.)  that  G-D,  whom  he  loves,  should  not be G-D, and            G-D at 100% °P

consequently  he  would  desire  to feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd
                        Bk.XVIII:1755p19d, 346p19d.
(III:xxviii.).  (19:2) Therefore, he who loves G-D, &c.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XX.   Bk.XIB:21662; Bk.XVIII:2825p203p27; Bk.XIX:299idea of G-D, 30814. 

Proof.(20:1)  This  love  towards  G-D  is  the highest good which we
can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to

all  men (IV:xxxvi), and we desire that all  page 257  should rejoice there-
in  (IV:xxxvii.);   therefore  (III:De.xxiii),   it  cannot  be  stained  by  the

emotion  envy  nor  by the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition
                                                                     [ by 3P31 ]
of  Jealousy, III:xxxv.Note);  but,  contrariwise,  it  must needs be the
       [ encouraged ]                        Bk.III:128—imagine.
more  fostered,  in  proportion  as  we  conceive a greater number of
           ] be enjoying it  [
men to rejoice therein.  Q.E.D.

Note.(20:2)  We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion      

directly  contrary  to  this  love,  whereby  this  love can be destroyed;
                                                                      < Bk.XV:286184 on TEI:[10]:5 >
therefore  we  may  conclude,  that this love towards G-D is the most

constant  of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the
              <E5:Parkinson:283169 on E5:XX(18)N:257>
body,  it  cannot  be  destroyed,  unless  the  body be destroyed also.              E5:Dijn:257- 8
                                                               ] related  [
(20:3)  As  to  its  nature,  in  so  far as it is referred to the mind only, we

shall presently inquire.`

                     Bk.XII:287                            < E5:Parkinson:283166 on E5:II:248, passions >
(20:4)  I  have  now  gone through all the remedies against the emotions,
                                                                        Bk.XIV:2:1946, 2:2653. ^
or  all  that  the  mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them.
                        ] is clear [
20:5)  Whence it  appears  that  the  mind's  power  over  the  emotions

consists:—  Bk.III:255.

                           ] very [   Bk.XVIII:336p20s.
I.      (20:6)  In  the  actual  knowledge  of  the  emotions  (V:iv.Note).

II.      (20:7)  In  the  fact  that it separates the emotions from the thought
        of  an  external cause,  which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and

III.    (20:8)  In  the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to
        things,  which  we distinctly understand, surpass those referred
        to  what  we  conceive  in  a  confused and fragmentary manner

IV.    (20:9)   In   the  number  of   causes   whereby  those  modifications
           (Affectiones. Camerer reads affectusemotions), are fostered, which
         have  regard  to  the  common  properties  of  things  or  to  G-D
         (V:ix., V:xi.).

V.      (20:10) Lastly,  in  the  order  wherein  the  mind can arrange and
         associate,   one  with  another,   its  own  emotions   (V:x.  and
         V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.).    Bk.III:256.

VI.      [ Bk. VIII:60512Bk.XIV:2:266 - Omits reference to E5:VI:250. ]

(20:11)  But,  in  order that this power of the mind over the emotions may

be  better  understood,  it  should be specially observed that the emo-

tions  are  called  by us strong, when we compare the emotion of one

man  with  the  emotion  of  another,  and  see  that  one man is more

troubled  than another by the same emotion; or when we are compar-        Calculus:Temperament

ing  the  various  emotions  of  the  same  man one with another, and                 Mark Twain
                                            Bk.XIV:2:1931—or moved.
page 258   find  that  he  is  more affected or stirred by one emotion than
                             ] E4:V:194 [
by another.  (20:12)  For  the  strength  of  every emotion is defined by a

comparison  of  our  own  power with the power of an external cause.

(20:13) Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
   sin, impotence—E3:Wolfson:2:1843 & 5.         [ lack ], defect
infirmity or passion  is  defined  by  the  privation  of  knowledge only:
it  therefore  follows,  that  that  mind is most passive, whose greatest           

part  is  made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized

more  readily  by  its  passive  states  than  by  its  activities:  on  the

other  hand,  that  mind  is  most  active, whose greatest part is made
up  of  adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inad-

equate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily character-

ized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of
           ] weakness [
human  infirmity.   (20:14)    Again,  it  must  be  observed,  that  spiritual
 ]emotional distress and unhappiness[; { loss of °PcM }
unhealthiness;  and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive
                                                                          ]     instability       [
love   for   something   which   is   subject   to   many  variations,  and
 Bk.XVIII:3015p20s; Bk.XX:24086.   ]  truly possess  [
which  we  can  never become masters of (15) For no one is solicitous

or anxious about anything, unless he loves it; neither do wrongs, sus-

picions,  enmities,  &c.  arise,  except  in  regard to things whereof no

one can be really master.

(20:16) We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct

knowledge,  and  especially that third kind of knowledge (II:xlvii.Note),
{ posited }                                 Bk.XIX:29932.
founded  on  the  actual  knowledge of G-D, possesses over the emo-

tions:  if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are pas-

sions  (V:iii.  and  V:iv.Note);  at  any rate, it causes them to occupy a
          Bk.III:256; Bk.XIX:2199, 28532.                                 LikewiseBk.XII:287
very  small  part  of  the mind (V:xiv.).  (20:17)  Further,  it  begets  a love
                      G-D      Bk.XIV:2:2816, 2836; Bk.XVIII:2085p20s.
towards a thing immutable and eternal (V:xv.), whereof we may really
                                                                                [ tainted ]
enter  into  possession  (II:xlv.);  neither  can  it  be defiled with those
[ vices ]
faults  which  are  inherent  in  ordinary  love;  but  it  may  grow from
                          [ by 5P15 ]            ] engage [                              [ by 5P16 ]
strength  to  strength,  and  may engross the greater part of the mind,
       [ affect it extensively ]                [ occupy ]
and deeply penetrate it.

                                                                              Bk.XII:287; Bk.XIV:2:2891, 2:2622;
(20:18) And  now  I  have  finished with all that concerns this present life:          E5:Parkinson:283169 

for,  as I said in the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all

the  remedies  against  the  emotions(20:19)  And  this  everyone  may

readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to what is advanced

in  the  present  note,  and  also  to the definitions of the mind and its

emotions,  and,  lastly,  to Propositions  III:i. and  III:iii. (20:20)  It  is  now,  
                                     { EL:[60]:xxix. }                                                                                  Santayanaimmortality
page 259   therefore,  time  to  pass on to those matters, which appertain        Durant 647immortality
  { infinite mind of G-D }                                     E5:Dijn:258.                                   E5:Curley:60613Cambridge:762
to the duration of the mind {Soul or Mind}, without relation to the body.   Troublesome Text—Cash Value
 Durant:647                              Bk.XIV:2:2891, 2:2622.                          

Second Section - 5P21-40 
The second deals "with those matters which appertain  
to the duration of the mind without relation to the body."                                  
                   See Life of Reason.    
Prop. XXI. XXI - XXIIIBk.XIV:2:292; Bk.XIB:22379, 224; Bk.XIX:2024, 31528. 


Proof.—  (21:1)  The  mind  does  not express the actual existence of its

body,  nor  does  it  imagine  the  modifications of the body as actual,

except  while  the  body  endures  (II:viii.Coroll.);  and,  consequently

(II:xxvi.),  it  does  not  imagine  any  body as actually existing, except

while its own body endures. (21:2) Thus it cannot imagine anything (for
definition  of  Imagination,  see  II:xvii.Note), or remember things past,

except while the body endures (see definition of Memory, II:xviii.Note).


Prop. XXII. XXI - XXIIIBk.XIV:2:292, 2952; 3011; Bk.XIB:224;
                                                   Bk.XVIII:1281, 1305p22,35; Bk.XIX:3044.

                                   Bk.XIX:31125.                     Bk.XIV:2:2922
Proof.— (22:1) G-D is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that

human body, but also of its essence (I:xxv.). (22:2) This essence, there-

fore,  must  necessarily  be  conceived  through  the  very essence of
G-D (I:Ax.iv.),  and be thus conceived by a certain  eternal  necessity

(I:xvi.);  and  this  conception  must  necessarily  exist  in  G-D  (II:iii.).


Prop. XXIII. XXI - XXIIIBk.XIV:2:292; Bk.XVIII:3575p23, 3735p235p31d, 375p23,5p23-42.
                                                      Bk.III:231; Bk.XIB:22379, 224; Bk.XIV:2:3244; Bk.XX:13142.

Proof.— (23:1)  There  is  necessarily  in  G-D  a concept or idea, which
expresses  the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, there-
fore,  is  necessarily  something  appertaining  to  the  essence of the

human mind (II:xiii.). (23:2) But we have not assigned to the human mind
   Bk.XVIII:2035p23d.  < E5:Parkinson:284170 >
any  duration,  definable  by time, except in so far as it expresses the
actual  existence  of  the  body,  which  is explained through duration,
and  may be defined by time—that is (II:viii.Coroll.), we do not assign

to  it  duration,  except  while  the  body endures.  (23:3) Yet, as there is

something,  notwithstanding,  which is conceived by a certain eternal

necessity  through  the  very  essence  of G-D (last Prop.); this some-

thing,  which  appertains  to the essence of the mind, will necessarily
be eternal.  Q.E.D.

Note.(23:4)  This  idea,  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the body
                      < E5:Parkinson:283169 on E5:XX(18)N:258 >
under  the  form  of  eternity,  is,  as  we  have  said, a certain  page 260
mode  of  thinking,  which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
      E5:Curley:60613.             Bk.XIV:2:1572.
necessarily eternal (5) Yet it is not possible that we should remember
              E5:Dijn:258.                                         Bk.XIV:2:296.
that  we  existed  before  our  body, for our body can bear no trace of        
                                                                     Bk.XVIII:2025p23s, 2055p23s.
such  existence,  neither  can  eternity  be defined in terms of time, or

have any relation to time. (23:6) But, notwithstanding, we feel and know
      E5:Curley:60814; Bk.XIX:31527.
that  we  are  eternal(23:7)  For  the mind feels those things that it con-

ceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers.
                  Bk.XVIII:165p23s; Bk.XIX:2224.
(23:8)  For  the  eyes of the mind,  whereby  it sees and observes things,            E5:Dijn:257- 8.

are  none  other  than proofs. (9) Thus, although we do not remember

that  we  existed  before  the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far

as  it  involves  the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is

eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time,

or  explained through duration. (10) Thus our mind can only be said to
endure,  and  its  existence  can only be defined by a fixed time, in so

far  as it involves the actual existence of the body. (23:11) Thus far only

has  it  the  power of determining the existence of things by time, and

conceiving them under the category of duration.

Prop. XXIV. Bk.III:152; Bk.XIB:5344; Bk.XIV:2:298, 2:368p24,25p36cs; Bk.XVIII:367p24,369p24.

Proof.— (24:1) This is evident from I:xxv.Coroll.

Prop. XXV.  Bk.XIB:8560; Bk.XIV:2:301; Bk.XVIII: 368p24,25p36cs; 370p25; Bk.XIX:3043.

Proof.(25:1) The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate

idea  of  certain  attributes  of  G-D  to an adequate knowledge of the
essence  of  things  (see its definition II:xl.Note.ii.); and, in proportion

as we understand things more in this way, we better understand G-D

(by the last Prop.);  therefore  (IV:xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind,

that  is (IV:Def.viii.) the power, or nature, or (III:vii.) highest endeavour

of  the  mind,  is  to  understand  things by the third kind of knowledge.


Prop. XXVI.

Proof.— (26:1)  This  is  evident.  (2)  For,  in  so  far  as  we conceive the

mind  to  be  capable  of  conceiving things by this kind of knowledge,

we, to that extent,  conceive it as determined  page 261  thus to conceive

things;  and  consequently  (Def. of the Emotions:i.), the mind desires

so  to  do,  in  proportion  as  it  is  more  capable  thereof.   Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVII. XXVII-XXXIIIBk.XIV:2:2826, 305, 3251; Bk.III:258; Bk.XVIII:370p27.


Proof.(27:1) The highest virtue of the mind is to know G-D (IV:xxviii.),                  Ferguson

or  to  understand  things by the third kind of knowledge (V:xxv.), and

this  virtue  is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by

the  said  kind  of  knowledge  (V:xxiv.): consequently, he who knows

things  by  this  kind  of knowledge  passes  to  the  summit  of human

perfection,  and  is therefore (Def. of the Emotions:ii.) affected by the
     Bk.XIX:3058; { better °PcM }                                           [ by 2P43 ]
highest  pleasure,  such  pleasure  being accompanied by the idea of 
                        ^ E5:Parkinson:285175
himself  and his own virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions:xxv.), from this
                                                                            ] contentment [
kind  of  knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXVIII.  Bk.XIV:1:1723; Bk.XIX:2905, 29931.

Proof.(28:1)  This  proposition  is  self-evident.   (2)  For whatsoever we

understand clearly and distinctly we understand either through itself, or
] something else [
through that which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are
                                                          ] related [
clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of know-
                                                                                            [ mutilated ]
ledge  (II:xl.Note.ii.)  cannot  follow  from  ideas  that  are fragmentary,

and  confused,  and  are  referred  to  knowledge of the first kind, but

must  follow  from  adequate  ideas,  or ideas of the second and third

kind  of  knowledge;  therefore (Def. of the Emotions:i.), the desire of

knowing  things  by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the

first, but from the second kind.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXIX.  Bk.XIV:2:263; Bk.XIX:158, 3046, 31126.

Proof.— (29:1)  In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of
its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined
by  time, and to that extent only, has it the power of conceiving things

in  relation  to time (V:xxi., II:xxvi.).  (2) But eternity cannot be explained

in  page 262  terms  of  duration (I:Def.viii. and explanation).  (29:3)  There-

fore  to  this  extent  the  mind has not the power of conceiving things
under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is            Durant:647 - eternity
of  the  nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity

(II:xliv.Coroll.ii.),  and  also  because  it  is of the nature of the mind to

conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V:xxiii.),

for  besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence

of mind (II:xiii.). (29:4)  Therefore  this power of conceiving things under

the  form  of  eternity  only  belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's

conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.

Note. (29:5) Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either
{ by reason }                                                                 { by intuition }
as  existing  in  relation  to  a given time and place, or as contained in
                                       Bk.XIB:249147; Bk.XIV:2:2921; Bk.XIX:21321.
G-D and following from the necessity of the Divine Nature. (6) Whatso-

ever  we  conceive  in  this  second  way as true or real, we conceive
               > aspect—E5:Dijn:259. <
under  the  form  of  eternity,  and  their ideas involve the eternal and              Durant:647144
                    ^ Bk.III:231.
infinite  essence  of  G-D,  as  we showed in II:xlv. & Note, which see.

Prop. XXX. Bk.III:258, 230; Bk.XVIII:367p30; Bk.XIX:3045.

Proof.— (30:1)  Eternity  is  the  very  essence  of G-D, in so far as this

involves necessary existence (I:Def.viii.). (30:2) Therefore  to conceive

things  under  the  form  of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as
they  are  conceived through the essence of G-D as real entities, or

in  so  far  as  they  involve  existence  through  the essence of G-D;

wherefore  our  mind,  in  so  far   as  it conceives itself and the body

under  the  form  of  eternity,  has  to that extent necessarily a know-

ledge of G-D, and knows, &c.  Q.E.D.

Prop. XXXI.  E5:Dijn:258; Bk.XIX:3047.


Proof.(31:1)  The mind does not conceive anything under the form of

eternity,  except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form           Analogyskin

of  eternity  (V:xxix.);  that  is,  except  in  so  far as it is eternal (V:xxi.,         Hampshire32:176

V:xxiii.);  therefore  (by the last Prop.),  in so far as it is eternal, it pos-

sesses the knowledge  page 263  of G-D,  which knowledge is necessar-

ily  adequate  (II:xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is cap-

able  of  knowing  everything  which  can  follow from this given know-

ledge  of  G-D  (II:xl.),  in  other  words, of knowing things by the third
   Bk.XVIII:369p31d, 3735p31d.
kind  of  knowledge (see Def. in II:xl.Note.ii.), whereof accordingly the

mind  (III:Def.i.),  in  so  far  as  it  is eternal, is the adequate or formal

cause of such knowledge.  Q.E.D.

                                                                                       ] advanced [
Note. (31:2)  In  proportion,  therefore,  as a man is more potent in this
{ third }                                                                    Bk.III:232.
kind  of  knowledge,  he will be more completely conscious of himself
 Bk.XVIII:36831s, 371p31s.
and  of  G-D;  in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as
                                                            < following propositions >
will  appear  more clearly in the sequel. (31:3) But we must here observe

that,  although  we  are  already certain that the mind is eternal, in so
far  as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that              Durant:647146
                                                                    ] intelligible [
what  we  wish  to  show  may  be  more  readily explained and better

understood,  we  will  consider  the  mind  itself,  as though it had just
begun  to  exist  and  to  understand things under the form of eternity,

as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger

of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless
    Bk.XVIII:363p31s.  ] clear [
our premises are plain.

Prop. XXXII Bk.III:231; Bk.XIB:22379; Bk.XVIII:370p32-p36,c; Bk.XIX:30918. 

Proof.(32:1) From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible
    [ satisfaction of mind ]                               { better °PcM }                                    E5:Parkinson:285175
mental acquiescence, that is (III:De.xxv.), pleasure, and this acquies-

cence  is  accompanied  by  the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and
consequently  (V:xxx.)  the  idea  also  of  G-D  as  cause.   Q.E.D.

                                            { E5:LXII(1):270. }  5P36, 42.
Corollary.(32:2)  From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises
 { E5:XXXVI(1):265.} Bk.XIV:2:302, 2:3074; Bk.XVIII:369, 370p32c.             [ by 5P32 ]
the  intellectual  love of G-D. (32:3)  From this kind of knowledge arises                Langer
better °PcM }                           Bk.XIB:8560; Bk.XIX:3059.
pleasure  accompanied  by the idea of G-D as cause, that is (Def. of          E5:Parkinson:285175
                                                                                      { fiction }
the Emotions:vi.), the love of G-D; not in so far as we imagine him as

present  (V:xxix.),  but  in  so  far as we understand him to be eternal;
                          EL:Endnote xxix:1 , Bk.XII:282; Bk.XIA:143120, 121.
this is what I call the intellectual love of G-D.                                                           Isaac Bashevis Singer
                             < E5:Parkinson:284173 >  5P35.

Prop. XXXIII.  Bk.XVIII:363p33,s. 

Proof.— (33:1)  The third  kind  of  knowledge is eternal (V:xxxi., I:Ax.iii.);

therefore  (by  the  same  Axiom)  the  page 264  love which arises there-

from is also necessarily eternal.  Q.E.D.

Note. (33:2)  Although  this  love  towards  G-D has (by the foregoing

Prop.)  no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just
                                                ] supposed [
as  though  it  had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop.
(33:3)  Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind possesses
                                 Bk.XVIII:363p33s.           [ , in our fiction, now come to it,  ]
as  eternal  those same perfections which  we feigned to accrue to it,
                                                                                     ^ Bk.XIX:30816.
and  they  are  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  G-D  as eternal cause.
         { better °PcM }; Bk.XIX:30817.                                                                                           E5:Parkinson:285175
(33:4)   If  pleasure  consists  in  the  transition  to  a  greater  perfection,

assuredly  blessedness  must  consist  in  the  mind  being  endowed
     { Calculus:6.2b & c }
with  perfection  itself.

Prop. XXXIV.   Bk.XIX:2024, 31530.

Proof.— (34:1) Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates
thing  as  present  (II:xvii.Note);  yet  this  idea  indicates  rather the

present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external

thing (II:xvi.Coroll.ii.). (34:2) Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emo-

tions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of

the  body;  therefore  (V:xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,               Durant:647141 
              { E5:Endnote 18:3 }
subject  to  emotions  which  are  attributable  to  passions.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.(34:3) Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is


                                                        ] common belief [
Note.(34:4)  If  we  look  to  men's  general opinion, we shall see that

they  are  indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they

confuse  eternity  with  duration,  and  ascribe it to the imagination or              Durant:647143
  Bk.XIV:2:843.                               ] continue [
the memory which they believe to remain after death.

Prop. XXXV.  Bk.III:207; Bk.XVIII:1305p22,352p5. 

Proof.— (35:1)  G-D  is  absolutely  infinite  (,  that  is (,
               { sive, E5:Endnote 18:1 }
the  Nature of G-D rejoices in infinite perfection, {Calc:Fig.3}; and such

rejoicing is (II:iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I:xi. and

I:Def.i.),  the  idea  of  his  own  cause:  now  this is what we have (in

V:xxxii.Coroll.) described as intellectual love.

Prop. XXXVI.  Bk.XIB:21863, 22276, 22379; Bk.XIX:30919. 

                                                                       ] related [
Proof. (36:1) This  love  of  the mind must be referred to the activities

of  the  mind  (V:xxxii.Coroll.  and  III:iii.);  it is itself, indeed, an activity
                                                                                       E5:Dijn:257- 8.
whereby  the  mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of G-D as              E5:Dijn:257- 8

cause  (V:xxxii.  &  Coroll.);  that  is  (I:xxv.Coroll. and  II:xi.Coroll.), an

activity  whereby  G-D,  in  so far as he can be explained through the

human  mind,  regards  himself  accompanied  by  the idea of himself;
therefore  (by  the  last Prop.),  this  love  of  the  mind  is  part of the

infinite love wherewith G-D loves himself. Q.E.D.

Corollary.  (36:2)  Hence  it  follows  that  G-D,  in  so  far as he loves
 {Analogy} Bk.XIV:2:310.        Bk.XIX:30919.             Bk.XVIII:371p36cs.
himself,  loves man, and, consequently, that the love of G-D towards

men,  and  the intellectual love of the mind towards G-D are identical.

 Bk.XIX:29623, 3045
Note.(36:3) From what has been said we clearly understand, where-
           Bk.III:260.      { E5:XLII(1):270} 5P42
in our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the
                                          Bk.XIX:30920.                    { E5:Endnote 18:1 }
constant  and  eternal  love towards G-D,  or  in  G-D's love towards

                           E5:Wolfson:2:3112   Bk.XIV:2:3252, E5:Wolson:2:3114,5Isaiah 6:3
men.  (36:4) This  love  or  blessedness  is,  in  the  Bible,  called  Glory
                                      [ Bk.VIII:61217Bk.XIV:2:311-317Psalms 16:9, 73:24 ^ ]
                                                                  Bk.XIV:2:313{ HirPs: 16:8-11 }; Bk.XIB:233.

and not undeservedly. (36:5) For whether this love be referred to G-D or

                                                  [ satisfaction of mind < contentment of mind >
to  the  mind,  it  may  rightly  be called  acquiescence of spirit, which           Need for Religion
176E3:XXX(3)N:150, E5:XXVII:261, E4:LII & (4)N:222. >

     Bk.XIV:2:316.                                                    E5:Dijn:257- 8
(De.xxv. and  xxx.) is not really distinguished from glory (36:6)  In so far

                                                        { better °PcM }   { E5:Endnote 18:1, C:4.4 }
as it is referred to G-D, it is (V:xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that           E5:Parkinson:285175
                                                                    [ E5:XVII:255, E5:XXXIII(2)N: 264 ]

term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred

to the mind, it is the same (V:xxvii.).

(36:7)  Again,  since  the  essence  of  our  mind consists solely in know-
                                                                    { Posit }
ledge,  whereof  the  beginning  and  the  foundation  is  G-D (I:xv., &

II:xlvii.Note),  it  becomes  clear  to  us,  in  what manner and way our
                                                                                       Bk.XIV:2:563, 3246,
mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from the Divine Nature
                                  < E5:Parkinson:285177 >
and  constantly  depends  on  G-D. (36:8)  I have thought it worth while
                                ^ EL:Dijn:260Clay in the hands of the potter.
here  to  call  attention  to  this, in order to show by this example how

the  knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of

the  third  kind  (II:xl.Note.ii.),  is  potent,  and more powerful than the
    Bk.XIV:2:1252, 2:1505; Bk.XVIII:3655p36cs; Bk.XIX:3031.
universal  knowledge,  which  I have styled knowledge of the second

kind(36:9)   For,  although in Part I  page 266  I showed  in  general terms,

that  all  things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as

to  their  essence  and  existence  on  G-D,   yet  that  demonstration,

though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not

affect  our  mind  so  much,  as when the same conclusion is derived
                singularBk.III:220                           { pantheism }
from  the  actual  essence  of  some  particular  thing,  which  we say
depends on G-D.


Proof.— (37:1) This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature
                                                                                                                              { sive }
of  the  mind,  insofar  as  the latter is regarded through the Nature of

G-D  as  an eternal truth (V:xxxiii. and V:xxix.).  (37:2) If, therefore, there

should  be  anything  which  would be contrary to this love, that thing
would  be  contrary  to  that  which  is true; consequently, that, which
]                could destroy               [
should  be  able  to  take  away  this  love, would cause that which is
true to be false; an obvious absurdity. (37:3) Therefore there is nothing

in Nature which, &c.  Q.E.D.

Note. (37:4)  The  Axiom of Part IV.  has reference to particular things,
in  so  far  as  they  are regarded in relation to a given time and place:

of this, I think, no one can doubt.  Bk.XIX:24218, 3032.

Prop. XXXVIII. Bk.XIB:22276, 22379; Bk.XIV:2:263; Bk.XVIII:369p38; Bk.XIX:40036; Bk.XX:24395. 

Proof.(38:1)  The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II:xi.); there-

fore,   in  proportion  as  the mind  understands  more  things  by  the

second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it                 Bk.XIV:2:319
        ] survives [
that  endures  (V:xxix.  and  V:xxiii.),  and,  consequently  (by  the last
               ^ remainsBk.XIV:2:319.
Prop.),  the  greater  will  be  the  part  that is not touched by the emo-
                                                                                          ] bad [
tions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil (IV:xxx.).

(38:2)  Thus,  in  proportion as the mind understands more things by the
         Bk.XIX:40035.                                                                Bk.XIX:31121.
second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it,
                       < unhurt >
that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions,

&c.  Q.E.D.

Note. (38:3)  Hence  we  understand  that  point which I touched on in

IV:xxxix.Note,  and  which  I  promised  to  explain in this Part; namely,
                                     { fearsome }
that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and

distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the

mind loves G-D  page 267   more.  (38:4)   Again, since from the third kind of
                                                                                 < contentment >
knowledge  arises  the  highest possible acquiescence (V:xxvii.), it fol-             E5:Dijn:257- 8.
lows  that  the  human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that

the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body (V:xxi.)
should  be  of  little  importance  when  compared with the part which
 ] survives [
endures.   (38:5)  But  I  will  soon  treat  of  the subject at greater length.

Prop. XXXIX.

Proof.— (39:1)  He,  who  possesses  a  body  capable  of  the  greatest
                                                 ] assailed [
number  of  activities,  is  least  agitated by those emotions which are

evil (IV:xxxviii.) that is (IV:xxx.),  by those emotions which are contrary
                                                                            ] capacity [    [ ordering ]
to  our nature;  therefore (V:x.), he possesses the power of arranging
        [ connecting ]           [ affections ]
and  associating  the  modifications of the body according to the intel-
 Bk.XVIII:362p39d.                          [ by 5P14 ]
lectual  order,  and,  consequently,  of  bringing  it  about,  that all the
                                                               ] related [
modifications  of  the  body  should  be  referred  to  the  idea of G-D;

whence  it  will  come to pass that (V:xv.) he will be affected with love

towards  G-D,  which  (V:xvi) must occupy or constitute the chief part

of  the  mind;  therefore  (V:xxxiii.),  such  a  man  will possess a mind

whereof the chief part is eternal.  Q.E.D.

Note.(39:2)  Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number

of  activities,  there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature,
                             ] related [
that  they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of

themselves  and  of  G-D,  and  whereof  the  greatest or chief part is

eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely fear death (39:3) But,

in  order that this may be understood more clearly, we must here call
to  mind,  that we live in a state of perpetual variation, and, according

as  we  are  changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy

or unhappy.

(39:4)  For  he,  who,  from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse,
              ] unfortunate [                                         ] good fortune [
is  called  unhappy;  whereas  it  is set down to happiness, if we have

been  able  to  live through the whole period of life with a sound mind

in  a  sound  body.  (39:5)  And,  in  reality, he, who, as in the case of an
infant  or  a  child,  has  a  body  capable  of  very  few activities, and
depending,  for  the  most part on external causes, has a mind which,

considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself, or of   page 268

G-D, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of very many

activities,  has  a  mind  which,  considered  in  itself  alone,  is  highly

conscious  of  itself,  of  G-D,  and of things.  (39:6) In this life, therefore,
                                                                                                { or man }
we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child ^ , in                 Software

so  far  as  its  nature  allows and conduces thereto, may be changed

into something else,  capable of very many activities, and referable to

a  mind  which  is highly conscious of itself, of G-D, and of things; and

we  desire  so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and
memory  may  become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as

I  have  already  said  in  the  note  to  the  last  Proposition.

Prop. XL. 


Proof.— (40:1) In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses

more  of reality (, and, consequently (III:iii. and  Note), it is to

that  extent more active and less passive. (2) This demonstration may

be  reversed,  and  thus  prove  that,  in proportion as a thing is more
active, so is it more perfect. Q.E.D.

                                                                E5:Dijn:259; Bk.XIX:31122.
Corollary.(40:3)  Hence  it  follows that the part of the mind which en-
dures,  be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.  (40:4) For the
 Bk.XIV:2:3245; Bk.XVIII:369p40c3p3.                                          ] intellect [
eternal   part   of  the  mind   (V:xxiii. and V:xxix.) is the understanding,

through  which  alone  we  are  said  to  act  (III:iii.); the part which we
have  shown  to  perish is the imagination (V:xxi.), through which only
we  are  said  to  be  passive (III:iii. and general Def. of the Emotions);
                                    [ by 5P40 ]
therefore,  the  former,  be  it  great  or small, is more  perfect than the

latter.  Q.E.D.   Bk.XIB:22276.

Note.(40:5)  Such  are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth
                                                           ] considered without reference [
concerning  the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the
] existence of the [
^ body; whence, as also from I:xxi and other places, it is plain that our

mind,  in  so  far  as  it  understands,  is  an  eternal mode of thinking,
which  is  determined  by  another  eternal  mode of thinking, and this

other  by  a  third,  and  so  on  to infinity; so that all taken together at
] the same time [              Bk.XIV:2:564, 3245; Bk.III:203, 204; E5:Dijn:258.
once   constitute  the  eternal  and  infinite  intellect  of  G-D.
                                               < Bk.XV:285178Bk.XV:26633 on E1:XXI:63,
                                                           Bk.XV:26530 on E1:XVII(18)N:61. >

Third Section - 5P41-42
Prop. XLI Bk.XIB:227, 255; Bk.XII:282, 3051; Bk.XIV:2:262. 

Proof.— (41:1) The first and only, foundation of virtue, or the rule of right
                                                                                                   { self- }
living  is  (IV:xxii.Coroll.  and  IV:xxiv.)  seeking  one's own true interest
                { when }
(41:2)  Now,  while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we
         Bk.XIX:30610.                 < Bk.XV:285179 >
took no account of the mind's eternity, which has only become known
to  us  in  this  Fifth  Part(41:3)  Although we were ignorant at that time
that  the  mind  is  eternal,  we nevertheless  stated  that the qualities

attributable  to  courage  and  high-mindedness are of primary import-

ance.  (41:4) Therefore,  even  if  we  were  still ignorant of this doctrine,

we  should  yet  put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.


                                                                      [ E5:Curley:61520 ]
                           ] common [                  < vulgar Bk.XII:306; Bk.XVIII:316p41s.
Note.— (41:5)  The  general belief of the multitude seems to be different.  
^ creed—Bk.XIV:2:326.
(41:6)  Most  people  seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they
  ] indulge [ Bk.XVIII:3265p41s.
obey  their  lusts,  and  that  they  cede  their  rights,  in so far as they
are  bound  to  live according to the commandments of the Divine law.         Wolfson:2:326-329
(41:7)  They  therefore  believe  that  piety, religion,  and,  generally,  all
                                                                                  Bk.XIV:2:326—last line.
things  attributable  to  firmness  of  mind,  are  burdens,  which,  after

death,  they  hope  to  lay  aside,  and  to  receive the reward for their
] servitude [
bondage,  that  is,  for  their  piety,  and  religion;  it is not only by this
                                                                    ] incurring dreadful punishment [
hope,  but  also,  and  chiefly,  by  the fear of being horribly punished

after  death,  that  they  are  induced  to  live  according  to the Divine
                                                              < weak-minded >
commandments,  so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them.

(41:8) If  men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind

perishes  with  the  body,  and that no hope of prolonged life remains

for  the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they
                                                                ] deciding to shape [
would   return   to   their  own  inclinations,  controlling  everything  in

accordance  with  their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than

themselves.   (41:9)  Such  a course appears to me not less absurd than

if  a  man,  because  he  does  not believe that he can by wholesome
                                                                                 ] glut [
food  sustain  his  body  for  ever,  should  wish  to  cram himself with

poisons  and  deadly  fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not
eternal  or  immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether,
                                                                               ] such attitudes [
and  to   page 270   live  without  the  use  of  reason;  these ideas are so
absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.

Prop. XLII. E5:Dijn:26113 on Bk.III:24713; Bk.XIA:141105; Bk.XII:306;
                                Bk.XVIII:371p42,dp31s,p33s, E4:App.4.

Proof.  (42:1)  Blessedness consists in ^ love towards G-D  (V:xxxvi.
                                       ] arises [                     Bk.XIB:21250.
and  Note), which  love  springs  from  the  third  kind  of  knowledge
                                               [ Love ]                                       [ related ]
(V:xxxii.Coroll.);  therefore  this love (III:iii. and III:lix.) must be referred
          [ Mind ]
to  the mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore (IV:Def.viii.) it is

virtue  itself.  (42:2)  This  was  our  first  point.  (3) Again, in proportion as

the  mind  rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it

the more understand (V:xxxii.); that is (V:iii.Coroll.), so much the more
                                     [ affects ]
power  has  it over the emotions, and (V:xxxviii.) so much the less is it
                                                           ] bad [
subject  to  those  emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as

the  mind  rejoices  in  this  divine  love  or blessedness, so has it the
               ] checking [
power of controlling lusts.  (42:4) And, since human power in controlling
                     ^ Bk.XIV:2:3293.
the  emotions  consists  solely in the understanding, it follows that no

one  rejoices  in  blessedness,  because  he  has  controlled his lusts,

but,  contrariwise,  his  power  of  controlling his lusts arises from this

blessedness itself.  Q.E.D.

Note. (42:5) I  have  thus  completed all I wished to set forth touching
       [ Mind's ]                                  [ affects ]
the   mind's   power   over   the   emotions  and  the  mind's  freedom.
                                              [ capable ]
(42:6)  Whence  it  appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much
he  surpasses  the  ignorant  man,  who  is  driven  only  by  his lusts.
(42:7)  For  the  ignorant  man  is  not only distracted in various ways by
                                                                                        ]contentment[  [peace of mind]        Religion's Cash Value
external  causes  without  ever  gaining, the true acquiescence of his
                                                 if  unconscious   [
spirit,  but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of G-D,
                                                                  ] be passive Bk.XVIII:371p42s.
and  of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
                                                                               ] considered [
(42:8)  Whereas  the  wise  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is regarded as such,

is  scarcely  at  all  disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself,

and  of  G-D,  and  of things,  by  a  certain  eternal necessity, never
 { E5:Endnote 38:0 }           Bk.XIX:26117.                  < contentment of mind >
ceases  to  be,  but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.

             ] road [                                                                   ] goal [
(42:9) If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems
                                                                     ] found [
exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. (10) Needs must               Stewart[5]:178 

it  be  hard, since it is so seldom  page 271  found.  (42:11) How would it be

possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great

labour  be  found,  that  it  should  be  by  almost  all  men  neglected?
                                                     Bk.XIA:3764, E5:Smith:144125; Bk.XVIII:335.                   Stewart[6]:178
(42:12)  But  all  things  excellent  are  as  difficult  as  they  are  rare.                       E5:Feuer:258
                       Sed omnia praeclara tam difficilia, quam rara sunt.
       Wienpahl:256- very clear
^ {and distinct} 

End of Book V of V.


E5:Ending - From Frederick Pollock's Bk.XII:307—As difficult as they are rare.

E5:Ending - Steven B. Smith's Bk.XIA:144125—As difficult as they are rare.

E5:Ending - Feuer's Bk.XIB:258—As difficult as they are rare.

From Bk.XIV:2:329Wolfson's Ending.  EL:Feuer:11651—As difficult as they are rare.

                                                                { Spinoza's Daring }
From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:331.What is New in Spinoza?                       Susanne K. Langer

From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:xxvi.—Summary of what is New in Spinoza.                      Mark  Twain

From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:347-9—Possible Fifth Daring.

 From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:350-352What is New in Spinoza? Continued.

Continued with addition made in the 1983 reprint of Bk.XIV; ISBN: 0674665953: Pgs. 352-355.

From Richard Dawkins's The Ancestor's Tale; 0618005838, 2004—in G-D/Nature.

What is New in Spinoza? Added to G-D by JBY. 

From Susanne K. Langer's "Philosophy in a New Key", Page 84 - What is new in Spinoza.

Lord Russell holds a very similar view of other people's metaphysics:

"I  do  not deny," he says, "the importance or value, within its own sphere, of the kind of  philosophy  which  is  inspired  by ethical notions. The ethical work of Spinoza, for instance, appears to me of the very highest significance, but what is valuable in such a  work  is  not  any metaphysical theory as to the nature of the world to which it may give  rise, nor indeed anything that can be proved or disproved by argument. What is valuable  is  the  {cash value}  indication of some new way of feeling toward life and the world,  some  way  of  feeling  by  which  our  own  existence can acquire more of the characteristics which we must deeply desire."

E5:Endnote Part 5 Title—From Pollock's Bk.XII:2801 - Power of the  understanding

E5:Sub-Title. - From De Dijn's Book III:253On Human Freedom.

E5:Sub-Title. - From Deleuze's Book XIX:130—Of the Power of Understanding
                                                                               or of Human Freedom.

E5:Endnote N.11. - From Wolfson's Book XIV:2:262

E5:Endnote Prf:10 - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:283note162Free-will.

E5:Endnote 3:0 -From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:269—Not a Free Cause. 

E5:Endnote 4:5 - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:268—True Thoughts.                            True Idea

E5:Endnote Prop.10 - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:272—Fire of Our Reason.            Dictates of Reason

E5:Endnote 10:5 - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:283167Right Way of Living 

E5:Endnote Prop.11 - From Frederick Pollock's Bk.XII:286Idea and Love of G-D. 

E5:Endnote 18:1—Apparent Contradiction and Weak Analogy.  

E5:Endnote 18:3—Loss of an Arm and Peace-of-Mind 
  {suffering, loss of PcM}
        The physical pain certainly persists; the mental pain can be mitigated if
        the  mind  is  occupied with the understanding of why or by acceptance.

E5:Endnote 20:18 -From Bk.XV:283169Parkinson on Duration of the Mind.
                                                                 Pollock, Wolfson, De Dijn, Curley.
                                                                 EL:[60]:xxix; E5:XX(20):259.

E5:Endnote 20:18 -From "Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy"; Cambridge Univ. Press;
        ISBN: 052148328X; Page 762—Duration of the Mind.

E5:Endnote 20:20 - From Will Durant's "Story of Philosophy"; Washington Square Press;
                              18th Printing; 1965; Page 500—Santayana on Duration of the Mind.

E5:Endnote 20:20 - From Bk.VIII:60613Curley on Duration of the Mind.
Wolfson, De Dijn, Parkinson.
                                                                 EL:[60]:xxix; E5:XX(20):259.  

E5:Endnote 20:20From William Safire and Leonard Safir's Words of Wisdom;
                                0671695878, pg. 170

E5:Endnote 21 - From Bk.III:258De Dijn on Eternity of the Mind.                            Damasio:216
                                                      Pollock, Wolfson, Curley, Parkinson.
                                                       EL:[60]:xxix; E5:XX(20):259; Bk.XIB:225; Bk.XIB:22582.  

Continue with this from The Quotable Einstein, 0691026963; 1996; Page 148: 

From Daniel C. Dennett's Darwin's Dangerous Idea 1995; 068482471X; p. 520. 

E5:Endnote Prop. 21 - From Will and Ariel Durant's "The Story of Civilization: Part VIII ", Chapter XXII - Spinoza. ISBN: 0671012150, 1963, Pages 647-650.  

{I have changed Durant's spelling of God in accordance with Note 4.}
Continued from E4:Endnote Prop. 7. 

E5:Endnote 23:2 - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:284170Duration of the Mind continued.

                                     Cont. from Bk.VIII:60613
E5:Endnote 23:6 - From Bk.VIII:60814Curley on Duration of the Mind. cont.
                                                               Pollock, Wolfson, De Dijn, Parkinson.
                                                               EL:[60]:xxix; E5:XX(20):259; Bk.XIB:22582.

E5:Endnote Einstein Time—From Clark's Book XVI:136.

E5:Endnote P24 - From Bk.XIB:11041.Schechinah {Indwelling}. 

E5:MediaTimeFrom Marshall McLuhan, "Understanding Media",
                                         ISDN: 0262631598; Page 147.  

Hawking—From Hawking's Book XVII:144.—Time   Bk.XIV:1:331.

                                                     Bk.XIV:1:262-295; Bk.XIII:10163.
E5:Bk.I:317  E5:L29(12)—Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

Taken with kind permission from Terry M. Neff - Letter 29:317
Letter (12):101 Spinoza to L. M. (Lewis Meyer).  Bk.XIV:1:2641; Bk.XIII:10163.

[Printed in the O.P.  The original is lost, but a copy made by Leibnitz
has been preserved.]

[Spinoza answers question on the infinite and in answering briefly
explains the terms substance, mode, eternity, and duration.]

                   ( On the Nature of the Infinite )
                     { Abraham Wolf, ISDN: 0714615730; Page 115. }

[L29:1] Dearest Friend,I  have  received  two  letters  from you, one dated
                                                  ] Bk.XIII:10163 [
Jan. 11,  delivered to me by our friend, N. N., the other dated March 26,

sent  by  some  unknown  friend  to  Leyden.  They were both most wel-

come  to  me, especially as I gathered from them, that all goes well with

you, and that you are often mindful of me.  I also owe and repay you the
                                        ] kindness [             ] courtesy [
warmest  thanks  for  the  courtesy  and  consideration,  with  which you

have  always  been kind enough to treat me: I hope you will believe, that

I  am  in  no  less degree devoted to you, as, when occasion offers, I will

always  endeavour  to  prove, as far as my poor powers will admit.  As a

first  proof,  I  will  do  my  best  to answer the questions you ask in your
                                                       ] my considered views on the question of the [
letters.  You  request  me  to tell you, what I think about the infinite; I will
    ] gladly oblige. [
most readily do so.

[L29:2]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

Everyone  regards  the  question  of  the  infinite  as  most difficult, if not
                        ] failure in [
insoluble, through ^ not making a distinction between that which must be
                                   { See Includes: Items without degree sign. }
infinite  from  its  very  Nature, or in virtue of its definition, and that which          G-D sive Nature
                           { See Includes: Items with degree sign.  See
Reality, Modes. }
has  no  limits,  not in virtue of its essence, but in virtue of its cause; and
                                                           Bk.XIV:2812,2841. ^                   { ^ analysis }
also  through  not  distinguishing  between  that  which  is  called infinite,
                                                                             Bk.XIX:2025; ]equated with [
because it has no limits, and that, of which the parts cannot be equalled
                                                              Bk.XIV:1:2911—maximum and minimum
or  expressed by  any number, though the greatest and least magnitude

of  the  whole  may  be  known;  and,  lastly,  through  not distinguishing
                                                   ] apprehended only by the intellect [
between  that,  which  can  be  understood  but  not  imagined,  and that
which  can  also  be  imagined.  If  these distinctions, I repeat, had been

attended  to,  inquirers  would  not have been overwhelmed with such a

vast  crowd  of  difficulties.  They  would  then  clearly have understood,
                                                                  Bk.XIV:1:2852; Bk.XIX:2037.
what  kind  of  infinite  is  indivisible  and  possesses no parts; and what             Disclaimer

kind,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  divided  without  involving a contra-

diction  in  terms.  They  would  further  have  understood,  what kind of
                                     ] illogicality [
infinite   may,   without   solecism,  be  conceived  greater  than  another
infinite,  and  what  kind  cannot  be  so  conceived.  All  this  will  plainly

appear from what I am about to say.

[L29:3]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

However,  I  will  first  briefly explain the terms substance, mode, eternity,
and duration. 

[L29:4]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

The  points  to  be  noted  concerning  substance  are  these: First, that

existence  appertains  to its essence; in other words, that solely from its

essence  and definition its existence follows.  This, if I remember rightly,
                                             ] in an earlier conversation [
I  have  already  proved to you by word of mouth, without the aid of any

other  propositions.  Secondly,  as  a  consequence  of  the  above, that

substance  is  not  manifold, but single: there cannot be two of the same
                                                                          ] E1:VIII:48 [
nature.  Thirdly, every substance must be conceived as infinite.

[L29:5]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."
           ] affections [
The  modifications  of  substance  I call mode.  Their definition, in so far

as it is not identical with that of substance, cannot involve any existence.

Hence, though they exist, we can conceive them as non-existent.  From

this  it  follows, that, when we are regarding only the essence of modes,

and not the order of the whole of Nature, we cannot conclude from their

present  existence,  that  they  will  exist or not exist in the future, or that

they  have  existed  or  not  existed  in  the past; whence it is abundantly

clear,  that we conceive the existence of substance as entirely different

from  the existence of modes. From this difference arises the distinction

between  eternity  and duration.  Duration is only applicable to the exist-

ence  of  modeseternity  is  applicable  to  the existence of substance,
                             ] enjoyment [
that  is,  the  infinite  faculty  of  existence or being (infinitum existendi sive
             Bk.I:3191; Bk.XIII:10265.
(invita Latinitate) essendi fruitionem).

[L29:6]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

From  what  has  been  said  it is quite clear that, when, as is most often

the  case,  we  are  regarding  only  the  essence  of modes and not the
                                   ] arbitrarily [
order of Nature, we may freely limit the existence and duration of modes          G-D sive Nature

without  destroying  the  conception  we  have  formed of them; we may

conceive   them   as   greater   or  less,  or  may  divide  them  into parts.

Eternity  and  substance,  being  only conceivable as infinite, cannot be           Disclaimer
                                                                                    ] annulled [

thus  treated  without  our  conception of them being destroyed.  Where-
                            ] nonsense [                 ] madness [
fore  it  is  mere  foolishness,  or  even  insanity,  to  say  that  extended
                                                                   { analogy }
substance is made up of parts or bodies really distinct from one another.         Mark Twain

It  is  as  though  one should attempt by the aggregation and addition of
                          ] construct [
many  circles  to make up a square, or a triangle, or something of totally
different  essence.  Wherefore  the  whole heap of arguments, by which

philosophers commonly endeavour to show that extended substance is
made up of parts—Bk.XIV:1:2661.
finite,  falls  to  the  ground  by  its  own  weight.  For  all  such  persons

suppose, that corporeal substance is made up of parts. In the same way,
                                                                           ] Bk.XIII:10366E1:XV(20)n:56 [
others, who have persuaded themselves that a line is made up of points,

have  been  able  to  discover many arguments to show that a line is not
infinitely  divisible.  If you ask, why we are by nature so prone to attempt
to  divide  extended  substance,  I  answer, that quantity is conceived by
                                          { mental constructions }                            ] Bk.VII:27 [
us  in  two ways,  namely,  by abstraction or superficially, as we imagine            Disclaimer

it  by  the  aid of the senses, or as substance, which can only be accom-
                                      ] intellect [
plished  through  the  understanding.  So that, if we regard quantity as it

exists  in  the  imagination  ( and  this  is  the  more  frequent  and  easy

method),  it  will  be found to be divisible, finite, composed of parts, and
{ of many kinds }
manifold.  But, if we regard it as it is in the understanding, and the thing

be  conceived  as  it  is  in  itself  (which  is  very  difficult),  it  will  then,

as   I   have   sufficiently   shown  you  before,  be  found  to  be  infinite,
{ no parts }       ] one alone. [
indivisible,  and  single.  { Cash Value = Organic. }

[L29:7] Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

Again,  from  the  fact  that we  can  limit  duration  and  quantity  at our
                                                              { by a mental construction }
pleasure,   when   we  conceive  the  latter  abstractedly  as  apart  from

substance,  and  separate  the former from the manner whereby it flows
{ immanently }                          { Einstein's time }
from  things eternal, there arise time and measure; time for the purpose

of  limiting duration, measure for the purpose of limiting quantity, so that
 { Bk.VII:27 }
we  may,  as  far as is possible, the more readily imagine them.  Further,
                                                            ] affections [
inasmuch   as   we   separate   the   modifications   of   substance  from

substance  itself, and reduce them to classes, so that we may, as far as

is   possible,   the   more  readily  imagine  them,  there  arises  number,
                                                                                                    { aids }
whereby  we  limit  them.  Whence it is clearly to be seen, that measure,
{ Einstein's time }; Bk.XIB:248145; Bk.XIX:3312.
time, and number, are merely modes of thinking, or, rather, of imagining.
             ]        surprising         [
It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that all, who have endeavoured to
                        ] workings [                                          ] concepts [
understand  the course of Nature by means of such notions, and without          G-D sive Nature

fully    understanding    even   them,   have   entangled   themselves   so
] extraordinarily [
wondrously,  that  they  have  at  last  only  been  able  to extricate them-

selves by breaking through every rule and admitting absurdities even of

the  grossest  kind.  For  there  are  many  things  which  cannot be con-

ceived  through  the imagination but only through the understanding, for
                                                       { Sham }
instance,  substance,  eternity,  and  the  like;  thus,  if  anyone  tries  to

explain such things by means of conceptions which are mere aids to the
          Bk.I:3201Mr. Pollock paraphrases:
                                   "It is like applying the intellectual test of sanity and insanity to acts of pure imagination."
imagination,  he is simply assisting his imagination to run away with him.

Nor  can  even  the  modes  of  substance  ever  be  rightly  understood,
                                ] mental constructs [
if  we confuse them with entities of the kind mentioned, mere aids of the

reason  or  imagination.   In so doing we separate them from substance,
               ]   manner  of  their  efflux    [
and  the  mode  of their derivation from eternity, without which they can

never  be  rightly  understood.  To make the matter yet more clear, take
                                                                                { by a mental construction }
the  following  example: when a man conceives of duration abstractedly,

and, confusing it with time, begins to divide it into parts, he will never be

able  to understand how an hour, for instance, can elapse.  For in order

that  an  hour  should  elapse,  it is necessary that its half should elapse

first,  and  afterwards half of the remainder, and again half of the half of

the  remainder,  and  if  you go on thus to infinite, subtracting the half of

the  residue,  you  will  never  be  able  to  arrive  at the end of the hour.
                                                                                   ] mental constructions [
Wherefore  many,  who  are not accustomed to distinguish abstractions
      ] real things [
from  realities,  have  ventured  to  assert  that  duration  is  made  up of
] moments [                                Bk.XIX:20510.
instants,  and  so  in  wishing  to avoid Charybdis have fallen into Scylla.
                                                                          ] moments [
It  is  the same thing to make up duration out of instants, as it is to make

number simply by adding up noughts.

[L29:8]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."
                            ] obvious [
Further,  as  it  is  evident from what has been said, that neither number,

nor  measure,  nor  time,  being  mere  aids  to  the  imagination, can be

infinite (for,  otherwise,  number  would  not  be  number,  nor  measure

measure,  nor time time); it is hence abundantly evident, why many who
                          ] concepts, mental constructions [
confuse  these  three  abstractions with realities, through being ignorant
                                         ] reality [
of   the   true   nature   of   things,   have   actually   denied   the  infinite.

[L29:9]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."
       ] deplorableness [
The wretchedness of their reasoning may be judged by mathematicians,

who  have  never  allowed  themselves to be delayed a moment by argu-

ments  of this sort, in the case of things which they clearly and distinctly

perceive.   For  not  only  have  they  come  across  many  things, which

cannot  be  expressed  by  number  (thus  showing  the  inadequacy  of

number  for  determining  all  things);  but  also  they  have  found many

things,  which  cannot  be  equalled  by  any number, but surpass every

possible   number.    But  they  infer  hence,  that  such  things  surpass

enumeration,  not  because  of  the  multitude  of their component parts,

but  because  their  nature  cannot,  without  manifest  contradiction,  be

expressed  in  terms  of  number.  As,  for  instance,  in  the  case of two
        ] AB & CDBk.XIII:105, Pgs. 120 & 396 [; Bk.XIX:2049E2:VIII(4)n:49.                                     Hegel - scroll
circles,  non-concentric,  whereof  one  encloses  the  other, no number           down about 30%
                                                                                                                               to sketch
can  express  the  inequalities  of  distance which exist between the two

circles,  nor  all  the  variations which matter in motion in the intervening

space may undergo. This conclusion is not based on the excessive size

of  the  intervening  space.   However  small  a  portion of it we take, the

inequalities  of  this  small  portion  will surpass all numerical expression.

Nor,  again,  is the conclusion based on the fact, as in other cases, that
                                            ] AB & CDBk.XIII:105 [
we  do  not  know  the  maximum  and  the  minimum  of  the said space.

It springs simply from the fact, that the nature of the space between two

non-concentric  circles  cannot  be  expressed in number. Therefore, he

who would assign a numerical equivalent for the inequalities in question,

would  be  bound,  at  the  same time, to bring about that a circle should
  ] Bk.XIII:10567 [
not be a circle.

[L29:10]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

The same result would take placeto return to my subjectif one were

to  wish  to  determine  all  the  motions  undergone  by  matter up to the

present,  by  reducing  them  and their duration to a certain number and

time.   This  would  be  the  same  as  an  attempt  to  deprive corporeal

substance,   which   we  cannot   conceive   except   as  existent,  of  its
  ] affections [
modifications,  and  to  bring about that it should not possess the nature            G-d sive nature

which   it   does   possess.   All  this  I  could  clearly  demonstrate  here,

together  with  many  other  points touched on in this letter, but I deem it
] unnecessary [

[L29:11]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

From  all  that has been said, it is abundantly evident that certain things

are  in their nature infinite, and can by no means be conceived as finite;

whereas there are other things, infinite in virtue of the cause from which
                                                                     ] by a mental construction [
they  are  derived,  which can, when conceived abstractedly, be divided

into  parts,  and  regarded  as  finite.   Lastly,  there are some which are

called  infinite  or,   if  you  prefer,  indefinite,  because  they  cannot  be
expressed  in  number,  which  may yet be conceived as greater or less.

It  does not follow that such are equal, because they are alike incapable

of  numerical  expression.  This is plain enough, from the example given,

and many others.

[L29:12]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

Lastly,  I  have  put briefly before you the causes of error and confusion,

which   have  arisen  concerning  the  question  of  the  infinite.   I  have,

if  I  mistake  not,  so  explained  them  that  no question concerning the

infinite  remains untreated, or cannot readily be solved from what I have

said;  wherefore, I do not think it worth while to detain you longer on the


[L29:13]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."
                                                                              ] our modern [
But  I  should  like  it first to be observed here, that the later Peripatetics

have, I think, misunderstood the proof given by the ancients who sought
                                      {     Neff      }
to  demonstrate  the  existence of G-D.  This, as I find it in a certain Jew
                ] Bk.XIII:10668 [
named  Rabbi  Ghasdai, runs  as follows:" If there be an infinite series
                         ^ Chasdai or Hasdai Crescas. { See Endnote E5:EL29 Crescas }
of  causes,  all  things  which  are,  are  caused.   But  nothing  which  is

caused can exist necessarily in virtue of its own nature Therefore there

is  nothing  in  Nature,  to whose essence existence necessarily belongs.
                                                     ] Bk.XIII:10769 [
But  this  is  absurd.  Therefore the premise is absurd also."   Hence the

force  of  the argument lies not in the impossibility of an actual infinite or

an  infinite  series of causes; but only in the absurdity of the assumption
                                                                                                 ] determined [
that  things,  which  do  not  necessarily  exist  by  nature, are not condi-

tioned   for   existence   by   a   thing,   which   does  by  its  own  nature

necessarily exist.

[L29:14]  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."

I  would  now pass on, for time presses, to your second letter: but I shall

be  able  more  conveniently  to  reply to its contents, when you are kind

enough  to pay me a visit.  I therefore beg that you will come as soon as
                                ] my moving [
possible; the time for travelling is at hand.  Enough.  Farewell, and keep

in remembrance Yours, &a.

Rhijnsburg, 20 April, 1663.

END of LETTER XXIX.  —  Famous "Letter on the Infinite."
Bk.XVIII:76—L70(81), Bk.1:407, Bk.XIII:352, 353, 355.

E5:L29 CrescasFrom Abraham Wolf, "The Correspondence of Spinoza",
                                         ISDN: 0714615730; Page 396.  ( Out of print. ) 

E5:Endnote 31:1Analogy-Worm. 

E5:Endnote 32:2c - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:284173Intellectual Love of G-D. 

E5:Endnote 33 - From Matthew Stewart's The Courtier and the Heretic 2006;
                               0393058980, p. 177—Knowledge and Intellectual Love of G-D:

E5:Endnote 35 - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:285175G-D Loves Himself.

E5:Endnote Preface 1:2 - From Deleuze's Bk.XIX:130a, Pg. 411Blessedness.          Bk.XX:171.

E5:Endnote 36 - From Matthew Stewart's The Courtier and the Heretic 2006;
                               0393058980, p. 177—Immortality.

E5:Endnote 36:3Glory.

Hebrewkaw-vode'; weight, splendor, glory, honor: Strong: 3519, 3513;
See Psalm 19:2—The heavens declare the glory of G-D, ....  

E5:Endnote 36:3n - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:285176Self-contentment.

E5:Endnote 36:4n - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:3112immortality.

   Read E2:Dijn:214 before reading the following. 

E5:Endnote 36:7 - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:285177Power of Intuition.

E5:Endnote 38:0 - From Clark's Book XVI:242—Unending Stream.

E5:Endnote 38:3n - From De Dijn's Bk.III:257-8Intellectual Love of G-D.       Isaac Bashevis Singer


E5:Endnote 41 - From G. H. R. Parkinson's Bk.XV:285179Life of Reason.

E5:Endnote 41:5 - From Curley's Bk.VIII:61520Multitude. 

E5:Endnote 41:5 - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:326-329—Revealed Religion. 

E5:Endnote 42 - Daniel C. Dennett's Breaking The Spell ; 2006; 067003472X; pp. 280-1
Mitchell Silver—Virtue and Receiving Award:

E5:Endnote 42 - From De Dijn's Bk.III:26113 on E4:Dijn:24713Blessedness.

E5:Endnote 42 - From Matthew Stewart's The Courtier and the Heretic 2006;
                           0393058980, p. 178—Immortality and Blessedness.

End of Endnotes for Part V of V.

Since November 6, 1997  Part V hits. 

Revised: September 8, 2006

 "A Dedication to Spinoza's Insights
The Ethics - Part 1 - Part II - Part III - Part IV - Part V